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If justice were immediate, there would never be an award of pre­
judgment interest. 1 The injured party would receive an enforceable judg­
ment immediately, witb. no loss in value from the time value of money. 
Because justice often takes many years to achieve, interest is added to the 
original judgment to ell$ure that compensation is complete. 2 These calcu­
lations are ubiquitous, s�nce the laws of most U.S. jurisdictions provide for 
interest on legal judgments from the time the claim arose until the date of 
judgment. 3 Such interest is called prejudgment interest." 
When the injury occurred long before the judgment, prejudgment in­
terest can equal or even exceed the principal. For example, in 1992 the 
Seventh Circuit awarded French plaintiffs $65 million in damages and $148 
million in prejudgment interest in a suit arising out of the grounding of the 
1 .  Interest is defined as •pa;yment for the use or foroearance of money, or as damages for its 
detention." Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177, 185 (1872). 
2. See Procter & Gamble Di-rib. Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1 924) . In his opinion, 
Learned Hand wrote: 
Whatever may have been our archaic notions about interest, in modem financial 
communities a dollar to-dlly is worth more than a dollar next year, and to ignore the 
interval as immaterial is to contradict well-settled beliefs about value. The present use of 
my money is itself a thing of value, and, if I get no compensation for its loss, my remedy 
does not altogether right my wrong. 
Id. at 166. 
3 .  See 1amea D. WJ.!son et al., Prejudgment Interest in Personmlnjury, WrongfUl Death and Other 
A.cdons, 30 TRIAL LAW. OUlDB lOS, 1 14-17, 136-94 (1986) (surveying the law on prejudgment interest 
and noting that at least 32 stites 'ermitted or required payment of prejudgment interest on personal 
injury or wrongful death actions i� 1986, while molt ststea that did not allow prejudgment interest on 
such claims nonetheless allowed it for pecuniary losses). 
· 
4. See 1 DAN B. DoBBS, DoSBS LAW OF RBMBDIBS: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RBsTlTUTION f 3 .6(1), 
at 335 (2d ed. 1993). 
I I  
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supertanker, Amoco Cadiz, off the coast of Brittany in 1978.5 Even when 
the legal resolution occurs quickly, the interest can be large when the 
judgment is large, especially when interest rates are high. Moreover, 
because of the effect of compounding, even small differences in interest 
rates can have large effects on the final award. For example, in Amoco 
Cadiz, a one percent difference in the interest rate (100 basis points) would 
have changed the final award by $20 million. 6 For these reasons, the 
methods courts use to calculate prejudgment interest are of much practical 
significance. 
The calculation of pr�judgment interest is also of theoretical impor­
tance. Prejudgment interest plays an �portant role in promoting fairness 
and efficiency. Fairness generally requires that the successful plaintiff be 
fully compensated for its losses and that the defendant pay this amount. 7 
5. See In re Oil Spill by the Alnoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 
1279, 1335 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) [hereinafter Amoco Cadiz]. The aupertanker Amoco Cadiz 
broke apart off the coast of Brittany, spilling moat of ita load of 220,000 tons of oil into the sea. The 
wreck, one of the largest oil spills in history and more than six times the size of the Eaon Valdez spill, 
damaged nearly 200 miles of coast jmd took more than six months and 340 million French franca to 
clean up. Jd. at 1285; see Charles·McCoy, Alaska SpUI Found Less Damaging 7Jian Wa.r Feared, 
WALL ST. J., May'12, 1989, at A4 (stating that the.Eaon Valdez spilled 11 million gallons of oil); 
Amoco Corp., WALL ST. J., Jan. l7, 1992, at B4 (stating that the Amoco Cadiz spilled 68 million 
gallons of oil) . Using the exchang4 rate on January 4, 1992 (0 . 18988), the date the Seventh Circuit 
isaued ita opinion, an award of 34() million francs is worth $64.593 million. See Exchange Rmes: 
Friday, January 3, 1992, WALL ST, J., Jan. 6, 1992, at C12; Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1330. The 
conversion of that award from francis into dollars is discussed in subpart VI(F), itifra. An additional 
$20 million plus interest was awarded to the owner of the cargo. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1330. 
The award for the lost cargo and the prejudgment interest on it are not discussed further in this Article. 
6. Throughout this Article, I will asaume an original judgment of $65 million, see supra text 
accompanying note 5; a prejudgme$t period of 10.6 years, see infra note 66 and accompanying text, 
and an interest rate of 1 1 .85�. see itifra note 61 and accompanying text. The multiplier (which 
represents the interest rate compounlled for 10.6 years), total award, and interest component, BBsuming 
interest rates of 10.85�, 1 1 .85�, and 12.85�, are given in the following table: 
Interest Rate ( ") MuUiplier Total Award Interest Component 
($ millions) ($ millions) 
10.85 2.9799 193 .692 128.692 
1 1.85 3.2775 213.037 148.037 
12.85 3 .6018 234.115 169.1 15 
Aa the above table indicates, a 1% reduction in the interest rate would have reduced the interest 
component of the award by $19 miliion, whereas a 1 % increase would have raised it by $21 million. 
These very large differences, around 14% of the interest component, stem from interest compounding, 
which is discussed in aubpart ll(A); itifra. 
7. See West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 (1987) ("Prejudgment interest ia an 
element of complete compensation • . . .  "); Buaik v.  Levine, 307 A.2d 571, 513 (N.J. 1973) ("[T]he 
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Because excess funds can be lent at interest and funds can be borrowed 
only by paying interest, unless interest is assessed on the original judgment 
the successful plaintiff is not fully compensated• and the losing defendant 
is unjustly enriched. 9 The payment of prejudgment interest, therefore, 
ensures that the plaintiff receives full compensation for its losses and that 
the defendant pays the full penalty, thereby putting both parties in the same 
position that they would have been in if the judgment had been paid 
immediately.10 
Prejudgment interest also has an efficiency rationale, promoting effi­
ciency in two ways. First, because prejudgment interest is an element of 
full compensation, it plays a role in ensuring that prospective parties have 
the appropriate incentives to take precautions when engaging in the same 
activity that produced the judgment. Efficiency generally requires that 
victims receive full compensatory damages and that injurers pay this 
amount.11 Accordingly, because compensation is incomplete without pre­
judgment interest, prospective defendants will be underdeterred and will 
take too few precautions, 12 whereas prospective plaintiffs will be over­
deterred and will take excessive precautions. Thus, prejudgment interest 
helps ensure that prospective parties undertake the efficient levels of 
precautions. 
defendant has had the use, and the plaintiff has not, of moneys which the judgment finds was the 
damage plaintiff suffered."). 
8. See General Motora Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1983) (stating that pre­
judgment interest is necessary to place the patent owner in its rightful position); Funkhouser v. 1.B. 
Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933) (stating that the plaintiff is "not fully compensated if he is 
confined to the amount found to be recoverable as of the time of breach," with nothing added for 
delay); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, I.) 
("The present use of my money is itself a thing of value, and, if I get no compensation for its loss, my 
remedy does not altogether right my wrong."). 
9. See Amoco CAdiz, 954 F.2d at 1332 ("An injurer allowed to keep the return on [the money 
owed to the plaintiff] has profited by the wrong."); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-American 
Corp., 155 F. Supp. 1314, 1328 (E.D.N.C. 1991) ("Awarding prejudgment interest in this case does 
not penalize defendants, but rathw puts each party in the same position it would now be in had the 
fraudulent transfer never occurred."). 
10. See In re Pago Pago Aircrash of Ian. 30, 1974, 525 F. Supp. 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1981). The 
court provided the following justification for awarding prejudgment interest: 
An individual who must litigate to recover damages should be placed in the same position, 
when he recovera, as the individual who recovered the day he suffered an iqjury. 
Otherwise, the tortfeasor benefits from denying liability and continuing to litigate, while 
he retsina the use of money to which the plaintiff is entitled, and the plaintiff is deprived 
of the benefit he should have derived from an immediate recovery. 
Jd. at 1014. 
ll. See RICHARD A. POSNBJt, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163-65 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that 
the tort system helps ensure efficient levels of precautionary measures). 
12. See lames A. Henderson, Jr., Product liability and the Passage of'Hme: 1M Imprisonment 
of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 765, 775-76 (1983) (contending that the failure to award 
prejudgment interest discourages manufacturers from modifying defective products). 
I I 
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Second, if there were no provision for prejudgment interest, defen­
dants would have a powerful incentive to stretch out litigation.13 
Delaying judgment would effectively provide the defendant with an interest 
free loan from the plaintiff until the judgment is rendered. Because the 
defendant could not otherwise borrow money without paying interest, the 
defendant would benefit at the plaintiff's expense by stretching out 
litigation. 14 With interest at a market rate, neither party would benefit 
from nor be injured by delay in this respect.15 Thus, awarding pre­
judgment interest reduces the defendant's incentive to delay judgment.16 
Nonetheless, the requirement that a losing defendant pay prejudgment 
interest to a successful plaintiff remains far from universal.17 Although 
a growing number of jurisdictions recognize a successful plaintiff's 
entitlement to prejudgment interest, 18 other jurisdictions expressly bar 
recovery.19 Still other courts and statutes leave it to the discretion of the 
court whether to provide prejudgment interest.20 Frequently, within a 
jurisdiction, the availability of prejudgment interest depends on the source 
of the claim and the nature of the injury. For example, in California a 
successful plaintiff whose claim is for a certain amount (liquidated) or an 
amount capable of being made certain by calculation (clearly ascertainable) 
is entitled to prejudgment interest. 21 In addition, a plaintiff whose 
damages are neither liquidated nor clearly ascertainable may be awarded 
13. See Wilson et al., supra note 3, at 1 10 ("The longer the delay, the longer defendantaor their 
[insurance] carrien are allowed to hold monies lonJ due plaintiffs and compound the interest earned 
on those monies."); Recent Development��-Prejudgment Interest D8 Damages: New Application of an 
Old Theory, 15 STAN. L. REV. 107, 1 1 1  (1962) [hereinafter Recent Developmentll] (arJUing in favor 
of prejudpent interest awards to •discouraJe defendant's use of 'the law'• delay' as an instrument of 
coercion"). 
14. See Henderson, supra note 12, at 775-76 (contending that the failure to require prejudJment 
interest discoura1es settlement offers). 
15. There are other incentives not to stretch out litiJation, most notably the leJal costs that are 
incurred. 
16. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Some 71aought11 on the Equilibrium Hypothesis, 69 B.U. 
L. REV. 561, 566 (1989). 
17. See Wilson et al., supra note 3, at 136-94 (surveying state and federal law on prejudgment 
interest). 
18. See Anthony B. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 192, 209 (1982). 
19. See id. at 199-200 (stating that a good example of •the traditional approach" is Dlinois, where 
the courts provide prejudpent interest only when expressly provided by contract or in one of the few 
situations expteBBly enumerated by statute). 
20. See id. at 204. This tripartite division in the treatment of prejudJmenl interest-allowed as 
a matter of right, left to the discretion of the court, or denied absolutely-has long existed. See Note, 
Development�� in the Law: Damagu-1935-47, 61 HAitv. L. RBv. 1 13, 136 (1947). 
21. See CAL. CIV. Coos § 3287(a) (West 1996) (•Every person who is entitled to recover 
damaJes certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is 
vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day . . . . "). 
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interest.22 Similarly, under federal law the availability of prejudgment 
interest appears. to depend not only on the relevant statute, but also often 
on the court in which the claim is filed. 23 
Commentators tr•ce the lingering reluctance of legislatures and courts 
to provide prevailing plaintiffs with prejudgment interest to an ancient 
hostility towards int$rest.24 Interest was long seen as a means of 
punishing an egregious defendant rather than compensating a successful 
plaintiff. 25 That view led to the common-law rule that prejudgment 
interest was allowed fQr liquidated claims, but not for unliquidated ones. 26 
The logic was that only defendants who could determine exactly what they 
owed could improperly withhold payment. 27 That distinction between 
liquidated and unliquid�ted damages bas been widely rejected; prejudgment 
interest is now widely considered necessary to ensure full compensation to 
the plaintiff and to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant.28 
22. See id. § 3287(b) ('"Byery per10n who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages 
based upon a cause of action in', contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest 
. . . •  "); id. § 3288 ("In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in 
every case of oppression, fraud or malice, interest may be given in the discretion of the jury."). The 
distinction between ascertainable and unascertainable damages has been rejected in many jurir.dictiona. 
See Funkhouserv. I.B. Preston ¢o., 290U.S. 163, 168 (1933) ("[A] distinction, in this respect, simply 
as between cases of liquidated a111d unliquidated damages, is not a sound one."); 1 DoBBS, supra note 
4, I 3. 6(2), at 341 ( pointing to courta' and legislatures' "liberalization" of the '"aacertainab le" standard 
as an implicit rejection of the li!J!itation). 
23. See Michael K. Brown1 The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Penonallnjury and 
Wrongful Death Cases, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 325,337 (1982) ('"The availability of prejudgment interest 
in peraonal injury or wrongful death actions brought under a federal statute depends upon the statute 
involved as well as upon the foru�n . . . .  "); I .A. Bock, Annotation, Recovery of Prejudgment Interest 
on Wrongful Death Damages, 96 A�.R.2d 1104, 1107 (1964) (stating that the allowance of pre­
judgment interest generally depends on both the federal statute and the forum); see also Alan R. 
Gilbert, Annotation, Award of Prejudgment Interest in Admiralty Suiu, 34 A.L.R. FBD. 126, 228-43 
(1977 ) (surveying the disagreement among courta as to the propriety of awarding prejudgment interest 
under various federal statutes for wrongful desth and personal injury causes of action in admiralty). 
24. See Martin Oyos, Note, Prejudgment Interest in South Dakota, 33 S.D. L. REV. 484, 485-88 
(1988) ( providing a historical overview of prejudgment interest from ancient times to the present); see 
also Iohn C . .Keir & Robin C. Ur, Opportunity Cost: A Measure of Prejudgment Interest, 39 Bus. 
LAW. 129, 131 (1983) (stating that the "ancient and medieval prejudices against the charging of 
interest" affect the current treatment of prejudgment interest). However, the recognition that pre­
judgment interest is a necessary part of restitution is ancient, even in cultures that otherwise prohibited 
interest. For example, primitive veraions of prejudgment interest were awarded when fruit or seeds 
were taken to be planted; the suceessful claimant received a share of the resulting increase. See 1 
FRITZ M. HBICHBLHBIM, AN ANClBNT EcoNOMIC HISTORY 104 (Joyce Stevens trans., 1958). 
25. See Rothschild, supra note 18, at 196. 
26. See Oyos, supra note 24, at 487; Rothschild, supra note 18, at 196. 
27. See Wilson et al., supra note 3, at 107; Robert I. Sergesketter, Comment, Interesting 
Inequities: Bringing Symmetry and Certainty to Prejudgment/merest Law in Te%as, 32 Hous. L. REV. 
231, 236 (1995). 
28 . See RecentDevelopment.s, supra note 13, at 107-10; H. Deane Wo���g, Comment, Prejudgment 
Interest: Too Little, Too Much, or Both?, 10 UCLA-Al.ASKA L. R.Bv. 219, 221-23 (1981) (declari���g 
that one rationale for awarding prejudgment interest "is [to compensate} the plaintiff's loss of the use 
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Accordingly, the trend is towards awarding prejudgment interest on all 
monetary awards. 29 
Nonetheless, there has been little movement to improve how pre­
judgment interest is calculated. 30 Fairness and efficiency do not merely 
require that prejudgment interest be assessed;31 they require that it be 
assessed correctly.32 Correctly calculating prejudgment interest requires 
the proper use of financial principles. 
In many jurisdictions, however, the correct calculation of prejudgment 
interest is prevented by a statute that requires the selection of an improper 
interest rate or the use of a conceptually wrong computational method. 33 
Even when a statute does not require an incorrect calculation, courts often 
do a poor job of calculating prejudgment interest, thereby undercutting the 
goals of fairness and efficiency. For example, some jurisdictions have 
adopted by common law the statutory, fixed postjudgment interest rate as 
the prejudgment interest rate34 or award simple interest. 3' 
In still other jurisdictions, trial court judges have wide discretion in 
setting an interest rate and calculating prejudgment interest. Under federal 
law, for example, courts have significant discretion in determining how 
of money that was. rightfully his• and that another rationale is to prevent the defendant's unjust 
enrichment). 
29. See Patrick C. Diamond, Note, The Minnesota Prejudgment Interest Amendment: An Analysis 
of the Offer-Counteroffer Provision, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (1985); Wong, supra note 28, at 
224-25. 
30. See infra note 47. 
31. A rule that prohibits the award of prejudgment interest, such as the common law rule that pre­
judgment interest is not recoverable on amounts that are neither liquidated nor ascertsinable by fixed 
standards, is both unfair and inefficient. See infra subpart VI(A). 
32. Aa the Seventh Circuit asked metorically in Amoco Cadiz, "[ W]hat is the point of computing 
the principal amount of damages in intricate detail if the judge may tum around and increase (or 
reduce) the value of that award by a factor of three on the basis of vague equitable concerns?• Amoco 
Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992). 
33. See infra subpart VI( G). 
34. Hawaii and Texas have each adopted their statutory, fixed, posgudgment rate as the pre­
judgment rate. See Wong, supra note 28, at 226 n.38 (citing Lucas v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 
461 P.2d 140, 144 (Haw. 1969)); Sergeaketter, supra note 27, at 250-53 (discussing Cavnar v. Quality 
Control Parking, Inc., 696 S. W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. 1985)). Texas, however, has recently adopted a 
modified version of the Treasury bill rate by statute. TBx:. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, 
U 2, 6(g) (Vernon Supp. 1997). 
35. See Big Bear Properties, Inc. v. Oherman, 157 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 
State v. Day, 173 P.2d 399, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (noting the general rule that interest may not 
be compounded unless statutory provisions provide otherwise or the parties have stipulated to an 
amount of compound interest that does not violate any statutory provision); see also Lsndals v. George 
A. Rolfes Co., 454 N. W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 1990); Shaeffer v. Kelton, 619 P.2d 1226, 1231 (N.M. 
1980); Papadopoulos v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 617 P.2d 931, 934 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); 
Spang & Co. v. USX Corp., 599 A.2d 978, 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Tri-State Ref. & Inv. Co. v. 
Apalooaa Co., 431 N. W.2d 311, 316-17 (S.D. 1988) (all interpreting statutes as requiring that the 
accumulation of prejudgment interest be calculated as simple interest). The most common incorrect 
computational method required by statute or adopted by courts is to grant simple interest. See infra 
subpart ll(A). 
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prejudgment interest is calculated. That discretion has been broadly 
exercised, seriously undercutting the law's goals of compensating victims 
and deterring wrongdoers. 36 
A good example of this phenomenon occurs in successful patent in­
fringement suits. Thanks to a strong statement by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, awarding prejudgment interest is the rule in patent infringement 
suits.37 However, the courts have provided much less guidance on how 
that interest should be calculated. A recent commentator on the patent 
decisions of the Federal Circuit, in describing the methods used to calculate 
prejudgment interest, observed that "the recent cases indicate appellate 
approval of almost unfettered discretion in the district courts. No reported 
cases have reversed district judges in their decisions on these points. "38 
The range of methodologies approved in patent cases is especially trou­
blinf11 because the rationale for unifying patent appeals within the Federal 
Circuit was to harmonize their treatment. 40 
This wide range of discretion, common with equitable remedies, is 
unusual with money judgments at law. 41 The usual explanation for the 
persistence of so much discretion is that courts and legislatures have yet to 
formulate the proper rules for calculating prejudgment interest.42 They 
have not been helped by commentators.43 In spite of the important role 
that prejudgment interest plays in the administration of justice, the 
36. Cf. Christopher P. Bowers, Comment, Courts, Contracts, and the A.pproprkue Discount Rate: 
.A. Quick Fix for the Legal Lottery, 63 U. CHI. L. RBV. 1099 (1996) (describing the case law setting 
the appropriate rate to discount future damages as inconsistent and in disarray and proposing that courts 
adopt a unifonn market peg). 
37. See General Motors Cotp. v. Devex Cotp. , 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983) (•[P]rejudgment interest 
should ordinarily be awarded."). The patent statute authorizes the award of interest, even though it 
is not very clear. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (•[T]he court shall award the claimant damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of 
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court."). 
38. See Paul M.Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. R.Bv. 691, 135 
(1993). 
39. For an example of the approval of inconsistent methodologies by the Federal Circuit, see infra 
note 80. 
40. SeeS. REP. No. 91-215, at S (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; Robert P. 
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 16 CAL. 
L. R.Bv. 803, 821-22(1988);PaulineNewman, The Federal Circuit-A Reminiscence, 140BO. MAsoN 
U. L. RBV. 513, 524 (1992). 
41. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3 .6(5), at 360-61. 
42. See id.; CHAIUJ!ST. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THB LAW OF DAMAOBS §51, at 210-11 
(1935); 1 THBODORB SEDGWICK, A TRBATISB ON THB MBASURB OF DAMAOBS § 297, at 567-68 (9th 
ed. 1912); see also Brown, supra note 23, at 331 (criticizing the broad language of California Civil 
Code§ 3288, which fails to provide guidelines governing a jury's discretionary award of prejudgment 
interest under that statute). 
43. See Lonny 1. Hoffman, Recovery and Calculation of Prejudgment Interest Under Tuas Low, 
35 S. TBx. L. RBV. 439, 440 (1994) (•Blame for the systematic deficiencies [regarding the calculation 
of prejudgment interest] can be shared equally by courts and commentators alike, who have devoted 
only scant attention to the subject. "). 
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scholarly literature is limited. What literature there is mostly addresses the 
implications for litigation and settlement of a rule that awards prejudgment 
interest compared to one that does not. 44 Discussion of the various 
methods that could be used to calculate prejudgment interest in the legal 
literature is nearly absent;4$ that literature consists primarily of contra­
dictory court opinions. 46 Yet most opinions give the issue of prejudgment 
interest little attention.47 As the Court of Federal Claims recently stated, 
"A generally-agreed, standard, objective method of fixing delay damages 
[prejudgment interest] . . . is sorely needed. "48 Accordingly, this Article 
seeks to fill that gap by providing more guidance than is currently available 
for .the calculation of prejudgment interest. 
This Article describes how prejudgment interest should be calculated, 
and if its advice is followed, it will curtail, but not eliminate, discretion. 
One of the themes that emerges is that there is not likely to be an 
44. See, e.g. , PosNBR, supra note 11, at 558-59 (arguing that prejudgment interest discourages 
settlement by increasing the stakes); HANS Zmsm.. BT AL., DBLAY IN THB COURT 133-36 (1959) 
(arguing that prejudgment interest does not discourage settlement); R.onald 1. Gilson & Robert H. 
Mnookin, Disputing Through .Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between lAwyer� in litigation, 94 
COLUM. L. R.BV. 509, 535-36 (1994) (arguing that as the difference between the market interest rate 
and the prejudgment intereat rate increases, the parties are leas likely to act cooperatively); Miller, 
supra note 16, at 567 ( proposing that prejudgment intereat both discourages settlement by increasing 
the stakes and encourages settlement by reducing defendant's incentive to delay); George L. Priest, 
Private litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B. U. L. R.BV. 527, 539 (1989) ( proposing that 
prejudgment interest discourages settlement by significantly increasing the cost of settlement). 
45. I could find only five such articlea-FranklinM. Fisher & R.. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin's 
Yearbook and the 'Iheory ofDamagea, 51. ACCT. AUDmNG& FIN. 145 (1990); Keir & Keir, supra 
note 24; R..F. Lanzillotti & A.K. Esquibel, Measuring Damages in Commercial litigation: Present 
Value of Lost Opportunities, 5 1. ACCT. AUDmNG & FIN. 125 (1990); James M. Patel! et al., 
Accumulating Damages in litigation: The Roles of Uncertainly and Interest Rates, 111. LBGAL STUD. 
341 (1982); and Wong, supra note 28. In addition to these articles and the articles cited in footnote 
44, the scholarly literature consilta mostly of notes arguing that prejudgment interest should be more 
widely available in the author's home state or in a particular substantive area of the law. See, e.g., 
Hoffman, supra note 43 , at 454-55 (1994) ( proposing a statute to expand the availability of pre­
judgment interest to more instances than are currently available in Texas). 
46. See Hoffman, supra note 43, at 440 ("[E]vety lawyer who has struggled with calculating the 
correct measure of interest recovety ... lament& the labyrinthine pathways of the rules. "); see also 1 
DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3.6, at 333-64 (reviewing the case law relating to the calculation of pre­
judgment interest). 
47. See Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 131-32 (stating that most courts ignore prejudgment interest 
or treat it perfunctorily). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin wrote, nearly 100 years ago: 
The question of interest is one much more often passed upon than carefully considered by 
the courta. It is usually presented only incidentally to much more important issues, and 
often decided one way or the other at the close of exhaustive investigation of the other 
questions, and with the pemaps unconscious feeling that it is not of sufficient magnitude 
to justify further serious labor. 
Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 332 ( Wis. 1899). Those words could have been written today. See 
Nelson v. Travelers Ina. Co., 306 N.W.2d 71, 75 ( Wis. 1981) ("With some exceptions, these 
observations could be made with equal pertinence today .. . .  "). 
48. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 494 (1994), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
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:Uts will, 1 hope, assi.st not .only judgC:S49 in .assess�ng prejudgment 
interest but, in addition, should atd lawyers tn franung their arguments and 
legislators in writing the statutes that provide for interest on judgments.50 
I. The Problem 
Prejudgment interest is assessed in order to place the parties in the 
same position they would have been in had the defendant paid the plaintiff 
an amount equal to the original judgment when the injury occurred. 51 
Thus, in order to compensate the plaintiff and prevent the defendant from 
profiting from the delay, the law requires that the injurer pay interest on 
the original judgment as would be required in a voluntary transaction. 52 
A clear statement of the rationale for awarding prejudgment interest was 
recently made by the Seventh Circuit using as an example the costs in­
curred by French plaintiffs to clean up the Brittany coast following the 
Amoco Cadiz oil spill: 
[C]onsider what would have happened if the French parties had 
borrowed $60 million to finance the cleanup in April 1978, and 
Amoco had put that sum in trust to fund an award of damages . . . . 
The victims would have had to pay the market rate of interest . . . . 
If they arranged to repay the debt in a single balloon payment at the 
end (when they recouped from Amoco), and if the rate of interest 
averaged 12%, then by April 1991 the victims would owe their 
creditors $262 million. Meanwhile the trust fund, lending out its 
assets at the market rate of 12%, would have grown to $262 million. 
Scores would be fully settled if Amoco tendered its interest in the 
49. These calculatiou are sometimes made by special masten, see, e.g. , Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 
1279, 1330 (7th Cir. 1992), and by juries, see, e.g. , CAL. CIV. CODB § 3288 (Weat 1996) ("In an 
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract . . . interest may be given, in the 
discretion of the juzy. "). 
SO. Statutozy reforms are discussed briefly infra subpart VI(O). 
51. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10. 
52. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983) (holding that prejudgment 
interest should be awarded absent justification for withholding auch an award). Aa the Supreme Court 
atated in that case, a patent infringement auit: 
In the typical case an award of prejudgment interest is necessazy to ensure that the patent 
owner is placed in as good a position as he would have been in had the infringer entered 
into a reasonable royalty agreement. An award of interest from the time that the royalty 
payments would have been received merely serves to make the patent owner whole, since 
his damages consist not only of the value of the royalty payments but also of the foregone 
use of the money between the time of infringement and the date of the judgment. 
/d. at 655-56. 
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fund: it would thus "pay" $60 million as of 1978, and the victims 
would receive $60 million as of 1978; the lenders who financed the 
cleanup would receive full payment for the use of their money. (We 
use these dates and rate only as illustrations; the periods and rates 
actually used in this case differ. We also disregard taxes.) 
Victims who finance their own cleanup lend to themselves; 
forced to devote money to a project not of their own choosing 
(money they otherwise could have lent out at the market rate of 
interest), they are entitled to compensation for the "hire" of this 
capital. Tortfeasors who choose to reinvest their money in their 
business (as Amoco has done) rather than create a trust fund ... are 
in no position to complain when called on to pay prejudgment 
interest. An injurer allowed to keep the return on this money has 
profited by the wrong.53 
303 
As described by the Seventh Circuit, the court's role is to assess a 
final judgment that places the parties in the same position they would now 
be in had the original judgment been paid immediately. Financial econo­
mists call that amount the future value of the original judgment, the amount 
the original judgment would have grown into over the interim. Accord­
ingly, the final judgment must equal this future value. The general formula 
for the future value of the original judgment, FV, is 
rl '2 r, r,.T FV - J(l+-)(1+-) ... (1+-) ... (1+-), 
n n n n 
(1) 
where J is the original judgment, r1 is the (annual) interest rate for period 
i, n is the number of compounding periods in a year, and T is the time in 
years between the injury and the issuance of an enforceable judgment. 54 
The full amount the court should award is FV, with prejudgment interest, 
I, equal to the difference between FV and J. Each of the individual terms 
of the form (l+r/n) is called a forward factor. The ith forward factor is 
the amount that $1 at the beginning of period i will grow to by the end of 
period i. 
Courts rarely calculate the final award using equation (1) directly. 
Instead, the final award .is most often assessed by first calculating a 
multiplier (denoted by m), which when applied to the original judgment 
produces the final judgment: 
FV - J x m. (2) 
53. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 133 1-32 (citations omitted). 
54. Thus, nTis the number of compounding periods between the injury and the judgment. The 
reason for separating n and T is that the choice of compounding period i• conceptually distinct from 
the length of the prejudgment period. See i'!fra BUbparts IV(A) and VI(A). 
1 .. 
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Thus, once it has determined liability and assessed the original judgment, 
the court's role in assessing prejudgment interest can be reduced to setting 
the multiplier, m. 
To correctly set the multiplier, the court must either use or estimate 
the proper forward factors over the prejudgment period.55 This is most . 
commonly done by finding an interest-rate index to use as a proxy for the 
true rate and then selecting a single interest rate, r m• that is an appropri­
ately calculated mean of that rate over the prejudgment period.56 Thus, 
the multiplier is commonly calculated as follows: 
(3) 
Setting the multiplier entails three tasks. 51 First, the court, as its most 
difficult task, sets. the interest rate for the prejudgment period, r m• 58 
Second, the court determines the length of the prejudgment period, T. 59 
Third, the court calculates the number of compounding periods in a year, 
n. Although this last task might seem trivial, surprisingly, it is often 
performed incorrectly, resulting in substantial miscalculations of interest. 60 
The final award to the French plaintiffs in Amoco Cadiz was calculated 
in this way, using equations (2) and (3). The court accepted the plaintiff's 
claim that it should set r m equal to the average prime rate over the 1980s61 
and implicitly set n equal to one. 62 The court next calculated the length 
of the prejudgment period in years. The prejudgment period did not begin 
when the spill occurred,63 but instead began on January 1, 1980.64 It 
ended July 24, 1990, when the district court adopted the special master's 
55. The formula for the prejudgment interest, I, is 
I - J x (m- 1). 
56. Alternative methods of calculating the mean interest rate are discussed irifra subpart VI(C). 
57. Equations (2) and (3) together imply that the full award calculated at this constant rate over 
the prejudgment period is given by 
r FY - J X (1+2!)"T. 
n 
58. The interest rate is discussed infra subparts ll(B), ll(C), IV(B), IV(D), VI(D), VI(F) and 
Parts ill, V. 
59. The prejudgment period is discussed irifra subpart VI(B). 
60. The compounding period is discussed infra subpart IV(A). 
61. The arithmetic mean prime rate over the 1980s calculated to four decimal places is 11.85%. 
The court adopted the plaintiff's proposed rate of 11.9%, the arithmetic mean calculated to three 
decimal places. See infra note 339. 
62. ld. 
63. The spill occurred on March 16, 1978. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1331. 
64. Id. at 1337. 
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recommendations and issued its final report. 6S Expressed in years, the 
prejudgment period is 10.5616 years, which I will round to 10.6 years. 66 
Setting rm= 11.85%, n= 1, and T= 10.6, the multiplier, using equation (3), 
is 3.2775.67 The final award, which is calculated using equation (2), is 
the product of the original judgment and the multiplier. Valuing the 
original judgment at $65 million implies a final award of $213.037 million. 
In the pages that follow, I use the calculation of the multiplier in 
Amoco Cadiz to illustrate the proper calculation of prejudgment interest. 
On the whole, the Seventh Circuit did a good job with prejudgment inter­
est, and its opinion in Amoco Cadiz is among the most sophisticated opin­
ions on that subject written by any court. Yet, there are alternative values 
for r m• n, and T that produce final awards that are more consistent with the 
law's goals of compensating the French plaintiffs and preventing Amoco 
from being unjustly enriched but are not excessive. 
The rest of this Article is divided into six Parts. Part II discusses the 
basic requirements that an award of prejudgment interest should meet. Part 
III describes how to set the interest rate consistent with those requirements. 
Part IV describes various adjustments to the multiplier. Part V addresses 
the choice of interest rate when there are special circumstances, and Part 
VI discusses issues regarding the calculation of prejudgment interest not 
addressed elsewhere. Part VII presents the conclusion, which is followed 
by an appendix that calculates the alternative Amoco Cadiz awards pre­
sented throughout this Article. 
II. Basic Principles of Prejudgment Interest 
This Part describes the basic principles that should be used to calculate 
prejudgment interest, leaving the more technical issues for later. The 
paradigm employed in this Article is a suit between two publicly traded 
corporations with ready access to the capital markets. 68 These corpo­
rations can raise funds, if necessary, to compensate for the funds denied to 
them by delay.69 The stockholders are assumed to hold diversified invest­
ment portfolios, so little of their wealth is tied up in the litigating 
corporations.70 The specific problems raised when individuals and close 
65. Id. at 1290. 
66. July 24 is the 205th day of the year (for a nonleap-year). Thus, 56.16% of 1990 took place 
through July 24. Hence, the prejudgment period is 10.5616 years. 
67. This multiplier is 1811 than 2% smaller than the multiplier set by the court-3.3162. Amoco 
Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1335. I was unable to produce the court's !J1Ultiplier using the interest rate, dates, 
and methods described by the court. 
68. The ume logic applies to government entities that can 'easily access the capital markets. 
69. The corporationa can also invest any excess funds. That, however, can be done by any 
investor. 
70. The stockholders are not assumed to own equal portions of each corporation, which would 
mean whatever they lost on one holding they would gain on the other. However, even if that were the 
1ll 
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corporations are parties are addressed later. 71 The principal conclusions 
reached in this Part are that prejudgment interest should be compounded, 
that the interest rate should correspond to the interest rate the defendant 
pays, or can pay, for unsecured debt, and that prejudgment interest should 
be assessed at a floating rate. 
A. Simple Versus Compound Interest 
One of the most frequently contested issues involving prejudgment in­
terest is whether the court should award simple or compound interest.72 
With simple interest, the interest is calculated each period on the original 
base amount. 73 Thus, ten percent simple interest on $1 million will pro­
duce $100,000 every year. With compound interest, the interest is calcu­
lated each period by adding to the last period's ending base the interest 
calculated over that period.74 Thus, in the first year, ten percent com­
pound interest on a $1 million base will produce $100,000 interest, which 
is added to the base (reinvested), giving a base at the beginning of the 
second year of $ 1 . 1  million. In the second year, there is $1 10,000 inter­
est, ten percent of $ 1 . 1  million, and in the third year $121 ,000 interest, ten 
percent of $1 .21 million. As long as interest accrues, annual interest will 
increase by ten percent each year. As this example illustrates, the differ­
ence between compound and simple interest is that with the former, interest 
earned in the past generates current interest, whereas with the latter, past 
interest never generateS current interest. Obviously, compound interest 
will produce a larger award than simple interest at the same rate?1 
The traditional, common-law rule is that prejudgment interest is not 
compounded.76 Even some state statutes that have otherwise liberalized 
the traditional rules on prejudgment interest still insist on simple 
assumption, the stockholders should still favor a reasonsbly accurate calculation of interest. The reason 
is not because they benefit in the current litigation, which they do not, but because of the efficiency 
gained by deterring corporate actions that cost other corporations more than they benefit the first 
corporation. 
71. See infra subpart V(B). 
72. See Rothschild, supra note 18, at  217 ("The most frequently litigated interest issues in breach 
of trust cases are whether to award simple or compound interest and at what rate interest should 
apply."). 
73 . See STEPHBN A. Ross BT AL., CORPORATB FINANCE 82 (3d ed. 1993). 
74. See id. 
75. There are two technical exceptions of no practical importance. First, simple and compound 
interest will produce the same award when the interest rate is always zero, because there is no interest. 
Second, simple interest can exceed compound interest when interest rates are negative. Stated interest 
rates, however, are never negative because one can earn zero interest by holding cash. In practice, 
nominal rates are greater than zero, so these two exceptions are irrelevant. 
76. See RBsTATBMBNT (SBCOND) OF CONTRACI'S § 354 cmt. a (1981); 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, 
§ 3 .6(4), at 353 & n.7. It is also the rule in the United Kingdom. See La Pintada Compania 
Navegacion S.A. v. President of India, [1984] 2 lloyd's Rep. 9, 17. 
I� 
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interest. 77 When there is no specific statutory provision, courts are 
divided on whether interest should be compounded. California, for ex­
ample, · awards simple interest.78 That appears to be the majority rule.79 
Under federal law, the decision whether to award simple or compound in­
terest is left to the discretion of the court. 80 
Conceptually, the proper way to calculate prejudgment interest is to 
use the compound interest formulation. Compound interest is required 
because prejudgment interest is not paid to the plaintiff as it accrues, but 
is retained by the defendant until the judgment is enforced. 81 Thus, each 
period the defendant's obligation to the plaintiff increases. Compound 
interest accounts for this effect, as can be seen in equation (1). 82 
The award of compound interest is also consistent with commercial 
practices. 83 Although some commercial contracts call for simple interest, 
these are almost exclusively short-term contracts of known duration.84 
77. See MINN. STAT. § S49.09(l)(c) (1996); TBlc. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1 .05 § 6(B) 
(Vernon Supp. 1996); NJ. R.. CT. 4:42-ll(b); 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3 .6(4), at 353. 
78. See Big Bear Properties, Inc. v. Ghennan, 157 Cal. R.ptr. 443, 446-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 
State v. Day, 173 P.2d 399, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (noting the general rule that interest may not 
be compounded unleas statutory provisions provide otherwise or the parties have stipulated to an 
amount of compound interest that doe1 not violate any statutory provision). 
79. See 1 DoBBS, supra note 4, § 3 .6(4), at 354. 
80. See Bio-R.ad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrumental Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 969 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(stating that whether prejudgment intereat should be simple or compound is left to the discretion of the 
district court). 
81 .  If prejudgment interest were paid to the plaintiff as it accrued, the plaintiff would still get the 
benefit of compounding because the intereat received could be reinvested elsewhere, generating com­
pound intereat. See R.othiCbild, supra note 18, at 218; Patrick 1. McDivitt, Comment, Pre-Judgment 
Interest as an Element of Damages: Proposed Solutiona for a Colorado Problem, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 
335, 342-43 (1978). Conceptually, the proper treatment would be to compound interest and to reduce 
the base by any payment from the debtor to the creditor. This would be equivalent to simple interest 
only when all intereat was paid as it accrued. 
82. The corresponding version of equation (1) with simple interest would be 
rt r2 r, r,q FY - J(l + - + - + • . •  + - + • • •  + -) . 
A A A A 
Thus, the multiplier with simple interest, m,, would be 
m8 - 1 + Tr_. 
which is smaller than the multiplier with compound interest, as given in equation (3), when r., is 
positive. 
83. See Sergeaketter, supra note 27, at 255-59; Wong, mpra note 28, at 23 1-32 (both noting that 
financial institutions commonly compound interest). The recognition of this principle is the foundation 
upon which the tax treatment of explicit and implicit interest is based. See generally Peter C. Canellos 
& Edward D. Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount ot(lter 1982, 
38 TAX L. REv. 565 (1983); Lawrence Lokken, The 7Tme Value of Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REv. 1 
(1986). 
84. When a contract is of known duration, there is a unique effective interest rate that when 
compounded is equivalent to the stated simple interest rate. 
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Simple interest is almost never provided when there is no requirement to 
pay interest as it accrues and the loan is for an indefinite duration. 
Finally, fairness and efficiency require that interest be compounded. 
Simple interest unfairly favors the defendant. With simple interest, the 
plaintiff is not fully compensated and the defendant does not fully pay for 
the harm caused. As a result, simple interest underdeters the defendant 
and overdeters the plaintiff from engaging in the activity that produced the 
harm. In additiont simple interest encourages the defendant to drag on 
legal proceedings. 8$ Of all of the suggestions made in this Article, this 
one-that prejudgm,ent interest be compounded-is likely to be, if not the 
most significant, at least one of the most significant, in terms of dollars. 
Returning to Amoco Cadiz, the total award would have been reduced by 
over $66 million had the court awarded simple as opposed to compound in­
terest.86 
B. lWzat Interest /Jate? Defendant's Borrowing Cost 
The conclusion that emerges from this subpart is that prejudgment in­
terest should be calculated using the defendant's cost of borrowing.87 
That a single rate can be used might seem counterintuitive: the prejudgment 
interest award is int�nded to both compensate the plaintiff for delay and to 
prevent the defendapt from being unjustly enriched, 88 yet the plaintiff and 
the defendant might, have very different interest rates. 
Because the f�rness and efficiency goals of prejudgment interest 
concern both the plaintiff and the defendant, the most basic question in the 
85. See Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 145. 
86. The multiplier, total award, and interest component of the award with both simple and 
compound interest, under the same asaumptions as in note 6, are set out in the following table: 
Method of Multiplier Total Award Interest Component 
Calculating Interest ($ millions) ($ millions) 
Simple 2.2561 146.647 81 .647 
Compound 3 ,2775 213 .037 148.037 
As the above table indicates, the interest component of the award with compound interest is $66 million 
larger. Accordingly, if the �urt had accepted defendant's argument and assessed only simple interest, 
the interest award would have been cut by 45% .  
I am indebted to Professor Bernard Black for this example. His excerpt from Judge 
Easterbrook's per curiam opinion in Amoco Cadiz and the accompanying questions on prejudgment in­
terest in his corporate finance msterials, the latter of which I use several times, inspired me to write 
this Article. 
87. The argument that prejudgment interest should be assessed using the defendant's borrowing 
rate was first msde by James M. Patell, Roman L. Weil, and Mark Wolfson. See Patell et al., aupra 
note 45, at 342-46 (arguing that assessing prejudgment interest at defendant's borrowing rate compen­
sates the plaintiff for the risk of default by the defendant). 
88. See Wong, aupra note 28, at 222-23. 
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calculation of prejudgment jnterest is whose interest rate to use. Should 
the court look to the plaintiff or to the defendant? The answer to that 
question has the potential to affect the outcome substantially when the 
litigation involves parties with very different economic resources. A large, 
safe corporation with little <itebt and many tangible resources can borrow 
very cheaply in the capital markets. In contrast, a smaller, riskier 
corporation with a large amount of debt in its capital structure might not 
be able to borrow at all or only at a very high interest rate. 
The solution is reasonably straightforward, and the key is determining 
what the judgment is intendt)d to accomplish. If the judgment is intended 
to compensate the plaintiff or to prevent similarly situated parties from 
taking excessive precautions, then the court should look to the plaintiff. 
If, however, the judgment i$ intended to punish the defendant,89 to force 
the defendant to disgorge any profits it might have realized, !10 or to 
encourage parties in circumstances similar to the defendant's to take proper 
precautions, then the court should look to the defendant.111 In some cases, 
this guidance will lead the court to arrive at an unambiguous decision to 
look either to the plaintiff ot to the defendant. However, in other cases, 
the court will not be able tQ make a clear choice because the judgment 
might reasonably be both to compensate the plaintiff and to deter the 
defendant. Thus, there might not be a single correct interest rate to use. 112 
Fortunately, when the parti� are both publicly traded corporations, the 
ambiguity disappears because' the same interest rate should be used for both 
parties. Why this is so is described next. However, when one of the 
parties is an individual, it is unlikely that there will be a single correct 
interest rate to use.113 
89. In most jurisdictions and in m()st substantive areas of tho law, prejudgment interest is not 
assoaaod on punitive damages. See 1 DQBBS, supra note 4, § 3 .6(4}, at 356. 
90. "Roatitution . . . is an award made to remedy unjust enrichment of tho defendant . . . .  " Id. 
1 3  .6(2), at 343. 
91 .  On tho plaintiff's side, tho purpose of tho original award is to cornponaate tho plaintiff and to 
prevent similarly situated partioa from taking excoasivo or inefficient precautions. Tho purpose of pro­
judgment interest on that award is to OD8¥re that tho present value of tho award is not reduced by delay 
so that tho purpose behind tho award is e,chieved. On the defendant's side, tho purposoa of tho award 
might be to punish tho defendant, to oncouragosimilarly situated partioa to take appropriate precautions, 
or to prevent tho defendant's unjust enrillhmont. Similarly, tho purpose of the award of prejudgment 
interest is to ensure that tho present value of tho award is not reduced so that tho purpose of tho original 
judgment is achieved. This Article uses
. 
tho language of both purposoa on tho plaintiff's side and of 
all three purposoa on tho defendant's sidf for the original award. However, for the purpose of calcu­
lating prejudgment interest, nothing turns! on which, if any, purpose tho original award servos for either 
the plaintiff or tho defendant. 
92. In that event, if the party that i• to receive payment has a lower discount rate than tho party 
that is to pay, then either the payor will pay too much or tho recipient will receive too little. The in­
terest award will not be exactly right for 'both parties unloas the government steps in and either mak:oa 
up or collects the difference. 
93. See Infra subpart V(B}. 
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That recogniti9n-that if the judgment is to compensate the plaintiff, 
the court should c�culate interest from the plaintiff's perspective, whereas 
if the judgment is tb prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment, the court 
should look at it frqm the defendant's perspective-is only the first step in 
the analysis. It do� not answer the question of what interest rate to use. 
That question is e&siest to answer when the judgment is to prevent the 
defendant's unjust �ichment. As the excerpt from Amoco Cadiz suggests, 
the defendant's d�ision not to pay the plaintiff earlier implies that it 
elected tO borrOW rrom the plaintiff. M The defendant COUld haVe bor­
rOWed that money ftom outside sources at the time of the cleanup, paid the 
plaintiff then, and r'paid the loan presently. Had it done so, it would have 
been in the same fi�cial position in which it will find itself when it pays 
the plaintiff upon j*dgment. Thus, the loan from the plaintiff effectively 
replaces a loan froin outside creditors. If the defendant knew what the 
ultimate judgment would be, such financing through the plaintiff would be 
attractive if prejud�ment interest were calculated at a lower rate than . its 
borrowing costs aJl.d unattractive if calculated at a higher rate. The 
defendant would be indifferent between the two alternatives only if the 
rates were identical; Hence, when the award prevents the defendant from 
being unjustly enriched by its actions, the defendant's borrowing rate is the 
proper rate to use. 
When the judgtnent is intended to compensate the plaintiff, which in­
terest rate the court l should use might seem more complicated. The plain­
tiff has unlimited ijlvestment opportunities. It could have invested the 
proceeds of immedi�te restitution in its own business, made investments in 
other businesses by ! purchasing stock or debt, or even made nonbusiness 
investments, such � purchasing U.S. Treasury securities or shares of 
common stock. Al�rnatively, the corporation could have distributed the 
proceeds to its shari,eholders, each one of whom would have invested or 
consumed the procebds in a different way. There is no way to know what 
returns would have peen realized." 
Although we c�ot possibly know how the plaintiff would have in­
vested the proceedsj had the plaintiff received them earlier, we do know 
how they actually were invested. They were advanced to the defendant 
corporation. 96 We �so know that in an efficient market, expected return 
94. See supra text acC411mpanying notes 52-53 . 
95. See Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 146-47; see also Oyos, supra note 24, at 509 (calling for 
prejudgment interest at tho li:ate of return genoraUy available to investors without describing how to sot 
that rate). 
96. After all, tho defe�dant dooa not distribute any funds during tho prejudgment period; instead, 
any funds that would be awarded to tho plaintiff are held by defendant during this period-for the 
plaintiff if tho plaintiff ulti�tely prevails. 
i, 
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is a function of risk. 97 The more risk an investor undertakes, the higher 
the expected return. Thus, the appropriate choice of interest rate should 
reflect the risk that the plaintiff bears by virtue of its investment in the 
defendant. Since the plaintiff bears the risk of an investor in the defendant 
corporation, the interest rate that the defendant pays to borrow money is 
again the correct rate to use. 98 
C. Accounting for Position in Capital Structure 
The analysis has so far concluded that courts should use an interest 
rate that reflects the rate at which the defendant is borrowing or can 
borrow money to assess prejudgment interest. The question that next arises 
is which interest rate? A modern corporation can have many sources of 
debt capital. Should the court look at the company's senior debt or its 
subordinated debt, or should it look at the rate the company paid on trade 
credit or on a credit line that the company has that is collateralized by its 
receivables? For that matter, why talk only about debt? The corporation 
also has equity, so why not use the return on equity? 
The above questions can be answered by recognizing that rates of 
return differ across investments in a single company because the invest­
ments have different risks. The rate of return increases as one moves up 
97. For a discussion of how to adjust the calculation if the market is believed to be inefficient, see 
infra subpart V(C). 
98. The interest rate should not compensate the plaintiff for the risk of losing the case because 
doing so would overcompensate plaintiffs relative to a system in which justice was immediate. To soe 
this, assume that a plaintiff has a claim for $1000, but tho state of legal precedent or tho reliability of 
the evidence is such that tho plaintiffhu only a SO% chance of winning at trial. Aasumo further that 
the claim will take two years to litigate and that defendant's unsecured borrowing cost is 10%. In this 
case, the plaintiff, if succeasful, should receive $210 in prejudgment interest in addition to a $1000 
judgment. The expected preaent value of such a judgment is $500, which equals what the expected 
present value would be if the case were decided immediately and the judgment would be for $1000 if 
the plaintiff won. Adjusting the interest rate to compensate for the risk of the plaintiff losing the case 
would require doubling the award to $2420, which implies an annual intereat rate of 56% .  The present 
value of such an award, discounted at ,10% ,  is $2000. Because the plaintiff's chance of winning is 
SO% ,  such an award would have an expected present value of $1000. This is twice the value of the 
case to the plaintiff with an immediate �ecision. Moreover, if the plaintiff's chance of winning were 
smaller, say 25% ,  the award would have to be quadrupled to $4840. In effect, adjusting the interest 
rate for tho risk that the plaintiff will lose is equivalent to eliminating the plaintiff's ex ante risk of 
losing at trial. 
Neither should the interest rate be calculated on the expected value of the judgment. Such a rule 
would undercompensateplaintiffa. In the above example, the expected judgment is $500. Two years 
of interest at 10% on this amount is $105, which produces a final judgment, if the plaintiff wins, of 
$1105. This has a present value of $913.22, and an expected preaent value of $456.61, which is less 
than $500. Ex ante full compensation would then require that an unsuccessful plaintiff receive the other 
$105 in interest from its defendant. (This has a present value of $86.78 and an expected present value 
of $43 .39 .) Such a system is impractical because it would require the court to aasess the ex ante proba­
bility of winning or losing in each case. 
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the capital structure because the chance of not getting paid, the risk of 
default, increases. Since return increases with risk, the rate at which 
prejudgment interest is calculated should reflect the risk that the judgment 
will not be paid. Thus, prejudgment interest should be assessed at a rate 
equal to the interest rate o� corporate debt with the same default risk as the 
judgment. That is to say, prejudgment interest should be calculated at the 
interest rate that the corporation would pay to voluntary creditors that took 
the same position in the capital structure. 
The logic is the same when the award is intended to prevent the defen­
dant's unjust enrichment. To prevent the defendant from being unjustly 
enriched by the delay, the defendant should pay interest at the same rate 
that it would pay a voluntary creditor that took the same position in the 
capital structure and had the same rights as the plaintiff. 
Because the plaintiff is paid in full unless the defendant goes bankrupt, 
the plaintiff's risk of receiving less than full payment depends on its risk 
of loss in the event of the defendant's bankruptcy. Thus, the rate at which 
prejudgment interest should be assessed depends on the priority in bank­
ruptcy of claims arising out of lawsuits. 
In bankruptcy, legal claims are treated in a manner similar to that of 
unsecured debt. 911 When a corporation becomes bankrupt, its secured 
creditors have prior claim to the corporation's pledged assets. If the cor­
poration is liquidated, the pledged assets are first used to pay secured 
claims.100 If there is any cash left over, it goes to pay unsecured claims. 
If the realized value of the assets is insufficient to pay secured creditors, 
the unsatisfied claims of secured creditors are lumped together with the 
claims of unsecured creditors.101 Thus, because secured debt is more 
likely to be paid in bankruptcy than unsecured debt, secured debt pays a 
lower interest rate than unsecured debt. Since legal judgments are treated 
on par with unsecured debt, the proper interest rate to use is the rate for 
unsecured debt. 102 
Unsecured debt can be senior or subordinated.103 In bankruptcy, se­
nior debt is paid in full before subordinated debt is paid at altlo. 
Accordingly, senior debt pays a lower interest rate than subordinated debt. 
99. For a deacription of the treatment of lawsuits and judgments arising from them in bankruptcy, 
see DoUGLAS 0. BAIRD, THB ELBMBNTS OF BANICR.UPTCY 79-87 (1992). 
100. See id .  at 79. 
101 . See id. at 10. 
102. See Oorenatein Enten., Ine. v. Quality Care-USA, Ine., 874 F.2d 43 1, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Posner, 1.) ("The plaintiff is an unaecured, uninsured creditor, and the risk of default must be 
considered in deciding what a compensatory rate of interest would be."). 
103. In the United States, unsecured debt is commonly called a debenture. See RICHARD A. 
BRBALBY & STBWAilT C. MYBRS, PRINCIPLBS OF CORPORATB FINANCB 319 n.4 (4th ed. 1991). 
104. Subordinated debt is nid to be junior to tho senior debt. ld. at 318. 
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Legal judgments are not treated as senior or subordinated, but are treated 
on par with the two together.105 Thus, prejudgment interest should be 
assessed at the rate for unsecured debt that is neither senior nor subor­
dinated. 
In some highly leveraged companies, the debt can have many levels 
of seniority paying different interest rates. If leverage is low and risk is 
low, it is not very important which debt the court uses to calculate interest 
because the interest rates will be clustered together. If there is a great deal 
of leverage and many different classes of debt, however, then it is impor­
tant that the court select the right place in the capital structure because 
interest rates will likely vary substantially.106 
Litigants frequently argue that courts should assess prejudgment inter­
est at a rate other than the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. In the 
rest of this Part, I will discuss some of these proposed standards and show 
why they would be inappropriate to use. 
One argument that a plaintiff sometimes makes is that prejudgment in­
terest should be assessed at the average return on the plaintiff's equity.107 
The proffered rationale for such an award is that had the plaintiff had the 
105. See David W. Leebron, Iimited liobiUty, Tort Vu:lims, and Credilon, 91 COLUM. L. RBv. 
1565, 1637 (1991) ("[U]nsecured creditors share pro nta with tort victims. •) . David Leebron baa pro­
posed that tort creditors be given priority in bauknlptcy. Id. at 1643-46. If Professor Leebron's sug­
gestion is adopted, it would no longer be appropriate to calculate prejudgment interest using the defen­
dant's overall cost of unsecured borrowing. Instead, a lower rete that reflects the senior status of the 
claim would be appropriate. 
Alternatively, if the judgment were treated in bankruptcy on par with all capital voluntarily ex­
tended to the firm, it would be appropriate to award prejudgment interest at the defendant's average 
colt of capital. 
106. Prejudgment interest should be assessed using the stated return, not the expected return, on 
the defendant's unsecured debt. Voluntary creditors are compensated through a higher stated interest 
rate for the risk that the defendant will. become bauknlpt and thus will be unable to pay the judgment 
in full. In effect, when there is a positive probability that the loan will not be repaid in full, the stated 
interest rate on the loan exceeds the expected return from making the loan. Because the plaintiff also 
baa to face this risk, the court should aaaeas prejudgment interest using the defendant's stated interest 
rate, not ita expected rate of return. That conclusion greatly simplifies the calculation. To calculate 
the expected return would require some pretty fancy calculations using the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). Fortunately, those calculations can be avoided because the court should not use the expected 
rate of return and instead should use the stated return to compensate for the possibility that the judg­
ment might not be paid in full. 
Although the stated interest rate is used to calculate what the defendant owes the plaintiff, what 
the plaintiff recovers depends on the actual return on the unsecured debt. On debt instruments, the 
actual return is the promised return, unless the obligor defaults, in which case it might be leas. Thus, 
the proposed rule ultimately pays plaintiffs as a class the actual return, not the stated return, from 
investing in defendants as a class. In an efficient market, the expected return is an unbiased estimate 
of the actual return. 
107. See, e.g. , Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 492 (1994) ("Plaintiff . . .  
urges use of its own return on equity as the measure of delay compensation . . . . •), a.tf'd, 86 F.3d 
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). This method is endorsed by the Kein, who propose that prejudgment interest 
be awarded at the plaintiff's average historical return. Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 148. 
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money it would have invested it in its own business; therefore, the return 
that the business has produced over that period is the best estimate of what 
the plaintiff lost through delay.108 There are two problems with this 
argument. First, the return on the plaintiff's equity reflects the risk of the 
average investment in the plaintiff. That, however, is not the investment 
the plaintiff has made (albeit involuntarily) with the funds. Instead, the 
plaintiff has invested them in the defendant's debt and should receive a 
corresponding risk-adjusted return. Giving the plaintiff a higher return, 
based on its overall risk, would overcompensate the plaintiff for the risk 
it bore through its forced investment in the defendant. Second, it might be 
argued that the plaintiff should receive the presumably higher return on its 
equity because the defendant's refusal to immediately pay prevented it from 
investing the money in its own business. Thus, the plaintiff's lawyer might 
rhetorically ask, "Why should the plaintiff lose out when its investments 
are profitable because the defendant did not pay the plaintiff sooner?" The 
simplest response to this argument is that the defendant's refusal to pay 
earlier does not prevent the plaintiff from investing in its business. 
Because the plaintiff is assumed to have easy access to the capital markets, 
it can borrow at a risk-adjusted interest rate to fund prospective pro­
jects.1()!) Accordingly, because the plaintiff can borrow to fund available 
projects, the defendant's retention of money that is later judicially deter­
mined to be owed to the plaintiff does not prevent the plaintiff from 
undertaking particular projects. 
This suggests a second argument-that prejudgment interest should be 
awarded at the plaintiff's cost of borrowing. 110 This argument can be 
made either by the plaintiff, when its borrowing cost is high, or by the 
defendant, when the plaintiff's borrowing cost is low or at least lower than 
the defendant's. The logic is that because the plaintiff was denied access 
over the prejudgment period to the amount ultimately awarded, it had to 
make up for it by borrowing.111 Accordingly, to put the plaintiff in the 
same position today as it would be in had it been paid immediately, the 
defendant should pay interest at the plaintiff's cost of borrowing. Why this 
approach is wrong is easiest to see when the plaintiff's cost of borrowing 
is lower than the defendant's. Assume, for example, that the plaintiff can 
108. See Hughes Aircrqft, 31 Fed. Cl. at 492; Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 146-49. 
109. Recall that the choice of intereat rate is predicated on the assumption that the plaintiff can 
readily raise funds through the capital markets. The calculation of prejudgment interest when the plain­
tiff is an individual or a close corporation without such access is discuned infra subpart V(B). 
1 10. See, e.g., Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.ld 1279, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the defendant 
should pay the market rate for prejudgment interest because "[t]hat is what the victim must pay . . .  
if it borrows money"). TheKeirs are also sympathetic tO this argument, endorsing the use of the plain­
tiff's cost of capital as another method to set prejudgment interest. Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 147. 
1 1 1 .  &}uivalently, the plaintiff could have reduced its borrowings had the defendant immediately 
paid the plaintiff the amount ultimately awarded. 
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borrow without giving security at the riskless rate but that the defendant's 
unsecured borrowing rate is much higher. In this case, providing the 
plaintiff with prejudgment interest at the riskless rate will not compensate 
the plaintiff for the risk it bears of a default by the defendant. Because 
some defendants will default, plaintiffs as a class will be undercompensated 
if prejudgment interest is assessed at their borrowing rate. It would also 
be wrong to use the plaintiff's cost of borrowing if it exceeded the defen­
dant's cost of unsecured debt. The plaintiff's borrowing rate on the 
withheld funds would not exceed the defendant's if the hypothetical lender 
to the plaintiff were assured of payment in the event that the defendant 
pays the plaintiff. The hypothetical lender, however, is not so assured, 
conditional upon the judgment being paid, because other claimholders in 
the plaintiff also have a right to share in the award. Hence, they too will 
benefit from the award because they might receive a larger payment than 
otherwise. 112 Thus, awarding prejudgment interest at the plaintiff's cost 
of borrowing will overcompensate the plaintiff. Therefore, prejudgment 
interest should not be awarded at the plaintiff's cost of borrowing but at the 
defendant's . 
Another argument that is sometimes made is that prejudgment interest 
should be awarded at the Treasury bill rate, which is the interest rate that 
the federal government pays when it borrows.113 Because the federal 
government's obligations are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States, the taxing power, and the power to print money, they are 
widely considered to have no risk of default. 114 Although some large and 
mature businesses with little debt in their capital structure pay interest at 
the same rate as the federal government, most companies do not. us 
Because their debt has some risk of default, these companies pay higher 
interest rates to compensate for that risk. 116 Accordingly, it is generally 
correct to use the defendant's stated borrowing rate to calculate 
prejudgment interest.117 When the federal government is the defendant, 
however, the Treasury bill rate would be appropriate to use.118 
112. Thia benefit will equal the difference between the plaintiff's and the defendant's coat of 
unsecured borrowing. This is an implication of the well-known Theorem I of Franco Modigliani and 
Merton Miller, which statea that a finn's coat of capital is not affected by how ita ownenhip is divided 
among different classes of securities. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 418-21 . 
113. See Fisher & Romaine, supra note 45, at 146-48 (arguing that prejudgment interest should 
be awarded at a risk-free rate). By statute, Minnesota assesses prejudgment interest at the Treasury 
bill rate. MINN. STAT. § 549.09(1)(c) (1996). 
1 14. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 256. 
1 15. See id. at 256-57. 
1 16. See id. 
1 17. Thus, the court in Amoco Cadiz was correct in rejecting the district court's use of the interest 
rate on Treasury securities. See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that 
the prime rate would be the beat measure of the defendant's coat of borrowing). 
118. In Hughes Aircrqft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481 (1994), qQ'd, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996), Hughes alleged that the federal government infringed one of ita patenta for positioning 
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More generally, any fixed prejudgment interest rate will usually be 
wrong. Unfortunately, some state courts assess prejudgment interest in this 
way, using the same fixed interest rate that they are required by statute to 
use to calculate postjudgment interest.119 The obvious advantage of using 
a fixed rate is that the prejudgment interest calculation is easier because the 
task of setting an interest rate is eliminated. The cost of such a rule, 
however, is a loss of accuracy: sometimes too much interest and sometimes 
too little interest will be awarded. When interest rates are high, there will 
be a tendency to award too little, 120 and when they are low to award too 
much. Thus, once again, we are driven back to the conclusion that pre­
judgment interest should be calculated at the defendant's cost of unsecured 
borrowing. 
That the proper interest rate is the defendant's cost of unsecured 
borrowing might help to explain the law's failure to develop rules for the 
calculation of prejudgment interest. That rule does not yield a specific 
interest rate or even refer to a specific index. Instead, the correct rate 
depends on characteristics of the defendant. Such variations may have 
made it difficult for courts to formulate and put forth a general rule. Such 
a rule does exist, however, and how it might be implemented will be dis­
cussed in Part III. 121 Before describing how prejudgment interest should 
be calculated in practice, however, there is one more principle to discuss­
whether prejudgment interest should be calculated at a fixed or floating 
interest rate. 
satellites in orbit. Id. at 483. Hughes argued that the federal government should pay interest on the 
patent royalties owed in an amount equal to Hughes's average annual return on equity because Hughes 
would have invested the royalties in ita business. Id. at 492. The federal government argued that 
interest should be aaeeaeed at the short-term Treasury bill rate. See Ralph Vartebedian, U.S. in lAst­
Ditch Etfort to 7hwart Suit by Hughes, L.A. nMBS, May 23, 1994, at Dl. The government was 
correct. The Treasury bill rate is appropriate because that is the return when lending to the federal 
government, which Hughes was compelled to do. Hughes's lawyers were wrong. Hughes's return on 
equity reflects compensation for the risk of the average investment in Hughes, which is much riskier 
than lending to the government. 
1 19. See supra note 34. 
· 120. Moreover, if the defendant is not charged prejudgment interest at a rate that reflects ita own 
default risk, then it will have an incentive to increase that risk. See Roman L. Wei!, Compensation 
for the Passage of 'nine, in LITIGATION SBRVJCBS HANDBOOK 37.1,  37.4 (Roman L. Wei! et al. eds., 
2d ed. 1995). 
. 
121. There is an analogy to the underlying award because the amounts differ across casea even 
though there are general rules for calculating the award. 
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D. Fixed or Floating Interest Rate? 
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Interest rates usually vary with the duration of an investment.122 
This phenomenon is called the term structure of interest rates.123 Typi­
cally, short-term rates are less than long-term rates, producing an upward 
sloping term structure. 124 
The term structure of interest rates would seem to complicate the task 
of calculating prejudgment interest. If a plaintiff suffers an injury on 
January 1 ,  1986, and does not receive payment until January 1 ,  1996, then 
the plaintiff had a claim against the defendant for the intervening ten years. 
Since the claim arose in 1986 but was not paid until 1996, the ten-year 
interest rate in 1986 would appear to be the appropriate interest rate to use 
because that was the interest rate that the defendant would have had to pay 
to borrow for ten years. There is, however, a good reason for not calcu­
lating prejudgment interest using fixed interest rates but instead preferring 
floating-rate measures whenever possible. 
As described previously, prejudgment interest is provided for both 
fairness and.effi.ciency reasons. Providing prejudgment interest at the long­
term rate does not compromise fairness.  Ex ante the shareholders of nei­
ther plaintiff nor defendant corporations would be advantaged or disadvan­
taged by using a long-term rate. Although ex post there will be losers and 
winners from changing interest rates, they are as likely to be investors in 
defendants (debtors) as in plaintiffs (creditors).125 Providing prejudgment 
interest at the long-term rate does not compromise the first efficiency 
rationale, deterrence, either. Because ex ante plaintiffs and defendants 
receive full compensation and pay the full cost when interest is assessed at 
the long-term rate, they have the right incentives to avoid harm. 
122. Duration is a concept that measures the wait for the cash flows from a debt instrument. 
Duration is defined as the mean wait for the bond's promised cash flowa. It is the weighted average 
of the time until each cash flow, where the weights are the proportion that the present value of each 
payment bears to the total value of the bond. Duration differs from maturity, which is the date on 
which the last payment on the bond is due. See ZVI BODIB BT AL., lNVBSTMBNTS 441 (1989). The 
principal reason why duration is important in finance is because the sensitivity of the value of a debt 
instrument to changes in interest rates is a function of duration. The higher the duration of a bond, the 
greater the sensitivity. See id. at 440 (explaining that as payments become more distant the effect of 
discounting exerts greater influence on the price of bonds). 
123 . See Joseph Bankman& William A. Klein, Accurate Ta:cation ofLong-TermDebt: Taldng into 
Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. RBv. 335, 335 (1989) (•The phrase 'term structure 
of interest rates' is used by economists to describe the relationship between short-term and long-term 
interest rates."). 
124. Occasionally, long-term rates are below short-term rates. When this happens, the term 
structure is said to be inverted. 
125. This usumes that there is a blanket rule of using the long-term rate. If the long-term rate 
is sometimes used and the short-term rate is used in other cases, then whichever party gets to choose 
will benefit at the expense of the other party. 
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Providing prejudgment interest at the long-term rate does, however, 
compromise the second efficiency rationale for prejudgment interest; using 
a long-term interest rate will interfere with the parties' incentives to settle. 
If interest rates rise, defendants will be borrowing at below market interest 
rates, which will give them an incentive to prolong litigation. Of course, 
the plaintiff will have the opposite incentive; but it is easier for one party 
unilaterally to delay litigation than it is to expedite it. The incentives are 
reversed when interest rates fall :  plaintiffs will have an incentive to delay, 
since they are receiving above market interest rates. 
The conclusion that using a long-term interest rate satisfies only two 
of the three reasons for granting prejudgment interest does not imply that 
it would be appropriate to use a short-term rate. Before one can under­
stand why it is desirable to calculate prejudgment interest using short-term 
interest rates, an understanding of what drives the interest-rate term 
structure is necessary. 
Two theories have been offered to account for the term structure of 
interest rates. The first thoory, the expectations theory, hypothesizes that 
the term structure is driven by expectations about interest rates in the future 
over different horizons. Thus, an upward sloping term structure would 
indicate a market consensus that interest rates will rise continuously in the 
future.126 
The second theory, the liquidity preference theory, hypothesizes that 
investors are risk averse and generally have a shorter investment horizon 
than do most issuers. Accordingly, to induce these investors to hold long­
term bonds they have to receive a premium in the early years. The pre­
mium compensates for the risk that they will sell the bonds when interest 
rates are high, in which case bond prices are low, 127 and suffer a larger 
loss than they would receive from holding short-term bonds.128 The 
available evidence strongly supports the liquidity preference hypoth­
esis.129 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of the liquidity pref­
erence hypothesis is the persistent upward slope of the yield curve. If 
brought about by the expectations hypothesis, the persistence of that up­
ward slope would imply a systematic tendency by the market to overesti­
mate future interest rates.130 
126. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 152. 
127. There is an inverse relation between bond prices and interest rates. See id. at 1 19-20. 
128. See Theodore S. Sima, Long-Term Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and the Case for 
Accrual Taxation, 41 TAX L. REv. 313, 331 {1992) {observing that the yield curve's positive slope is 
due to the risks of holding long-term debt). 
129. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 153-54; Sims, supra note 128, at 330.31 (explaining that 
investors prefer the safety of short-term investments and must be induced to hold riskier long-term debt 
with the promise of a premium return). 
130. See Ross BT AL. , supra note 73, at 154. 
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The liquidity preference hypothesis implies that the term structure 
reflects the interest rate risk from locking in an interest rate ex ante. 131 
Because prejudgment interest is calculated ex post, there is no risk that 
interest rates will later change.132 Accordingly, prejudgment interest 
should be calculated using a very short-term rate, which does not contain 
a premium for interest rate risk. Using a short-term interest rate implies 
that prejudgment interest is effectively calculated on a floating-, variable-, 
or an adjustable-rate basis, not on a fixed-rate basis. 
Calculating interest on a floating-rate basis is consistent with the 
fairness justification for prejudgment interest, even though it will produce 
smaller interest awards. The lower awards are not unfair to plaintiffs 
because it is unnecessary to compensate them for the risk that interest rates 
will rise-that risk was eliminated by using floating interest rates. 
Moreover, because the plaintiff is fully compensated for delay and the 
defendant does not benefit from it, the first efficiency criterion, that the 
parties have the correct incentives to avoid activities that might produce 
harms and to take precautions to reduce those harms, is also met. 
As described above, using a fixed interest rate that reflects the cost to 
the defendant of unsecured borrowing when the claim arose also has the 
same two advantages. The problem with using a fixed interest rate is that 
it interferes with the incentive to settle. When interest rates rise, the 
defendant, who is borrowing from the plaintiff at below market rates, has 
an incentive to delay. Similarly, when rates fall, the plaintiff, who is 
receiving an above-market rate from the defendant, has an incentive to 
delay. In contrast, when prejudgment interest is calculated using a 
floating-rate measure, neither party has an incentive to delay.133 Because 
the plaintiff is receiving the proper risk-adjusted market rate of return and 
the defendant is paying that rate, neither party is benefitted (or harmed) by 
delay. Therefore, when prejudgment interest is calculated using a fixed 
rate of interest, the fairness justification for prejudgment interest and only 
one of the two efficiency justifications are satisfied. However, when a 
floating rate of interest is used, the fairness justification and the two 
efficiency justifications are satisfied. 
13 1 .  This does not suggest that expectations do not affect the yield curve, but only that 
expectations do not explain ita persistent upward slope. 
132. Because interest is awarded at the end of the process when the path of interest rates is known, 
there is no reason to guess what interest rates were. 
133. When a floating-rate debt instrument, instead of a fixed-rate instrument, is used as the basis 
for calculating prejudgment interest, the present value of the award is invariant to interest rate 
movements. 
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E. Summary 
Three simple rules emerge from this Part. First, courts should award 
compound interest, never simple interest, because the defendant retains and 
has the use of the plaintiff's money until the judgment is finally paid.134 
Second, prejudgment interest should be assessed at a rate that refiects 
the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. This rule both charges the 
defendant exactly what it saved by not extinguishing the obligation earlier 
and provides the plaintiff with the risk-adjusted return on the investment 
that it was forced to make in the defendant.13' 
Third, prejudgment interest should be assessed at a fioating interest 
rate. This rule ensures that neither party has an incentive to delay in order 
to take advantage of a favorable interest rate.136 
III. Setting the Prejudgment Interest Rate 
The previous Part discussed the most basic issues in the calculation of 
prejudgment interest. This Part describes how to set the interest rate. It 
endorses the use of the prime rate as a default, and describes several ways 
to go beyond it to produce a more accurate result. 
The previous Part set out the standard that the interest rate should 
meet. To ensure that the plaintiff is fully compensated and that the defen­
dant is not unjustly enriched, prejudgment interest should be assessed at the 
rate that the defendant would pay on an equivalent voluntary transaction. 
That Part concluded that interest should be assessed at a fioating rate that 
refiects the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. 
Setting the precise, theoretically correct interest rate imposes addi­
tional constraints-the interest rate must refiect the precise risk of default 
and any terms and conditions that would infiuence that rate. One determi­
nant of default risk is when a bond is to be repaid. In general, the more 
quickly a bond is repaid, the greater the likelihood of full repayment. This 
is because uncertainty tends to increase with the horizon. 137 Interest rates 
are affected not only by duration; they are also affected by the terms and 
conditions contained in the bond indenture.138 Bonds are commonly is-
134. This rule applies whenever prejudgment interest is awarded. It is not limited to litigation 
between two publicly traded companies. 
13S. This rule applies to cases between publicly traded corporations. It does not always apply 
when the plaintiff is an individual or does not have easy access to the capital marketa. See infra subpart 
V(B). 
136. This rule should also be applied whenever prejudgment interest is awarded; it is not limited 
to suita between public companies. 
137. See Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: 'Ihe Risk Structure of Interest 
Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449, 4S7-S9 (1974). 
138. For example, corporate debt can be callable by the issuing corporation or convertible by the 
holder into the issuer's stock. Callable debt will pay higher interest than noncallable debt because the 
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sued containing many features that affect the interest rate. In contrast, the 
judgment is without these additional features. Accordingly, in theory, pre­
judgment interest should be assessed at the rate that the defendant would 
pay to borrow the amount of the original judgment with a simple, floating­
rate bond that was payable in full on the judgment date with no payments 
made prior to that date. Most defendants, however, are unlikely to have 
such zero-coupon bonds outstanding.139 Thus, courts cannot tum to pre­
cisely comparable debt instruments to assess prejudgment interest.140 
issuer will call the debt only when it is to ita advantage (and therefore to the holder' a disadvantage) to 
do so. Debt is frequently callable by the iiBUing corporation at a small premium to par. This makes 
it attractive to the corporation to call ita debt when it can issue new debt at a sufficiently lower interest 
rate than the rate on ita outatanding debt to cover the cost of the refinancing. See Ross BT AL., aupra 
note 73, at 594-98. Conversely, convertible debt will pay lower interest than straight debt because the 
convertibility feature ia valuable to the holder. The holder will convert the debt to equity only when 
doing so is to ita advantage. See id .  at 662. For a discussion of the law and economic• of call provi­
sions, see William A. Klein et al., The CaU Provirion of Corporate Bontb: A Stolttlard Form in Need 
of Change, 18  I. CoRP. L. 653 (1993). For a discussion of the law and economicaofconvertible debt, 
see William W. Bratton, Ir., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bontb, 1984 Wis. L. 
RBv. 667 and William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Pack4ge, 123 U. PA. L. RBv. 541 
(1975). Unlike corporate bonds, which are issued pursuant to a trust indenture, legal claims are not 
protected by covenanta and warranties, which restrict the issuer's activities by tri888ring a default when 
violated. Common warranties include maintenance of a sinking fund, minimum capital requirements, 
and restrictions on further borrowing. ln contrast to the many features that investment bankers add to 
debt issues, the legal claim is without these bells and whistles. Accordingly, the reference rate should 
be based on an instrument that incorporates none of these features. Although there are techniques for 
making some of these adjuatmenta using option pricing theory, that discussion is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For some of these adjustments, such as the value of the bondholders' right to declare a 
default, there are no techniques currently available. 
139. A zero-coupon bond is a bond that makes a single payment of interest and principal at 
maturity and makes no prior paymenta. The final judgment is similar to a zero-coupon bond with 
principal equal to the original judgment. 
140. Even if such bonds were outatanding, they still would not provide the precise, theoretically 
correct interest rate that would place the successful plaintiff in the same position that it would be in had 
it been paid the amount of the eventual judgment immediately and invested the proceeds in the defen­
dant on the same terms as the legal judgment. This is true because the correct interest rate will reflect 
the size of the judgment ultimately rendered by the court, which is rarely known in advance. Of 
course, the potential liability is unlikely to escape the notice of the corporation's creditors. To the 
extent that the potential litigation liability reduces other creditors' expected recoveries, they will require 
higher interest rates and so existing claims will fall in value. Thus, in an efficient market, the coat of 
funds to the defendant, after knowledge of the potential liability becomes public, will accurstely reflect 
the attendant risks. Accordingly, once the claim is public, the defendant's borrowing coat should re­
flect the expected judgment. It will also evolve over time as the defendant's prospecta in the litigation 
change. 
I have two observations to offer about using an interest rate that reflecta this risk. Firat, any 
figure derived from the market is based on the market's estimate of the final judgment. That estimate 
will evolve over time and can be wrong. A perfectly accurate calculation of interest should reflect what 
the judgment ultimately is, not what the market expected it to be. This is because the risk to the plain­
tiff of receiving Jess than full payment is a function of the size of the judgment ultimately rendered, not 
of creditors' expectations of what it would be. Thus, unless the court can assess what the market ex­
pected it to do, it cannot calculate what the interest rate on its unsecured debt would have been had the 
market known the outcome of the case. 
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that prejudgment interest be awarded at a floating rate that reflects the 
defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. Loans at prime are generally un­
secured, and many corporations borrow regularly at the prime rate, which 
changes frequently. Moreover, using the prime rate has two additional 
advantages. First, the rate is widely published, easing the task of 
calculating prejudgment interest. 144 Second, the prime rate is a market­
determined rate that varies, often substantially, over time as interest rates 
change.145 The problem with using the prime rate is that in any given 
case the prime rate might be too high or too low. That is, it might not 
reflect the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. 
The prime rate will be too low when the defendant's unsecured debt 
has a relatively high probability of default. This is likely to occur when 
the defendant's business is volatile or its leverage is high. The prime rate 
will be too high when that default probability is relatively low. This is 
most likely to occur for well-established companies with little leverage.146 
What the prime rate does not do is it does not reflect the risk of an un­
secured investment in a particular defendant. Thus, to obtain a more accu­
rate calculation of prejudgment interest, some effort must be made to re­
flect the risk of the defendant's unsecured debt. 
There are at least two methods of estimating that interest rate. These 
methods are both approximations. Although neither will yield a precise, 
theoretically correct answer, they will produce credible results when done 
with some care. Both are also relatively simple to implement. Accord­
ingly, they are likely to be worth pursuing in most cases, and certainly will 
be worth the effort when the original judgment is large, the prejudgment 
period is long, or when the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing is 
substantially above or below the prime rate. 
The most obvious method for the court to use is to look at a floating­
or short-term interest rate at which the defendant can or is borrowing 
unsecured. For example, throughout the prejudgment period, Amoco had 
access to and borrowed through the commercial paper market.147 Com-
144. See Gorenstein, 874 F.2d at 436 (noting that the prime rate is a "readily ascertainable 
figure"). 
145. The prime rate rose 6% from 1979 to 1981; it then fell 8% from 1981 to 1983. See infra 
Appendix. 
146. See BLOCJC & HIRT, supra note 14�, at 212 tbt.S-1 (demonstrating that the interest rate on 
commercial paper, available to large, prestigious companies, was lower than the prime rate for every 
year between 1971 and 1989). 
147. For inltlnce, Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which became Amoco on April 23, 1985, 
had $100 million of outltlnding commercial paper at the end of 1983 and again at the end of 1984. 
STANDARD OIL Co. (INDIANA), 1984 ANNUAL RBPoRT, available in LEXIS, Corp Library, ANNRFI' 
file. Two years later, Amoco reported commercial paper borrowings of $346 milllon at the end of 
1985 and $174 million at the end of 1986. AMoco CORP., 1986 ANNUAL RBPoRT, available in 
LEXJS, Corp Library, ANNRPI' file. 
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mercia! paper, which is considered a substitute for bank loans, are short­
term, unsecured promissory notes.148 Because the commercial paper 
market is more restrictive than the market for bank loans at prime, the 
interest rate on commercial paper is regularly two to three percent below 
the prime rate.149 As a result, only the most creditworthy borrowers, 
such as Ainoco, can issue commercial paper. 
I have recalculated the final award in Amoco Cadiz, using the com­
mercial paper rate instead of the prime rate to calculate prejudgment 
interest. The mean interest rate for commercial paper. calculated in the 
same manner as the Amoco Cadiz court used to calculate the mean prime 
rate, is 9.57% .uo Using the same assumptions and methods to calculate 
the final award produces a final award of about $171 million,m a $42 
million reduction from the Seventh Circuit's figure. 152 For a corporate 
defendant that issues commercial paper. the calculation of prejudgment 
interest using the average commercial paper rate will produce a more accu­
rate award than one calculated using the prime rate because it uses more 
specific information. 153 
The problem with using a short-term rate, such as the commercial pa­
per rate, is that no allowance is made for duration. If there is very little 
risk that the firm will default on its obligations in the short term, but 
default is much more likely in the long term, then the issuer will not be 
able to borrow long term at a floating rate close to the commercial paper 
rate.154 This would not have been a problem for Amoco, in spite of the 
long prejudgment period, because it could and did borrow long term at low 
interest rates.155 However, when it is a problem, which is likely to occur 
when the defendant's future is uncertain and the prejudgment period is 
long, there are two ways to alleviate it. The first is to make use of 
mathematical techniques to estimate the increase in risk as maturity in-
148. See BLocK & HIRT, supra note 142, at 210. 
149. See EcoNOMIC REPoRT 011 THB l'RB.siDBNT 358 tbi.B-72 (1995) (reporting that in 1994 the 
rate for commercial paper was 4.93 % per annum while the prime rate was 7.15% per annum); ilffra 
Appendix Tables 1, 2. 
150. See infra Appendix Table 2. 
151. This is calculated using equation (3) and assuming an original judgment of $65 million and 
a prejudgment period of 10.6 years . .  
152. Thia is a 28% reduction in the interest component of the award. 
153. This calculation could also be made using the actual interest rate paid by Amoco on ita 
commercial paper. Such a calculation would be even more accurate because it uses even more specific 
information. 
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
ISS. In 1974, Amoco issued $150 million of floating rate notes, due in 1989, a fifteen-year debt. 
1 MOODY'S INVBSJ'ORS SBRVICB, MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 973 n.8 (1986). The intereat rate 
on the debt was 1 %  above the "Treasury Bill Rate." Id. Aa can be seen by comparing the intereat 
rates listed in Table 1 of the Appendix, 1 %  above Treasury bill rates would still have been significantly 
lower than the prime rate over the prejudgment period. See infra Appendix. 
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creases and to adjust interest rates for that risk. 156 The second is to use 
the following method to estimate the appropriate interest rate. 
The second method for setting the prejudgment interest rate is for the 
court to estimate the spread of the rate at which the defendant could have 
borrowed over some short-term interest rate index for a term that is rough­
ly comparable to the prejudgment period. A simple way to do this is to 
start with the rating of the corporation's unsecured long-term debt, and 
then, using information from the bond rating services on the risk premiums 
for various risk classes, calculate what interest rate the defendant would 
have paid on similarly rated short-term or floating-rate debt.m The diff­
erence between the rate that the defendant would have paid and the index 
is then added to the index's average over the prejudgment period to pro­
duce the prejudgment interest rate. 
As applied to the facts of Amoco Cadiz, this calculation is straight­
forward. Throughout the prejudgment period, the unsecured long-term 
debt of Amoco was rated AAA by Standard and Poor's and Aaa by 
Moody's Investor Services, both agencies' highest ratings.158 Such debt 
is considered to be of the highest quality, with a very low probability of 
default. Accordingly, such debt pays very low interest rates, just slightly 
above the rate on U.S. Treasury securities . Based on data collected over 
the period from 1973 through 1987, which overlaps somewhat with the 
prejudgment period in Amoco Cadiz, 159 the spread over Treasury bills for 
triple-A-rated debt averaged forty-seven basis points. 160 Over the period 
used by the Amoco Cadiz court to calculate its average interest rate, the 
short-term Treasury bill rate averaged 8.85 % .161 Adding forty-seven ba­
sis points to this rate, the constant interest rate used to calculate pre­
judgment interest is 9.32% . 162 The corresponding final judgment is 
156. These techniques are described by Merton, supra note 137, at 455-60. Such an exercise is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
157. If the corporation does not have a single class of unsecured debt outstanding, but several 
classea of aenior and subordinated debt, the court could take a weighted average of the ratings, in which 
the weighta are the outstanding balances, to estimate the rating that would be appropriate for the claim. 
The spread can also be estimated from the difference between the yield on the corporation's unsecured 
debt and Treasury securities with the same duration. 
158. MOODY'S INVBSTORS SBilVICB, INC., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL {1979-92); STANDARD 
AND PooR'S BoND GUIDE (1979-92) {Amoco was called Standard Oil until April 23, 1985). 
159. The prejudgment period runs from January 1, 1980 through July 24, 1990, the date the 
district court adopted the report of the special master. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1290, 1337 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
160. Edward I. Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and PerfoTmQIICe, 44 J. FIN. 909, 
917 (1989). A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point, so 47 basis points is a difference 
in interest rates of slightly leas than 0.5%.  
161 .  See bifra Appendix. 
162. This is 2.58% (258 basis points) below the interest rate the Amoco Cadiz court used to assess 
prejudgment interest. See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1335, 1337 (awarding the French plaintiffs 
prejudgment interest at the rate of 1 1 .9% per annum). 
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about $167 million, 163 which is $46 million less than the award made by 
the court using. the prime rate.164 
The virtue of the above method is that it takes into account the risk of 
a long-term investment in the defendant corporation.165 Such calcula­
tions, however, are only approximations. The principal reason is that debt 
instruments with the same bond rating do not all pay the same interest rate; 
ratings are an imprecise measure and they exclude much information that 
affects interest rates.1156 Accordingly, within a given rating, it is common 
to have a spread of rates and overlaps between ratings. The above method 
averages these features, but it does not eliminate them, which can be 
expected to affect the interest calculation. 
The two methods of setting the prejudgment interest rate that I have 
outlined above are simple to implement and either one, if accepted by the 
Amoco Cadiz court, would have reduced the interest component of the final 
judgment by about $40 million. 167 In addition, either argument was a 
likely winner for Amoco in view of Seventh Circuit precedent, which calls 
for using the prime rate only if neither side presents evidence of the cost 
163. This is also calculated using tho assumptions in supra note lSI. 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 143. This ropresenta a 31% reduction in the interest 
component of the award. 
165. A court could also use tho yield on Amoco's debt to estimate tho spread over Treasury 
securities. This estimate can then be used to calculate the multiplier, as in tho text. 
166. Ratinga only measure the risk of default; they exclude other factors that affect interest rates. 
See supra note 138. 
167. There is a third method for setting tho prejudgment interest rate. That method calculates what 
interest rate a debt instrument that had the same terms as tho judgment would pay. Financial econo­
mista have developed several models to estimate the market interest rate on a bond. These models com­
monly work by estimating a risk premium over Treasury securities as a function of several variables. 
Typically, the most important variables include leverage (which is frequently measured using financial 
ratios), volatility, and duration. 
Another factor that these regressions find affecta interest rates is marketability. Tho easier it is 
for a debtholder to sell a bond when the investor wanta to tum it into cash, tho lower tho interest rate. 
See Lawrence Fisher, Detenninanu of Rule Premiums on Corporate Bonds, 67 J. PoL. BcoN. 217, 221 
(1959) (explaining that •yields on almost all securities include" risk premiums, which depend in part 
•on the ease of turning the securities into cash"). The legal claim, however, cannot easily be sold, 
because direct sales of such claims are prohibited. Whether an adjustment should be made for the 
lesser marketability of the legal claim than a debt offering of the defendant is an interesting policy 
question. These regressions also often find that the bond ratings are significant. The ratings are a 
method of capturing information not contained in the other variables. For example, nonfinancial infor­
mation, such as the legal restrictions and protections in the bond indenture, is difficult to incorporate 
into a regression equation but is closely examined by the rating agencies. 
One difficulty with such models is that the regression equation might have to be estimated at dif­
ferent pointa in time. It is not sufficient to estimate one equation and then to use the resulting co­
efficienta to estimate the interest rate over the prejudgment period because the coefficienta are not 
necessarily stable. If they are not stable, separate equations must be estimated for different times, and 
each equation must be used to calculate interest rates only for the time it was estimated. Accordingly, 
because of the complexity of the task, I have not used it to calculate prejudgment interest in Amoco 
Cadiz. 
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of the defendant's unsecured borrowing.168 Yet Amoco presented no 
such evidence, arguing only that prejudgment interest should not be 
awarded, 169 but if it were awarded, then it should be assessed at the 
Treasury bill rate. 110 Both arguments were inconsistent with pre­
cedent. 171 As a result, Amoco probably paid $40 million more than 
necessary. 
To summarize the results of this Part, a court will rarely be able to 
observe a market transaction that is an exact equivalent of the coerced loan 
to the plaintiff. Accordingly, to set the prejudgment interest rate the court 
is going to have to use proxies and possibly make some adjustments. The 
Seventh Circuit has developed a rule of using the prime rate unless either 
party provides a more accurate estimate of the defendant's cost of un­
secured borrowing. That is a good rule because the prime rate is readily 
ascertainable and reflects changing market conditions. This Part has also 
described how to move beyond the prime rate by using a short-term rate 
at which the defendant borrows or by estimating the spread over Treasury 
securities on the defendant's long-term unsecured debt. Either method is 
a simple way for parties to address the question of what interest rate to use 
to assess prejudgment interest. 172 
IV. Adjustments to the Multiplier 
The previous Part described how to set the prejudgment interest rate, 
focusing on the selection of an interest rate index. This Part discusses 
possible refinements to the calculation of the multiplier once the index has 
been selected. Four such refinements are described: the choice of the 
compounding period, the calculation of the mean interest rate, fractional 
compounding periods, and income taxes. The two most important refine­
ments are for the compounding period and income taxes. 
168. See Gorenstein Bntera. ,  Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431 , 437 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Pomer, 1.) (choosing "the prime rate for convenience" but noting that "the interest rate paid by the 
defendant for unsecured loans" would be "a more precise estimate"). 
169. Amoco Cadi:t., 954 F.2d 1279, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992). 
170. Id. (explaining Amoco's position that the French plaintiffs were "not entitled to an increase" 
in the Treasury bill rate "[b ]ecause the district court could (and in Amoco's view should) have declined 
to award any prejudgment interest"). 
171. See Gorenstein, 874 F.2d at 436-37 (announcing "that prejudgment interest should be 
presumptively available to victima of federal law violations," rejecting the use of the Treasury bill rate 
to calculate prejudgment interest "because there is no default risk with treasury bills," and choosing 
the prime rate for convenience but noting that a better estimate would be the interest rate paid by the 
defendant for unsecured loans). 
172. However, neither method will produce the precise, theoretically correct interest rate. The 
first method does not take account of duration, and the second method does not adjust for the many 
features included in corporate debt that influence interest ratea. Although there are methods to adjust 
for these effects, neither method eliminates the problem of the market's evolving estimate of the final 
judgment, which cannot be completely fixed. See supra note 140. 
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A frequently overlooked aspect of the litigation of prejudgment interest 
is the compounding period. All interest rates, either explicitly or 
implicitly, assume a compounding period. The compounding period refers 
to the frequency with which interest is calculated, and the number of com­
pounding periods in a year is denoted by n. Yearly compounding means 
that interest is calculated just once a year (so n= 1); monthly compounding 
means that it is calculated once a month (so n= 12). The compounding pe­
riod is important when calculating compound interest, which is how pre­
judgment interest should be calculated, as opposed to simple interest. 173 
Because compound interest calculates interest on interest, the more frequent 
the compounding, the greater the amount of interest. 
For example, assume that a court has decided to calculate interest on 
a judgment by reference to a 10% interest rate that reflects the rate paid on 
bonds issued by the defendant. If the judgment is for $ 1  million and 
interest is to be calculated for one year, then the judgment including 
interest would be for $ 1 . 1  million, with $100,000 interest. However, 
corporate bonds usually pay, and thus compound, interest every six 
months.174 Thus, the bond probably pays 10% ,  compounded semiannu­
ally, which means that the interest rate is 5% over each six-month period. 
Hence, over the first six months, $50,000 interest will accrue. After six 
months, the outstanding balance is $1 ,050,000. On this amount, interest 
will accrue at the rate of 5% over the next six months, producing an 
additional $52,500 interest. Therefore, the total interest on the judgment 
will be $102,500. The $2,500 interest accrual in the second six-month 
period exceeds the interest accrued during the first period because of 
compounding. It is the 5% interest on the $50,000 interest generated in 
the first period. It is a general principle that for a given stated interest 
rate, more interest accrues the shorter the compounding period. 
Moreover, the impact of the choice of compounding period on the 
award can be substantial . For example, the Amoco Cadiz court awarded 
interest at the prime rate compounded yearly.175 The court did not take 
into account the practice that prime rate loans typically call for quarterly 
interest compounding.176 Adjusting the interest rate calculation for the 
173. See supra subpart ll(A). 
174. See WIWAM A. KLBIN & JOHN C. COFFBB, JR., BUSINBSS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: 
LBOAL AND EcONOMIC PRINCIPLBS 236 (5th eel. 1993). 
175. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1332. 
176. Other courts have. For example, in a patenl suit brought by Mobil against Amoco, Mobil 
was awarded prejudgment interest at the prime rate, compounded quarterly. See Mobil Awarded $91 
MiUion Against Amoco, RBUTBRS LTD. , Oct. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS 
file (awarding "prejudgment interest compounded quarterly baaed on the prime rate"). That opinion 
was later withdrawn without explanation. See Patenl8, Opinion Recalled, 49 Pat. Trademark & 
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1207, at 138 (Dec. 8, 1994). 
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more frequent compounding that the quoted rate presumes would have in­
creased the interest component of the award by about $ 1 1  million.171 
The above discussion implies that the calculation of interest on a 
judgment should use the same compounding period that is used with the 
reference interest rate. If that compounding period is not used, the court 
is using not the reference interest rate but a different rate to calculate 
interest. 178 
B. Of Means. Arithmetic and Geometric 
The usual method of setting an interest rate with which to calculate 
prejudgment interest is to take an average (mean) of interest rates from the 
injury until the judgment.179 The mean rate is commonly calculated by 
taking a sample of rates over the prejudgment period, adding . these rates 
together, and dividing by the number of observations to produce a mean 
rate of interest. That mean interest rate, called the arithmetic mean, is then 
used to determine the multiplier by plugging that value into equation (3). 
177. A loan that pays interest of 1 1 .85", compounded quarterly, actually pays intereat at 2.9625" 
each quarter. Over 10.6 years, there are 42 full quarterly compounding periods and 40" of a 43d. 
Thus, the multiplier can be calculated as follows: 
Accordingly, the total award can be calculated as follows: 
$65 miUton x 3.4482 - $224.133 million. 
That is an increase of $11 .1  million from the final award arrived at by the Amoco Cadiz court. Thus, 
by correctly compoundins interest quarterly, the intereat component of the award would have been 
increased by about 7.5 " .  
178. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v.  United States, 31  Fed. Cl. 481, 493 (1994) ("[W]e are mindful 
that rate of interest and compounding period are inextricably related."), qff'd, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). Another way to give effect to this prescription is to calculate the effective interest rate from the 
stated intereat rate and then calculate interest using annual compounding. The formula for the effective 
intereat rate, r., is 
r, 
'· - (1 + -)" - 1, ,. 
where r1 is the stated intereat rate and n is the number of compounding periods in a year. Thus, if 
interest is compounded quarterly, n = 4, and if it ia compounded monthly, n = 12. See Ross BT AL., 
supra note 73, at 91. An intereat rate of 11 .85", compounded quarterly, is equivalent to an effective 
interest rate of 12.39", which is calculated aa follows: 
.1239 - (1 + •1185)4 - 1 .  4 
179. The term "mean" is used instead of "average" because average is ambiguous. Average can 
imply the mean value as described above, or the median value (the value for which half the 
observations are below and half above) or the mode (the value that occurs most frequently). See 
DARRELL HUFF, HOW TO LIB WITH STATISfiCS 28 (1954). 
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This method, although it has the virtue of simplicity, is wrong and biased 
against the defendant because it systematically overestimates the correct 
amount of interest. 
In order to calculate the interest that accrues on the original judgment, 
a court should calculate the geometric mean of the forward factors.180 
The motivation for this result comes from the principle of compounding. 
Because the accumulated value of an investment will grow by the forward 
factor over each compounding period, the compound average rate of 
growth (i.e. ,  the constant rate of growth that will produce the same ending 
value) is the geometric mean.111 The rationale for using the geometric 
mean is easier to understand through an example. 182 
Suppose that in each of two successive years an asset will either 
double in value (r= lOO%) or halve in value (r=-50%), both with proba­
bility 50% .  Accordingly, a $1 investment will either be worth $2 or $0.50 
at the end of the first year. Suppose that the asset's performance over the 
two-year period results in the asset doubling in one year and halving in the 
other, so that the asset's price ends up exactly where it started.183 This 
implies that a constant annual return of zero over the two years would 
replicate the total return on the asset. Consequently, the geometric mean 
rate of return is zero.184 
180. The geometric mean, p.0, oft observations-�, Oz, . . .  , 01, • • •  , 0,-is the zth root of their 
product: 
In contrast, the arithmetic mean, p."' is their sum divided by z: 
0,+02+ ••• +0,+ ••• +0, 
I-lA • z 
181.  See BoDIB BT AL., supra note 122, at 721 . 
182. The example cornea from id. at 722-23. 
183 . Assuming that the asset first doubles in value, it will be worth $2 at the end of the first year. 
Since it is assumed to lose half of its value during the second year, it will be worth $1 at the end of 
that year. This can be written as 
FY - $1 (1 + 1)(1 - .5) - $1 . 
184. The formula for the geometric mean rate of return, ro. over two periods is given by 
Because of the commutative property of multiplication, the order in which the returns are realized does 
not affect the ending value. Substituting in the realized returns, the equation for the geometric mean 
can be written 
r0 - [(1 + 1)(1 - .!S)]lfl - 1 - 0, 
which implies that the geometric mean return is zero, r0 = 0. 
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However, the arithmetic mean rate of return over the two years is not 
zero, but 25% .185 Of course, an investment yielding 25 % a year over 
two years will not replicate the total return earned on the asset, which is 
zero, but will greatly exceed it.186 The result, that the arithmetic mean 
exceeds the geometric mean, is not coincidental. Geometric means will 
never exceed arithmetic means, and as long as there is any variability in 
the periodic return, the arithmetic mean will exceed the geometric.187 
Moreover, the difference between the two becomes greater as the volatility 
of returns increases.188 
The principal result that emerges from this subpart is straightforward 
and simple. Courts incorrectly calculate prejudgment interest when they 
calculate the arithmetic mean of the relevant interest rates and then use that 
rate to calculate the total award. 189 Instead, the theoretically correct 
method is to calculate the geometric mean of the forward factors and then 
use that rate to calculate the total award on a constant interest basis. The 
formula for the periodic geometric mean rate of return for a T-year invest­
ment, r 0/n, 190 is given by191 
185. The arithmetic mean rate of return, r,., is the sum of the tWo periodic returns divided by 2: 
Thus, the arithmetic mean is 
100% + -SO% 2S� TA - 2 -
• 
186. With a compounded annual return of25%, $1 will srow to $1.5625 at the end of two years. 
187. See Boom BT AL., supra note 122, at 721 .  
188. See id. (notiiiB that in a 60-year period of trackiiiB various investments, the sreateat differ­
ence between means occurs with stocks of small firms, which have the sreatest standard deviation in 
their annual returns). 
189. The seneral formula for the periodic arithmetic mean, r)n, is as follows: 
TA 
-n 
r1 r2 T1 T11T - + - + • • a  + - + • • •  + -" " n n 
nT 
190. The periodic interest.rate is r ofn, and there are n compoundiiiBperiods in a year. The annual 
interest rate, which is the way interest ratea are usually expreased, is r <P compounded n times in a year. 
Throushout this Article, I follow the usual convention of expreasiiiB interest ratea as annual rates. 
191. The equation for the geometric mean can easily be expanded to tske into account more obser­
vations than compounding periods. Suppose, for example, that a court decide• to use the one-year 
Treasury rate to calculate prejudgment interest over a five-year period from January 1,  1991, through 
December 31,  1995. The court could use the rate on January 1 of each year, which would give it five 
observation&. However, there is no particular reaaon to favor the ratea on January 1 over any other 
day of the year. In particular, if there is an upward trend in intereat ratea over the five years, lookiiiB 
at interest ratea at the beginning of each year would undereatimate accrued interest. Similarly, choosins 
a date at the end of the year would overestimate accrued interest. A more accurate measure of interest 
rates over the five-year period would take samples more frequently, perhaps quarterly or even daily 
depending on the amount involved. When the geometric average return is calculated in this manner, 
nT in equation (4) is the number of observations instead of the number of compoundiiiB periods. 
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r r r. r r ...!!. - [(1 + ...!)(1 + ....!) • • •  (1 + ..1) . . .  (1 + 2!))1/IIT - 1, (4) 
II II II II II 
where r/n is the return in each period.192 
Using the computer databases, my research assistants and I examined 
the cases in which prejudgment interest has been awarded. We were un­
able to find any discussion of the proper method of averaging interest rates 
for the purpose of calculating prejudgment interest. Undoubtedly, some 
courts have used the geometric mean because lawyers, and, more fre­
quently, the experts they have hired, have calculated prejudgment interest 
that way and the courts have accepted their calculations. However, be­
cause the arithmetic mean is far more familiar to most people, especially 
anyone who has ever calculated a grade point average, I suspect that most 
calculations use it and are, therefore, theoretically flawed. 
Although it is theoretically incorrect to use the arithmetic mean to 
calculate interest, the error that results from using it instead of the 
geometric mean is probably small. For example, the plaintiffs in Amoco 
Cadiz would have been awarded about $1 million less had the court used 
the geometric mean instead of the arithmetic.1113 Although $ 1  million is 
There is one cautionary note when the number of observations exceeds the number of com­
pounding periods. The resulting calculation for the full value of the award will no longer replicate the 
performance that an investor could have obtained by investing the original judgment in Treasury 
securities at the date the injury occurred. However, thia should not be a concern because the court's 
task is not to calculate what the plaintiff could have received by investing in one-year Treasury 
securities and rolling over the investment at the end of each year. 
192. To see that the geometric mean is the theoretically correct mean to use, substitute equation 
(3) into equation (2), which yields 
"•VJT FY - J X (1 + -, . 
Jl 
Setting this last equation equal to equation (1), which expresses FV as a function of J and the forward 
factors, and dividing both sides by J, yields 
�VIT � � � � (1 + -, - (1 + -)(1 +-) . . .  (1 + -) . . .  (1 + -). 
Jl II II Jl II 
Taking the 11Tth root of each side and subtracting one yields the formula for the correctly calculated 
periodic mean interest nte: 
,. .,. ,., ,., ,., ,. ..r 1/riT - - [(1 + -)(1 + -) . . .  (1 + -) . . .  (1 + -)] - 1 .  
II Jl II II II 
Because the above formula for r,./11 is also the formula for r,jn, equation (4), the geometric mean is 
the correct mean to use. 
193 . The plaintiffs in Amoco Cadiz claimed that the avenge prime nte over the 1980s was 1 1 .9% .  
Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1335 (7th Cir. 1992). Using data published by the federal government, 
the arithmetic mean of the prime nte over the 1980a wis 11 .85% (rounded to tour decimal places). 
See EcoNOMIC RBPoRT OF THB PRBslDBNT, supra note 149, at 358 tbi.B-72 (listing the bond yields 
and interest ntes from 1929-1994); infra Appendix Table 2. The corresponding geometric mean was 
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not an amount that most lawyers or their clients would ignore, it is less 
than one percent of the interest component of the award. Thus, the prac­
tical significance of calculating the mean interest rate in the proper way is 
likely to be small in most cases.194 Given the additional complexity of 
calculating the geometric mean and the relatively small· amounts in­
volved, 195 I am not surprised that we could find no discussion of it. 196 
1 1 .80".  See EcONOMIC RBPoRT OF THB PRBsiDBNT, supra note 149, at 3S8 tbl.B-72; infra Appendix 
Table 2. The following table seta out the multiplier, total award, and interest component of the Amoco 
Cadiz. award using both the arithmetic and geometric means. Aa before, the table assumes an original 
judgment of $6S million and a prejudgment period of 10.6 yean with annual compounding. 
Method of Mean Multiplier Total Award Interest Component 
Calculating Mean ($ millions) ($ millions) 
Arithmetic 1 1 .8S 3 .277S 213.037 148.037 
Geometric 1 1 .80 3 .2620 212.030 147.030 
194. Given the volatility of interest rates over the prejudgment period in Amoco Cadiz., unless in­
terest rates become much more volatile, it is unlikely that the method of calculating the mean interest 
rate will have a large effect in many cases. 
19S. In addition, the time and effort that would have to be devoted to explain the proper averaging 
method to the decision-maker might not be worth the effort. See Michael Brookshire& Frank Sleanick, 
1993 Survey ofNAFE Members: A Follow-Up Survey of Economic Methodology, 1 1. FORBNSIC BcoN. 
25, 31-32 (1993) (auerting that a simple and less accurate method is appropriate for estimating trend 
values). 
196. There is a second Ieason that emerges from this subpart and that lesson, unfortunately, is 
neither straightforward nor simple to follow. The arithmetic mean had the desirable property that it 
allowed adjustment& that were either a simple increase or decrease of a fixed number of percentage 
pointa or a multiple of the rate to be made after the calculation of the mean. Making such adjustments 
after calculating the arithmetic mean was equivalent to calculating the mean of the adjusted values. In 
contrast, the geometric mean does not have this desirable property, With the geometric mean, neither 
adjustments that are a fixed multiple of the rate nor fixed increases or decreases can be made after the 
calculation of the mean without changing the result. Such adjustments must be applied to each entry 
before calculating the mean if the resulting value is to be the geometric mean of such adjusted values. 
To see that adjusting the geometric mean is not equivalent to calculating the geometric mean of 
the adjusted entries, return to the example above. Assume that the plaintiff's marginal tax rate is so"' 
and assume that the tax treatment of prejudgment interest changes so that it  is  not includable by the 
plaintiff. Since prejudgment interest is aasumed not to be includable in income, the appropriate rates 
of return would be cut in half. Thus, the firat year's return would be SO "  and the second year's return 
-25 " .  The resulting product of the future value factors (1 .125 "> implies a compound annual interest 
rate of6.07".  (Recall that the periodic returna were 100" and then -SO" .  With a SO" tax rate, the 
after-tax returns, assuming the losses are fully deductible, are SO" and -25 ".  Thus, the forward 
facton are (1 + .S) and (1 - .25), and their product is 1 .12S, the square root ofwhich is 1 .0607, which 
implies a conatsnt annual rate of return of 6.07".) This is not equal to the before-tax compound 
annual interest rate (0 ") reduced by the tax rate (still 0 ">. Thus, since the compound adjusted interest 
rate is correct only if each entry is adjusted before calculating the mean value, proper interest calcu­
lation requires such a process. The difference, however, is probably small in most caiCIB. 
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25, 31-32 (1993) (asserting that a simple and less accurate method is appropriate for estimating trend 
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196. There is a second lesson that emerges from this subpart and that lesson, unfortunately, is 
neither straightforward nor simple to follow. The arithmetic mean had the desirable property that it 
allowed adjustment& that were either a simple increase or decrease of a fixed number of percentage 
points or a multiple of the rate to be made after the calculation of the mean. Making such adjustment& 
after calculating the arithmetic mean wu equivalent to calculating the mean of the adjusted values. In 
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adjustments that are a fixed multiple of the rate nor fixed increases or decreases can be made after the 
calculation of the mean without changing the reault. Such adjustment& must be applied to each entry 
before calculating the mean if the resulting value is to be the geometric mean of such adjusted values. 
To see that adjusting the geometric mean is not equivalent to calculating the geometric mean of 
the adjusted entries, return to the example above. Assume that the plaintiff's marginal tax rate �· SO%, 
and assume that the tax treatment of prejudgment interest changes so that it is not includable by the 
plaintiff. Since prejudgment interest is assumed not to be includable in income, the appropriate rates 
of return would be cut in half. Thus, the tint year's return would be SO% and the second year's return 
-25%.  The resulting product of the future value factors (1 .125 Slli) implies a compound annual interest 
rate of 6.07%. (Recall that the periodic returns were 100% and then -SO%. With a SO% tax rate, the 
after-tax returns, assuming the losses are fully deductible, are SO% and -25%.  Thus, the forward 
factors are (1 + .S) and (1 - .25), and their product is 1 .125, the square root ofwhich is l.0607, which 
impliea a constant annual rate of return of 6.07%.) This is not equal to the before-tax compound 
annual interest rate (0%) reduced by the tax rate (still 0 Slli). Thus, since the compound adjusted interest 
rate is correct only if each entry is adjusted before calculating the mean value, proper interest calcu­
lation requires such a process. The difference, however, is probably small in most cases. 
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C. Fractional Periods 
One problem that is likely to arise frequently in the calculation of 
prejudgment interest is what to do with fractional periods. Rarely will the 
prejudgment period coincide precisely with a whole number of the refer­
ence rate's compounding ·periods. Thus, to calculate interest for the 
prejudgment period, the court will likely have to calculate interest for 
fractional periods, either at the beginning or end of the prejudgment 
period.197 
There are two ways to calculate interest for a fractional period. The 
first is to assume that simple interest is paid within each compounding 
period.198 For example, if the compounding period were 180 days (n=2) 
and 45 of the 180 days were to be included at the end of the prejudgment 
period, then the interest for the fractional period would be one-fourth of 
the interest that would be due if the entire compounding period were 
included. If the prejudgment period were 3 years and 45 days ( T= 3 . 125) 
and the interest rate were 10% ,  compounded semiannually, the multiplier 
would be 1 .3568, which is the multiplier for 6 periods (1 .3401) plus one­
fourth of the difference between the multipliers for 7 (1 .4071) and 6 
periods. 199 The second method is to calculate compound interest over the 
partial last period by putting the fraction into the exponent. 200 Thus, the 
exponent would be 6.25 and the multiplier would be 1 .3565.201 Because 
simple interest accelerates the accrual of interest within a compounding 
period, the first method would produce a slightly higher result than the 
second.202 In the above example, the difference would be less than thirty 
cents on each $1000 of the original judgment. 203 
197. For an amusing discussion of how many days there are in a year for the purpose of calcu­
lating prejudgment interest, see Amoco Cadit, 789 F. Supp. 268, 270-71 (N.D. Dl. 1992), qff'd mem., 
4 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 1993). 
198. This is equivalent to paying interest on a pro-rata basis within a compounding period. 
199. When simple interest is provided over a fractional period, the multiplier given in equation 
(3) becomes: 
m - (1 +r .).a' + J[(l+r ,).a' •I - (l+r /J, 
where nT' is the number of completed compounding periods and/ is the completed portion of the last 
period. 
. 
200. This is equivalent to assuming continuous compounding within a compounding period. 
201 .  The exponent (6.25), the number of compounding periods, is the product of n (2) and T 
(3 .125). 
202. See FINANCIAL COMPOUND INTBRBsT AND ANNUITY TABLBS 20S1-S2 (Charles H. Gushee 
ed., 6th ed. 1980). Compound interest generates more interest than simple interest across two or more 
complete compounding periods. Id. at 2051.  However, simple interest generates interest more rapidly 
within a single period. ld. 
203 . This is leas than one-thirtieth of 1 %  of the final award and leas than one-tenth of 1 % of the 
interest component of that award. 
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Returning to Amoco Cadiz, the prejudgment period is 10.6 years. 
Compounding interest yearly, there are ten complete compounding periods 
and 60% of an eleventh. Thus, using the first method (simple interest) to 
calculate. interest over the fractional period, the multiplier would be 
3 .2824, which is the multiplier for 10 years (3.0645) plus 60% of the 
difference between the multiplier for 1 1  years (3.4276) and the multiplier 
for 10 years. The second method (continuously compounded interest) pro­
duces a multiplier of 3 .2775.'JJJ4 Hence, the total award with the first 
method is $213.355 million, which is $318,000 more than the award with 
the second method. 205 
The theoretically correct Jllethod to calculate prejudgment interest is 
the same method that the parties to the referenced financial transaction 
would use in calculating fractional period interest if the occasion arose. 
This will usually be the first method, the simple interest calculation for 
fractional periods, because this is the standard bond convention. 7116 If, 
however, the reference rate called for the second method, continuously 
compounded interest, then that method would be the one to use. In prac­
tice, however, the difference is unlikely to be large enough to warrant 
much attention. 
D. Adjusting the Multiplier for Taxes 
Much has been written on the tax treatment of legal recoveries, which 
includes prejudgment interest. That literature takes the judgment as given 
and seeks to examine from the perspective of tax law what the proper tax 
treatment should be. That literature does not ask whether courts correctly 
assess judgments and therefore does not propose to adjust their tax treat­
ment to offset any systematic errors in calculation. Instead, the literature 
assumes that judgments, on average, are correctly calculated, or if there 
are systematic errors in calculation, these errors fall within the purview of 
others to correct, and it seeks to assess the proper tax treatment according 
204. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
205. This is a difference of about one-fifth of 1 %  of the interest component. The difference is 
mucb smaller with quarterly compounding. There are 42 complete compounding periods and 40% of 
a forty-third. The fint computational method produces a multiplier of 3 .4486, which is the multiplier 
for 42 periods (3 .4082) plus 40% of the difference between the multiplier for 43 period• (3 .5091) and 
the multiplier for 42 periods. The second computational method produces a multiplier of 3 .4482. The 
difference in the award ia about $23,000, leas than one-fiftieth of 1 %  of the interest component. In 
genenl, the aborter the compounding period, the smaller the difference from choosing one or the other 
computational method for fractional periods. 
206. See FRANK l. FABOZZl, FlxBD INCOMB MATHEMATICS 73-74 (rev. ed. 1993) (stating that 
accrued interest on a bond between coupon payments ia calculated pro-rata); FINANCIAL COMPOUND 
INTBRBST AND ANNUITY TABLBS, supra note 202, at 2053 ("[l]n the caae of bonds it is customary to 
compute simple accrued interest from the last coupon date."). 
336 Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:293 
to tax principles.207 In this Article, I adopt the opposite approach. 
Because this is not a tax article, I do not consider whether the current tax 
treatment of prejudgment interest is correct. I only consider how interest 
should be calculated in light of the tax treatment the law provides. Thus, 
if the tax treatment of prejudgment interest is changed, the calculations will 
have to be modified. 
This Article has so far described how prejudgment interest should be 
calculated without taking taxes into account. When the calculation takes 
taxes into account, the multiplier has to be modified because the tax treat­
ment of prejudgment interest does not precisely mirror the tax treatment of 
corporate bond interest generally. The principal result that emerges is that 
taxes will reduce the multiplier because both the original award and pre­
judgment interest on that award are deferred for tax purposes. 
There are two ways in which the tax treatment of prejudgment interest 
might differ from that of interest generally-characterization and timing. 
Starting with characterization, prejudgment interest is treated as interest for 
tax purposes and does not take its character from the underlying judg­
ment. 208 Thus, prejudgment interest is deductible by the payor and in­
cludable by the recipient, which means that prejudgment interest is 
characterized in the same manner as interest generally. Accordingly, be­
cause prejudgment interest is taxable, prejudgment interest should be 
awarded at a before-tax rate. 
207. See, e.g., Joseph W. Blackburn, Tauuion of Penonol l1fiury Damages: Recommendations 
for Reform, 56 TBNN. L. RBv. 661 (1989); Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage 
Recovery T�ation, 14 WM. MITcHELL . RBv. 759 (1988); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Tom, 77 
CORNELL L. RBv. 143 (1992); Paul C. Feinberg, Federal Income Tauuion of Punitive Damages 
Awarded in Penonol lnjury Actions, 42 CASB W. RBs. L. RBv. 339 (1992); Thomas D. Griffith, 
Should "T� Norma • Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tea Policy A111llysi8 and the Taxation of Penonal 
Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. RBv. 1 115; Bertram Harnett, Tort.r and Teaes, 27 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 
614 (1952); Robert J. Henry, "Tort.r and Taxes, Teae1 and Tort.r: The Tauuion of Personol Injury 
R�covefies •, 23 Hous. L. RBv. 701 (1986); Aharon Yoran, Tea Aspecta in Tort Compensation, 22 lsR. 
L. RBv. 37 (1987). 
208. Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that prejudgment interest 
is taxable to the plaintiff because it is compenaation for the lost time value of money in obtaining a 
judgment and lacks the neceaaary immediate link between the award and the injury to qualify for the 
statutOry exclusion of damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness under I.R.C. 
I 104(a)(2) (1994)), rev'g 859 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that mandatory pre­
judgment interest paid to personal injury victims is not taxed because under Colorado law it is 
characterized aa damages), petition for cert . .filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3709 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1996) (No. 95-
1641); Commissioner v. Raphael, 133 F.2d 442, 444-47 (9th Cir. 1943) ( holding that prejudgment 
interest is taxable to the plaintiff even. when the underlying judgment ia tax exempt); Kovacs v. 
Commissioner, 100 T .C. 124, 131 (1993) (stating that statutorily imposed prejudgment interest is not 
excluded from income as damage on personal injury and ia therefore taxable), a.ff'd mem., 2S F.3d 
1048, cert. denied, US S. Ct. 424 (1994); Michael Asimow, The Interest Deduction, 24 UCLA L. 
RBV. 749, 770-72 (1977) (asserting that the line of authority that stands for the proposition that 
prejudgment interest should be taxed like the underlying damsgeaward has been discredited); Feinberg, 
supl'll note 207, at 376-77 (nnting that prejudgment interest is taxed to the recipient as interest 
regardless of how the underlying claim is taxed). 
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If both the characterization and timing of prejudgment interest were 
identical to those of interest generally, it would be appropriate to award 
prejudgment interest as described above, when taxes are ignored. Award­
ing prejudgment interest at the stated interest rate would place the suc­
cessful plaintiff in the same position that it would have been in, both before 
and after paying taxes, had the defendant paid its liability immediately and 
had the plaintiff loaned the proceeds to the defendant in exchange for an 
unsecured promise by the defendant to later repay the loan with in­
terest.� 
However, the timing of the creditor's interest inclusions and the 
debtor's deductions are not the same with prejudgment interest as they 
would be on a debt instrument with the same terms. Prejudgment interest 
is taxed when it is paid, 210 whereas interest generally (including bond 
interest) is taxed as it accrues, even if it is not paid until much later. 211 
Thus, compared with interest on a bond, the inclusions and deductions with 
prejudgment interest are tax deferred. 
The deferral of tax on prejudgment interest together with interest 
compounding imply that on an after-tax basis the plaintiff would be over­
compensated and the defendant would overpay if the final judgment were 
calculated using the multiplier in equation (3) without an adjustment for 
taxes. Because of compounding, the plaintiff earns interest on money that 
it would have paid in taxes (on interest previously earned) were the liability 
paid immediately and the proceeds invested in the defendant's debt. 
Accordingly, the present value of the plaintiff's tax liability on the 
prejudgment interest award is less than what its corresponding liability 
would be on bond interest if the damages were paid immediately and the 
proceeds invested at the same interest rate in the defendant's unsecured 
debt. Therefore, because the plaintiff's tax liability from prejudgment 
interest is less than its liability from the interest on a bond with the same 
terms, the multiplier and the award should be reduced to account for taxes. 
Similarly, the defendant overpays unless the multiplier is modified to 
reflect the deferral of tax on prejudgment interest. If the defendant paid 
209. This assumes that the settlement and the loan would be treated as separate tranaactions for 
tax purposes and would not be combined into a deferred settlement. See Tress. Reg. l 1 .461-
4(g)(1)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1995) (specifying that payment of a liability arising under a tort, breach 
of contract, or violation of law as outlined by Tress. Reg. § 1 .461-4(g)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995) 
"does not include the furnishing of a note or other evidence of indebtedness of the taxpayer"). 
210. It cannot be taxed as it "accrues" because the obligation is not fixed until the award is final 
and because the taxpayer must file a return shortly after the end of each year for the previous year. 
The taxpayer cannot delay filing until all tranaactions that began during the year are completed. See 
26 U.S.C. I 441(a) (1994); Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1 .441-1T(b)(1)(i)(B) (as amended in 1987) (stipu­
lating that unless otherwise provided a "taxable year may not cover a period of more than 12 calendar 
months"). 
211. This is the result of the original issue discount (OlD) rules. The OlD rules are codified at 
26 u.s.c. §§ 1271-1275. 
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the plaintiff immediately and the plaintiff invested the proceeds in unse­
cured, zero-coupon debt issued by the defendant, the defendant would not 
have to wait until the bond matured and the interest was paid to deduct its 
interest expense. Instead, each year the defendant would deduct the in­
terest that accrued during. that year. Thus, once again, the multiplier 
should be reduced, but now it is because the defendant's tax benefit from 
interest paid on a bond is greater than its benefit from an equivalent award 
of prejudgment interest. 
In order to adjust the award for the deferred tax on prejudgment in­
terest, the court should recognize that had the defendant paid the plaintiff 
immediately and had the plaintiff invested the proceeds, the plaintiff would 
have paid taxes all along on the accrued interest. Accordingly, the plaintiff 
would have earned interest after paying taxes not at the stated (before-tax) 
interest rate but at the after-tax rate. Thus, because the plaintiff will be 
taxed on prejudgment interest only when it is received, prejudgment 
interest should be awarded at the after-tax interest rate and then grossed up 
for taxes when it is received. This will leave the plaintiff, after paying 
taxes, with the same after-tax award. It will also leave the defendant in the 
same position as it would be in had it borrowed the money to pay the 
plaintiff because it would have received interest deductions all along. 
Therefore, when the tax treatment of prejudgment interest is taken into 
account, the multiplier, denoted by m .. m becomes:212 
T AT 
(1 + ..2!!.....)"T - 1 
n 
------ + 1, 
1 - 'tr 
(5) 
where Tr is the tax rate in year T and r,.Ar is the mean after-tax interest 
rate, with r1AT = r1(l-T1). 213 
There are two complications with calculating a multiplier using equa­
tion (5) that are not present when using equation (3). First, a quick look 
at eqq.ation (5) reveals that the court needs more information to calculate 
the multiplier with equation (5) than with equation (3). Equation (3) is a 
function only of the stated interest rate and time; it is not a function of 
corporate tax rates. In contrast, equation (5) is a function not only of the 
212. The intuition behind equation (5) is as follows: the numerator is the after-tax interest 
component of the multiplier and the denominstor is the gross-up. One is added to the multiplier 
because the original award is not grossed-up, which is also why one is subtracted in the numerator. 
213. If prejudgment interest were not taxable, but bond interest still were, it would not be 
appropriate to gross up the payment. Accordingly, the multiplier would become 
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stated interest rate and time, but also of corporate tax rates over the 
prejudgment period. The additional burden of making this more compli­
cated calculation, however, is small. The defendant's past tax rates can be 
readily determined from the defendant, and the calculation is easy to do 
with a spreadsheet. 
The second complication from calculating the multiplier using equation 
(5) is that the plaintiff and the defendant might require different multipliers. 
Only if the plaintiff and the defendant are both subject to tax at the same 
rate will they have the same multiplier. If, however, the parties are subject 
to tax at different rates, they will have different multipliers because each 
party's multiplier is a function of its history of marginal corporate tax 
rates. · In this event, any multiplier set by the court will at most be right 
for only one side, and hence, the court must decide upon which party to 
focus attention because the final judgment will either be too large or too 
small for the other party.214 
Adjusting the multiplier for the tax treatment of prejudgment interest 
is not the only modification that tax considerations might require. In order 
to satisfy the goals of fairness and efficiency, the multiplier might also 
have to be adjusted to reflect the tax treatment of the original judgment. 
Equation (5) implicitly assumes that there would be no tax consequences 
to either party from paying the award immediately. That is to say, if the 
defendant paid the plaintiff immediately, the plaintiff would not be taxed 
and so could turn around and invest the entire payment. If, however, an 
immediate payment would be taxable to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff 
could not invest the entire award but only the after-tax award. 215 
(Similarly, if the defendant could have deducted its payment to the 
plaintiff, that would have reduced its after-tax payment and hence the 
amount it must borrow to pay the plaintiff.) On this amount, the plaintiff 
will earn interest and pay taxes each year, as described above. 
Compounding interest at the after-tax rate yields what the plaintiff would 
have accumulated after taxes, assuming that it had been paid immediately. 
Once again, to calculate the final judgment, the after-tax award must be 
grossed up, so that the plaintiff will be left, after paying taxes, with the 
after-tax award. Accordingly, when the original award is taxable, the 
multiplier, now denoted by m.cr• may be written as216 
214. This problem is especially likely to occur when the defendant is a municipality because the 
interest paid on the judgment is taxable to the plaintiff, whereas interest paid on municipal bonds 
usually is not. Thus, if the award is to compensate the plaintiff, then the defendant's coat of unsecured 
(tsx exempt) borrowing muat be incresaed to reflect the tax paid by the plaintiff on the interest. Alter­
natively, if the award is to deter the defendant, then it would not be necessary to increase the intereat 
rate to ensure that the defendant does not benefit from the delay. 
215. The effect is the same if the immediate payment of the award would cause the plaintiff to lose 
a deduction or exclusion that it otherwise would have had. 
216. The intuition behind equation (6) is that the numerator is the after-tax component of the multi­
plier and the denominator ia the gross-up. One is neither subtracted from the numerator nor added to 
: r 
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(6) 
1 - 'tT 
where Tr and rmAT are as defined in equation (5) and 70 is the tax rate at the 
time of injury. 217 Multipliers calculated using equation (6) will usually 
be smaller than those calculated using equation (5) because with the latter 
there is no interest on that portion of the original award that the plaintiff 
would have paid in taxes (and that the defendant would have saved in 
taxes).2ta 
Which multiplier a court should use depends on the tax situations of 
the parties and the nature of the award. The court must first decide 
whether to focus on the plaintiff or the defendant, or a weighted average 
of the two. Then it should inquire into whether the award, if paid imme­
diately, would be taxed to the plaintiff or deductible by the defendant, as 
relevant. If it would be taxed, use equation (6); if not, use equation (5). 
In all cases, use the relevant party's tax rates. Equations (5) and (6) both 
reduce to equation (3) when all tax rates are zero. 
In Amoco Cadiz, for instance, the court properly compensated the 
French plaintiffs, which were tax-exempt government entities, by using 
equation (3) because their recovery and interest earnings were not reduced 
by taxes .219 If, however, the primary purpose behind the award had been 
to prevent Amoco's unjust enrichment or to deter future spills, then an 
adjustment would have been necessary and the court should have used 
equation (6). 
the fraction, as in equation (S), because both the after-tax originsl award and the interest component 
are grossed up. 
217. If prejudgment interest were not taxable, but the award were, then the multiplier would 
become: 
Kl' 
r. T 1 - �o mg - (1 - 'fo}[(l + -)" - 1] + --. 
" 1 - "r 
218. h is possible for the result to be reversed if tax rates have increased sharply. This is moat 
likely to occur when interest rateil are low and the prejudgment period is short. The intuition is that 
a larger award is necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the higher tax rate that is in effect when the 
judgment is paid versus the tax rate that would have applied had there been an immediate payment. 
If interest rates are low and the prejudgment period is short, then the additional interest that is a result 
of the higher tax rate prevailing at the end of the prejudgment period with equation (6) will exceed the 
interest earned on that portion of the original award that would have been taxed had it been paid 
immediately. 
219. The Seventh Circuit suggested that such an adjustment should have been made, but it made 
no attempt to do so. See Amoco Codiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1331 (7th Cir. 1992). Yet if the purpose of 
the award ia to compensate the plaintiffs, as the court suggested, see id., then no adjustment is 
necessary. 
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In general, equation (6) will give the correct multiplier when the 
purpose of the award is to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment be­
cause the defendant would have been entitled to a deduction as soon as it 
had paid the plaintiff but no sooner.220 When the purpose of the award 
is to compensate the plaintiff, the analysis is more complicated. If the 
award is taxable when it is received, then equation (6) gives the correct 
multiplier. On the other hand, if the award is not taxable at that time, then 
equation (5) gives the correct multiplier. 221 In general, the payment is 
taxable when it is received if it compensates the plaintiff for lost income, 
but not if it compensates for an otherwise deductible loss. 222 For exam­
ple, in a contract case in which the plaintiff is awarded expectancy damages 
of $1  million, $600,000 of which is compensation for expenses incurred 
and $400,000 is anticipated profit, the court should assess prejudgment 
interest on $600,000 using equation (5) as the multiplier and · on the re­
maining $400,000 using equation (6). 
To calculate the award necessary to prevent Amoco's unjust enrich­
ment would require using equation (6); it would also require knowledge of 
. Amoco's marginal tax rate each year. As a short cut, I have used the 
federal tax rate for the top corporate bracket, 223 which was 46% through 
1987 and 34% thereafter.224 Calculating prejudgment interest using the 
220. The Treasury regulations provide that a deduction for a liability arising out of a legal dispute 
can only be taken when the liability is paid. See Treas. Reg. § 1 .461-4(g)(2) (aa amended in 1994). 
However, if the payment ia a fine or penalty paid to the government, it ia not deductible. See 26 
U.S .C. § 162(f) (1994). In that case, because accelerating the payment would not accelerate a deduc­
tion, the court should use equation (S}. 
221. Thus, the court should also use equation (S) when the award compensates the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff is an individual, and the award is for personal injury, wrongful death, or a violation of civil 
rights because such awards are exempt from taxes. See MAllVIN A. CHIRBLSTBIN, FEDERAL INCOMB 
TAXATION: A GUIDB TO THB LEADING CASBS AND CONCBPTS 40-42 (7th ed. 1994) (describing the 
limits of the tax exemption for damage award recovery). 
222. The Treasury regulations provide that the taxpayer cannot claim a loss when "there exists a 
claim for reimbursement with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery. • Treas. 
Reg. § 1 .165-1(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 1977). In such a case, the loss is held in abeyance until it can 
be ascertained whether reimbursement will be received. Id. Consequently, since the loBI is deferred, 
it is offset by the reimbursement. 
2:i3. I ignore state income taxes, which should also be included. If the state tax rate is Ta and the 
federal rate is T,. then because state income taxes are deductible for federal income tax purposes, the 
combined total tax rate, Tr;. is given by: 
"c - "s + -r,(l - -r,). 
The combined total income tax rate should be used in the multiplier. 
224. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, Title m, I 301(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2820 
(1978) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § ll(b)(l) (1994)) (establishing 46% as the maximum corpo­
rate tax rate, effective for tax years beginning after December 31,  1978); Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10224(a), 101 Stat. 1330-412 (1987) (codified as amended at 26 
U .S.C. § 1 1(b)(l) (1994)) (establishing 34% as the maximum corporate tax rate, effective for tax years 
beginning after 1une 30, 1987). The maximum corporate tax rate was raised to 35% in 1993 for 
corporations with incomes over $10 million. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. 
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prime rate in the same manner as the Amoco Cadiz court, but adjusting for 
the tax treatment of prejudgment interest only (using equation (5)), the final 
award would have been $162. 166 million.225 Of course, this calculation 
does not take into account the deferral of tax on the original judgment. 
Because an immediate paylll.ent would have been deductible, the award nec­
essary to prevent Amoco's unjust enrichment (using equation (6)) would 
have been even less-$105.661 million.226 
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,ZJ.1 the government, which 
had infringed a Hughes patent for positioning satellites in orbit, resulting 
in a large damage award in favor of Hughes, argued that the final award 
should be adjusted for taxes in a manner similar to that proposed in this 
section. 228 The Court of Federal Claims, however, rejected that argu­
ment and calculated the award as described above without regard to taxes. 
Among other reasons, the court said that the method proposed by the 
government would inappropriately discriminate among successful plaintiffs 
whose tax rates vary.729 Such a modification, however, is not inappro­
priate; rather, it is necessary to compensate for plaintiffs' different tax 
situations. It is the failure to make these adjustments that introduces 
discrimination on an after-tax basis among plaintiffs; the adjustments are 
necessary to eliminate that discrimination. Moreover, the failure to adjust 
for taxes will systematically favor plaintiffs and disfavor defendants by 
awarding too much interest.230 Thus, such a rule would compromise the 
fairness and efficiency goals of prejudgment interest which require that the 
judgment be neither devalued nor increased by the passage of time. 
Awarding the correct amount of interest requires adjusting for the deferral 
of interest and the taxability of the judgment. 
E. Summary 
This Part has described four refinements to the calculation of pre­
judgment interest that affect the multiplier once the interest index has been 
selected. Two of them-assessing compound interest at a constant rate 
L. No. 103-66, I 1322l(a)(2), 107 Stat. 312, 477 (1993) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ l l (b)(l)(D) (1994)) (establishing 35% as the maximum corporate rate, effective for tax years 
beginning on or after January 1,  1993). 
225. Thia is a 34% reduction in the intereat component of the award. 
226. The latter award is as small aa it ia because of the large drop in the top marginal corporate 
tax rate that occurred in the middle of the prejudgment period. See 8Upra text accompanying notes 223-
24. Had the top rate remained at 46%,  the final award would have been about 20% larger. 
227. 31 Fed. Cl. 481 (1994), qff'd, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
228. Id. at 494. Note that in Hughu, the governmental party waa the defendant, not the plaintiff 
as in Amoco Cadiz., and 10 to compensate the private plaintiff for its losa would require using a tax­
adjuated multiplier. 
229. ld. at 495. 
230. It will alao favor high-bracket plaintiff• more than low-bracket onea. 
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equal to the geometric (not the arithmetic) mean interest rate over the 
prejudgment period and adjusting for fractional periods using the method 
of calculating such interest that would be used in the referenced trans­
action-although theoretically correct are unlikely to have a large impact 
on the final award. The other two refinements-adjusting for the com­
pounding period and for income taxes-are not only theoretically neces­
sary, but can also have a large impact on the final award. Consequently, 
prejudgment interest should be calculated with explicit reference to the 
compounding period, by setting n equal to the number of compounding pe­
riods in one year on the referenced loan. Prejudgment interest should also 
be calculated after adjusting for the effect of income taxes on both the 
original award and on prejudgment interest. This requires not merely 
adjusting the numbers put into the multiplier, but modifying the multiplier 
itself. 
V. Special Problems in the Choice of an Interest Rate 
This Part returns to the selection of the rate at which prejudgment 
interest is assessed. It considers special situations that arguably might lead 
a court away from using the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. 
Specifically, this Part first considers whether a court should adjust the 
interest rate when the judgment forces the defendant into bankruptcy. This 
Part then looks at how a court might adjust the interest rate when one or 
more of the parties is not a publicly traded corporation but a close cor­
poration or an individual . Finally, this Part looks at how a court should 
respond when the parties argue that a different interest rate should be used 
because the securities market is not efficient. 
A. Judgments 1hat Would Bankrupt the Defendant 
Special problems arise in setting an appropriate interest rate when the 
judgment would have bankrupted the defendant had it been paid immedi­
ately. Bankruptcy is most likely to occur with mass torts in which the 
liabilities can be staggering. 231 
For the purpose of calculating prejudgment interest, it is important to 
distinguish between immediate payments that would bankrupt the defendant 
and judgments that will bankrupt the defendant when they are later issued. 
This produces three new cases: (1) judgments that bankrupt the defendant 
when issued but would not have immediately bankrupted the defendant had 
they been paid when the injury occurred; (2) judgments that bankrupt the 
defendant when issued and would have bankrupted the defendant had they 
231. Of course, with mass torts, most plaintiffs are individuals, and this fact raises additional 
problema. The calculation of interest when an individual is a party is discussed infra subpart V(B). 
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been paid when the injury occurred; and (3) judgments that would have 
bankrupted the .defendant had they been paid when the injury occurred but 
will not do so when issued. The fourth category, judgments that would not 
have bankrupted the defendant and will not do so, has been the topic of 
discussion throughout this Article. 
For judgments that would not have bankrupted the defendant had they 
been paid at the time of injury but will do so when they are issued, it is not 
appropriate to adjust the interest rate. The reason is that plaintiffs as a 
class are compensated for the possibility of less than full payment by a 
stated interest rate above the riskless rate: interest is awarded at a rate 
above the riskless rate because some plaintiffs are not paid their full 
judgment. Thus, when the loss occurs it should not be shifted to other 
creditors by raising the prejudgment interest rate. 
The other two cases are more difficult to evaluate. Arguably, if the 
defendant would have been bankrupted had it immediately paid the plaintiff 
but will not now be bankrupted, the shareholders of the defendant will 
receive a windfall . Thus, it can be argued that the prejudgment interest 
rate should be increased to give the entire value of the equity to the 
plaintiffs. On the other hand, the risk that the value of the corporation will 
fall below the face value of the debt and later rise above it is one of the 
risks borne by debt. 232 Even so, no one would pay more than the excess 
of the corporation's market value over its secured claims for an unsecured 
note payable only by the corporation, whatever the interest rate. This 
implies that there might be no interest rate at which the plaintiff would 
have preferred to be a creditor of the defendant rather than paid in full 
immediately. As a result, it is not clear what interest rate a court should 
select. 
The last case is when the judgment both would have bankrupted the 
defendant if granted immediately and will do so now. With such judg­
ments, there is again no interest rate high enough that creditors would 
voluntarily extend their obligation to the defendant. Thus, the problems 
are similar to those in the previous case. 233 
Perhaps it is best to say that the analysis in this Article deals with the 
case in which the judgment would not have thrown the corporation into 
232. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 456-57. That risk increases with duration. 
233. Moreover, when the judgment bankrupts the defendant, then there is an additional consid­
eration that does not arise when an immediate judgment would have bankrupted the defendant but the 
judgment when issued does not. In this case, a larger recovery is at the expense of other creditors and 
a smaller one is to their benefit. The benefits and losses are not at the equityholders' expense, as is 
usually the case. Arguably, a court should preserve the plaintiff's fractions! claim in the assets of the 
corporation. However, creditors other than tort creditors are better able to monitor and influence the 
corporation than are tort creditors. In addition, they might be thought to be more morally culpable. 
Thus, it might be appropriate that they should lose out to the plaintiffs. This would imply that a higher 
interest rate should be used. 
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bankruptcy had it been paid immediately. When an immediate judgment 
would have bankrupted the defendant, there are difficult policy questions 
that must be answered before proper financial principles can be applied to 
calculate prejudgment interest. 
B. Individuals and Qosely Held Corporations 
Thus far, this Article has explicitly considered the calculation of 
interest for publicly traded corporations. The advantage of limiting the 
discussion to such companies is that it eliminates any difference between 
the interest rate that the plaintiff would require to lend to the defendant and 
the rate at which the defendant can obtain debt capital. However, when the 
plaintiff is an individual or a closely held corporation, there can be a 
substantial deviation between these rates. Accordingly, granting interest 
at the defendant's cost of borrowing might not fully compensate the plain­
tiff for the delay. 
For the purpose of calculating prejudgment interest, it is important to 
distinguish two possibilities: when the defendant is an individual or a close 
corporation and when the plaintiff is an individual or a close corporation. 
When the defendant is an individual or a close corporation, the defendant's 
cost of unsecured borrowing will both compensate the plaintiff for the risk 
it must bear by virtue of its involuntary loan to the defendant and prevent 
the defendant's unjust enrichment.234 Thus, when the defendant is an 
individual or a close corporation, but the plaintiff is a public corporation, 
the calculation of prejudgment interest is unchanged. When the plaintiff 
is an individual or a close corporation, however, granting prejudgment 
interest at the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing will often provide 
the plaintiff with less than full compensation for the risk it is forced to 
endure. 
To illustrate that result, assume that the plaintiff is an individual, that 
the defendant is a publicly traded corporation, and that a suit results in a 
$5 million judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff is very 
wealthy, she will have had most of her wealth involuntarily tied up in the 
defendant corporation from the time of the injury until the enforcement of 
the final judgment. Had she had the $5 million immediately, however, she 
probably would not have invested all of it in any single corporation. 235 
Finance theory teaches that risk averse investors should diversify their 
234. In addition, when the defendant is an individual, any judgment will usually be paid by an 
insurance company. In that case, it is not the ability of the individual defendant to pay the ultimate 
judgment but the insurance company's ability that detennines the proper interest rate. Insurance is 
taken up in more detail in the discussion of multiple defendants. See infra subpart VI(D). 
235. Thus, it is not the nature of the legal entity but the inability of the plaintiff to diversify away 
the risk of defendant's default that drives the result. 
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portfolios to reduce unique risk. 236 The incentive to diversify is strong 
because unique. risk, also called unsystematic risk, is not compensated for 
in the market. 137 Thus, because the plaintiff cannot eliminate the 
unsystematic risk that is · imposed on her by the defendant's wrongful 
act,138 granting prejudgment interest at the defendant's cost of unsecured 
borrowing will not fully compensate her for the delay. '1311 
A second reason that such a plaintiff will not be fully compensated for 
the delay is that delay reduces a plaintiff's control over the timing of her 
consumption. Assume that the plaintiff described above was sixty years 
old with a small income and a grown family when the injury occurred. 
Assume further that it took ten years to adjudicate the case during which 
time neither her income nor her family relations changed. However much 
pleasure she would get from sharing her award with her family, friends, 
and favorite causes, such a plaintiff would probably be interested in her 
own consumption as well. Had she received $5 million when the injury 
occurred, she could have increased her consumption over the rest of her 
life. At seventy, she can still increase her future consumption, but she 
cannot increase her past ten years' consumption. Although calculating pre­
judgment interest at the defendant's cost of borrowing compensates the 
plaintiff for the interest she could have earned, it does not compensate the 
plaintiff for how she would have valued the additional consumption in the 
interim. 240 
236. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 295. 
237. See BUR.TON G. MALKIBL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN W AU. STRBBT 244 (5th ed. 1996). The 
total risk of an asset can be divided into two parta: systematic risk. and unsystematic risk.. Unsystematic 
risk ia that portion that can be diversified away by combinins the asset into a portfolio with other 
aaaets. The risk that cannot be diversified away is called systematic risk. The market compensates 
inveators for the systematic risk they endure through higher expected returns. Investors, however, are 
not compensated for unsystematic risk, because that risk can be eliminated at very little cost by holding 
a diversified portfolio. Id. at 200-03. 
238. If the defendant's unaecured debt is risldesa, this problem is eliminated. 
239. See Patell et al., supra note 45, at 354-62 (modeling the interest necessary to compensate 
a plaintiff with a nontransferable claim). To compensate theplaintiff fully for the delay, the plaintiff 
should receive interest that reflects the interest rate she would require to induce her to invest so much 
money in such a risky venture. This latter amount is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to deter­
mine because it depends on the plaintiff's level of risk aversion. However, an approximate method of 
compensating the plaintiff for such riak is to estimate the default risk the defendant has involuntarily 
imposed upon the plaintiff, and to compensate the plaintiff according to how much the market would 
pay the plaintiff for enduring this much systematic risk. Such a calculation would be only a floor 
because the plaintiff, if strongly risk averse, might require a very large interest rate to accept so much 
risk. Unfortunately, the real measure here depends on the plaintiff's psychology, which might lead one 
to conclude that no adjustment should be made. Nonethelesa, despite the obvious possibilities of self­
serving claims, paying the plaintiff the market rate of interest might severely undercompensatehighly 
ri1k. averse plaintiffs. Thus, compensating an individual plaintiff for unsystematic risk at the market 
rate for systematic risk appears to be a reasonable compromise. A proposal that would compensate the 
plaintiff without imposing additional interest on the defendant is introduced infra subpart VI( F). 
240. See Patell et al., supra note 45, at 354-62 (modeling the impact of a nontransferable claim 
on an intertemporal pattern of consumption). 
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Of course, if a court concludes that the judgment is solely directed at 
the defendant, then these complications are irrelevant, and the defendant's 
cost of unsecured borrowing should be used to calculate prejudgment in­
terest. If, however, the judgment in whole or part is directed at the 
plaintiff, then these complications must be addressed.241 
A related problem that arises when the plaintiff is an individual or a 
close corporation is that the interest rate that compensates the plaintiff will 
no longer equal the rate required to prevent the unjust enrichment of the 
defendant. A higher rate will usually be required to compensate the plain­
tiff than is required to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant.242 
If the. court uses the appropriate interest rate for the defendant, the plaintiff 
will be insufficiently compensated. If the court uses the correct rate to 
compensate the plaintiff, then the defendant will pay too much. Accord­
ingly, based on the substantive law and the relevant public policies, the 
court will have to choose whether to use the appropriate interest rate for 
the plaintiff or for the defendant, or something in the middle. 
C. Inefficient Financial Markets 
The calculation of prejudgment interest in this Article has been pre­
mised on the assumption that the securities market is efficient. An efficient 
market is one in which no investment strategy can consistently outperform 
the market. 243 An inefficient market implies that there are some invest­
ment strategies that can outperform the market. 244 In spite of the enor­
mous literature on market efficiency, 245 there is still no consensus on the 
efficiency of the securities market. 246 Although numerous studies support 
the efficiency hypothesis, 247 there are also some persistent anomalies that 
241 . Although commentator� emphasize the dual nature of judgments, courts frequently elevate 
the compell88toiY function of monetary awards and prejudgment interest over deterrence, punishment, 
and preventing unjust enrichment. See, e.g. , Wong, supra note 28, at 221-23 (reviewing ca1101 and 
concluding that the principal rationale for prejudgment interest has shifted from puniahment to 
compell88tion). 
242. A lower rate than the defendant's coat of unaecured borrowing would never be appropriate 
to compell88te the plaintiff because the plaintiff can always receive the market rate on its investment. 
243. In other words, no investment ltlltegy of buying and selling individual securities can conaia­
tently generate higher returns than holding a well-diversified portfolio of securities over the same 
period. See Ross ET AL., supra note 73, at 370. 
244. See id. at 359. 
245. For a recent and thorough survey of the literature, see Eugene F. Fama, li;fficient Capital 
Markets: H, 46 J. FIN. 1515 (1991). For a more accessible but leas thorough treatment of the efficient 
capital market hypotheses, see MALKIBL, supra note 237, at 137-224. 
246. See MALKIBL, supra note 237, at 191-93 (summarizing the opposing viewpoints and 
proposing a middle position). 
247. See Ross ET AL., supra note 73, at 373-78. Two classic studies supporting the efficiency 
of the bond market are Mark I. Weinstein, 77le Systematic Risk of Corporate Bonds, 16 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 257 (1981) (concluding that bond ratings reflect default risk but lag behind, 
and therefore only marginally affect, the market's evaluations of changes in risk) and Mark I. 
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no one has been able to account for in a manner consistent with the hypoth­
esis. 248 Thi!! subpart considers how relaxing the assumption of market 
efficiency would change the calculation of prejudgment interest. The 
conclusion reached is that any impact is likely to be small. Moreover, 
because there is no practical way for courts to adjust their calculations for 
an inefficient market, they should not attempt to do so. 
One obvious argument for a prevailing plaintiff to make, especially 
one whose business has been successful over the period of the lawsuit, is 
that it would have invested the funds in its business and so the investment 
would have produced a return about equal to what the plaintiff made on its 
invested capital over that period. For example, if the company made 30% 
on its invested capital over the prejudgment period, then the plaintiff would 
argue that the defendant should have to pay prejudgment interest at 30% . 
This is essentially the argument that lawyers for Hughes Aircraft recently 
made in a patent infringement case brought against the federal govern­
ment. 249 Hughes's lawyers argued that the federal government should 
pay interest on patent royalties it never paid at a rate equal to Hughes's 
average annual return on equity because that is how Hughes would have 
invested the royalties.250 
Under the assumption that the stock market is efficient, this argument 
is easy to shoot down. First, it is not the average return of the company 
but its marginal return that is relevant. The managers of a corporation 
whose capital is rationed will begin with the projects with the highest net 
present value per dollar of investment and will work down to less attractive 
projects. 251 Thus, any additional capital would be spent not on the aver­
age project but on the next best project, which ex ante should be worse 
than any of the previous projects. In addition, if capital is not rationed, the 
marginal product should have an expected return equal to the firm's cost 
of financing that project. Otherwise, the managers are not maximizing the 
value of the firm. Thus, at the margin, there is no ex ante excess return 
from increased investment. Moreover, at the margin, there is no excess 
return or loss to the plaintiff from investing in the defendant's securities, 
including its debt, which is the investment that the plaintiff was forced to 
Weinstein, The IUfect qf a Rming Oumge Announcement on Bond Price, 5 J. FIN. EcoN. 329, 345 
(1977) (finding that bond rating changes reflect changes in risk but do not affect perceived market risk 
and concluding that this lack of effect supports the semistrong fonn of the efficient capital market 
hypothesis). 
248. The most enigmatic of such anomalies concerns seasonalities. See Ross BT AL., supra note 
73, at 378-79 (noting studies showing variance in stock returns depending on the month or the day of 
the week). 
249. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 492-95 (1994), qff'd, 86 F.3d 1566 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
250. See Vartsbedian, supra note ll8, at D l .  
251 .  See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 176-78. 
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make by the defendant's wrongdoing. It follows that the plaintiff would 
be overcompensated if it received the return on defendant's equity because 
the risk that any judgment would not be paid is less than the risk of the 
plaintiff's equity. Accordingly, if the market is efficient, the plaintiff is 
fully compensated for the risk it bears because there are no foregone profit­
making opportunities when it receives interest at the defendant's cost of 
unsecured borrowing. 252 
If the market is assumed not to be efficient, the plaintiff can argue that 
the respective cost of capital to it and to the defendant do not fully reflect 
the risk of investments in either of them. Specifically, the plaintiff can 
argue that the market overestimates its risk and underestimates the defen­
dant's risk, so that the return it has to offer to raise capital is higher than 
what is appropriate for its risk, whereas the return the defendant pays does 
not adequately compensate for its risk. This argument, assuming it is true, 
only gets the plaintiff so far. Even if the market is assumed to be in­
efficient, the firm can still raise capital to undertake new projects. Thus, 
the upper limit on the increased interest cost to the plaintiff, because of 
market inefficiency, is the sum of (1) the amount by which the interest rate 
on the defendant's debt is insufficient to compensate for the risk the 
plaintiff is forced to bear and (2) the excess of the amount the plaintiff 
must pay investors to fund the projects it could not fund through retained 
earnings because of the defendant's wrong over the rate that would com­
pensate investors for their risk. 
Furthermore, recognition that the market is inefficient does not neces­
sarily require an interest rate adjustment in the plaintiff's favor. Rejection 
of the efficiency hypothesis does not imply that the return on the plaintiff's 
securities is too high or that the return on the defendant's debt is too low. 
The market might be inefficient because the securities of other firms are 
mispriced or because the entire stock market moves in certain predictable 
ways, without the plaintiff's securities being underpriced relative to the 
defendant's securities. In addition, the plaintiff's arguments work in both 
directions. The defendant can argue that the risk of its securities was 
overestimated by the market, which would provide the plaintiff with a 
windfall if the defendant were required to pay interest at its borrowing 
cost. The defendant can also argue that the risk of the plaintiff's securities 
was underestimated, so that any additional funds reinvested in the plaintiff 
would have been poorly invested. 
Finally, because proving the required facts and quantifying the addi­
tional interest owed as a result of the inefficiency will be so difficult, I 
strongly caution against making any attempt to adjust for claimed market 
inefficiencies. Self-serving claims would abound, and any result could be 
252. See supra text acc:ompanying notes 107..{)9. 
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explained as an adjustment for inefficiency. 253 When an adjustment is 
made for inefficiency, the judge is rejecting verifiable market data in favor 
of a claim by one of the parties' lawyers about the underlying value of 
securities that cannot be substantiated. 
D. Summary 
This Part examined three situations in which it arguably might not be 
appropriate to assess prejudgment interest at the defendant's cost of 
unsecured borrowing. These situations are the bankruptcy of the defen­
dant, when the plaintiff is an individual or a close corporation, and if the 
securities market is inefficient. 
If the judgment would not have bankrupted the defendant had it been 
issued immediately, then the court should assess prejudgment interest using 
the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing, even if the final judgment 
bankrupts the defendant. Using the defendant's cost of unsecured bor­
rowing is appropriate in these circumstances, because the excess over the 
risk-free rate compensates the plaintiff for the risk that the defendant will 
default. On the other hand, if the original judgment would have forced the 
defendant into bankruptcy had it been issued immediately, then it might be 
appropriate to assess interest at a rate other than the defendant's cost of 
unsecured borrowing. 
The second situation arises when the plaintiff is an individual or a 
close corporation. In that case, assessing prejudgment interest at the 
defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing will probably not compensate the 
plaintiff for the risk of the defendant defaulting, because the plaintiff is 
unlikely to be able to diversify away that risk. Thus, to compensate the 
plaintiff for the risk she is forced to bear, the court will often have to 
assess prejudgment interest at a rate higher than the defendant's cost of 
unsecured borrowing. 
The final situation examined in this Part arises when the securities 
markets in which the plaintiff and defendant raise capital is considered 
inefficient. In that case, the court should not adjust the interest rate at 
which prejudgment interest is assessed for any perceived inefficiency 
because of the lack of hard data on which it can rely to make an ad­
justment. 
VI. Other Issues in the Calculation of Prejudgment Interest 
This Part discusses several diverse but important issues in the calcu­
lation of prejudgment interest that have not already been addressed. These 
253 . If securities markets were inefficient and a corporation's managers could consistently make 
money in these markets, they would probably be portfolio managers or investors, not corporate 
managers. 
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issues are what awards generate prejudgment interest, when to begin . the 
prejudgment period, the equitable grounds for denying prejudgment in­
terest, multiple defendants, postjudgment interest, and the relationship 
between prejudgment interest and currency conversion. This Part con­
cludes with a brief discussion of possible statutory reforms. 
A. Awards that Generate Prejudgment Interest 
As the law is currently enforced, not all awards generate prejudgment 
interest. The most glaring exception is the common law rule that interest 
is not recoverable on claims that are neither liquidated to a dollar amount 
nor ascertainable by fixed means. 254 Although most states have liberal­
ized the common law rule against awarding prejudgment interest on 
unliquidated claims, 255 that proposition still has some validity� 256 The 
traditional example of an unliquidated claim is a personal injury, although 
many other claims can also be unliquidated. 257 The usual justification for 
not awarding prejudgment interest on such amounts is that it is unfair to the 
defendant, who does not know how large the award will be. 258 This ar­
gument, however, proves too much, as it is no more unfair to hold the 
defendant liable for the underlying sum, which is an uncertain amount, 
than it is to hold the defendant liable for the interest thereon.259 Thus, 
because prejudgment interest prevents the value of an award from being 
reduced by delay, prejudgment interest should be awarded on both liqui­
dated and unliquidated damages, as most courts and commentators recog­
nize.260 
Another common-law restriction on prejudgment interest is that pre­
judgment interest is not awarded on nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and 
suffering.261 However, it is not clear why prejudgment interest should 
254. See 1 DoBBS, auprtl note 4, § 3 .6(1), at 336. 
255. Liberalization hu sometimea occurred judicially, such as by treating interest as lost rental 
value or by taking a broad interpretation of what is ascertainable, see id. § 3.6{2), at 339-46, and 
sometimea through statute, see id. § 3 .6(2), at 346-48. 
256. See id. § 3 .6(1)-(3), at 336-52 (deacribing the common-law rule as the most significant 
limitation on the recovecy of prejudgment interest). 
251. Damagea for nuisance, destruction of property, and back pay, as well as attorney's fees, have 
all been held unliquidated and unascertainable at some time. See id. I 3 .6(1), at 336. 
258. See id. I 3 .6(3), at 351; Recent Developments, suprtl note 13, at 107-08. 
259. See 1 DoBBS, .ruprt1 note 4, 1 3 .6(3), at 351-52 (reasoning that although the eventual amount 
payable by the defendant is unknown, it is still within the defendant's posseasion and could be 
invested). 
260. See, e.g. , Funkhouserv. J.B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933); Oyos, suprtl note 24, 
at 509-10 (proposing the elimination of the liquidated-unliquidated distinction and stating that this will 
give plaintiffa full compensation); Sergeaketter, suprt1 note 27, at 269 (stating that damages of all typea 
should bear prejudgment interest in order to give full compensation). 
261. See 1 DOBBS, .ruprt1 note 4, 1 3 .6(4), at 356 (pointing out that pain and suffering damages 
are nonascertainable and therefore ineligible for interest under the common-Jaw rule). 
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be denied for nonpecuniary losses because both pecuniary and nonpecu­
niary losses are compensated for with monetary awards. The effect of this 
prohibition is to undercompensate the plaintiffs who have suffered non­
pecuniary losses and to unjustly enrich the defendants who have imposed 
them. Moreover, the magni�de of this effect varies directly with what the 
multiplier otherwise would be. The magnitude of both the plaintiff's 
recovery for nonpecuniary losses and the defendant's payment will fall with 
delay and with market interest rates, considerations unrelated to the 
magnitude of the injury or the merits of the claim. It might be suggested 
that the award of nonpecuniary damages implicitly takes these 
considerations into account, and there is some evidence that awards are 
adjusted for delay. 262 It would, however, seem desirable to make such 
adjustments explicitly, so they can be reviewed by the appellate courts, 
rather than implicitly, which escapes appellate review. 263 
Nonpecuniary awards do, however, present a problem that does not 
occur with pecuniary awards. Pecuniary awards are based on actually in­
curred costs, which are easily measured using prices from the time of 
injury. Interest is then assessed upon these awards in the usual manner. 
With nonpecuniary awards, the danger is that a court looking at an injury 
that occurred years earlier, and without a precise guide, is likely to draw 
upon current values. When this occurs and prejudgment interest is also 
awarded, there is a double recovery. Because the interest rate includes a 
premium for inflation, such a plaintiff would recover the inflation portion 
of the prejudgment interest award twice. The solution, however, is not to 
deny prejudgment interest, which would deny successful plaintiffs compen­
sation for the rest of the risk-adjusted return. Instead, the solution is either 
to be careful to use values appropriate for the time of injury, or if using 
current values, to reduce them for inflation before adding interest. 
A related question that often arises with prejudgment interest is how 
to deal with future damages. Commentators recognize that plaintiffs would 
receive a double recovery if future damages were reduced to a present 
value as of the judgment date and then prejudgment interest were awarded 
262. See STBPHBN 1. CARROLL, RAND CORP., 1UR.Y AWARDS AND PRBruDGMBNT INTBRBST IN 
TORT CASES 1 1  (1983) (reporting that juries are implicitly awarding interest at an annual rate of 3. 7 %  
between injury and trial). 
263 . See Rothschild, supra note 18, at 216. For example, prejudgment interest is not awarded 
on the punitive portion of a treble damage antitrust award and is discretionary on the untrebled portion. 
See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble • Dtlmllges Really Single Dtlmllges?, 54 OHIO ST. L.1. 1 15, 
130 & n.57 (1993). In part, the logic ia that the trebling is intended to compensate for the delay. 
However, a more accurate final award would increase the original award by a smaller amount and pro­
vide interest. CJ. Brown, supra note 23, at 346-47 (stating that "unsupervised" delay-based additions 
to awards by juries are an "arbitrary" way to compensate plaintiffs for delay). This is likely to result 
in a large inaccuracy in antitrust cases because these cases take longer to resolve than most other cases. 
Cf. Lande, supra, at 133 (estimating that antitrust cases average 4.5 yean from filing to judgment). 
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on top.264 To avoid such double recovery, one commentator proposed 
that future damages be discounted to the date of judgment,265 thereby 
bringing all awards to that date with· no allowance for prejudgment interest 
on future damages.266 Although reducing all awards to a present value 
as of the date of judgment is conceptually correct, that is not the proper 
method of dealing with future damages. u.7 The proper method is to dis­
count future damages to the date of injury using a discount rate appropriate 
for the project and then to calculate prejudgment interest on that award 
using the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. 268 Such a rule is 
more accurate than one that would discount future damages to the date of 
judgment using a discount rate appropriate for the project because once the 
claim arose the plaintiff no longer looks to the project for payment but to 
the defendant. 
B. When to Begin the Prejudgment Period 
Another issue that comes up with prejudgment interest is when to 
begin the prejudgment period. Jurisdictions are split between those that 
begin to accrue interest from the time the claim arose (usually, the date of 
injury) and those that wait for the plaintiff to file a claim against the 
defendant to start the clock. 269 The arguments advanced to wait until the 
264. See McDivitt, supra note 81, at 338-41; see also Wong, supra note 28, at 240 (stating that 
prejudgment interest on future damages does not overcompensate the plaintiff provided that the damages 
are discounted to the date of injury). 
265. Discounting is the process of calculating the present value of a future cash flow; it is the 
opposite of compounding, which is used to calculate the final judgment frOm the original judgment. 
See 1 DoBBS, supra note 4, I 3 .6(3), at 351 (stating that the reduction to present value "is essentially 
the application of interest in revene"). When discounting, it ia common to call the interest rate the 
discount rate. See Ross BT AL., supra note 73, at 86. 
266. See McDivitt, supra note 81, at 340. 
267. For an argument not to use hindsight in measuring damages that occur after the date of injury 
but to use the best estimate of the stream of violations as of the date of injury, see Fisher & Romaine, 
supra note 45, at 153-56 (using hindsight does not take into account that the plaintiff was relieved not 
only of the stream of returns but also of the auociated risk). 
268. For example, if the patent on which the plaintiff has built ita business, a risky start-up 
venture, is infringed by a strong company, then a discount rate that is appropriate for the venture (a 
high rate) should be used to calculate the present value of the project. Prejudgment interest should then 
be awarded on this amount using the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing (a low rate). Alter­
natively, if a risky company embarks on a low-risk project that is lost because it (the defendant) 
breaches a contract with the plaintiff, then a low discount rate that is appropriate for the project should 
be used to discount the project's cash flows and prejudgment interest should be awarded on this amount 
at the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. In this latter example, the plaintiff's overall risk is 
irrelevant because the success of the project or the payment of the judgment does not depend on the 
plaintiff's overall risk. 
269. Compare N.Y. C.P .L.R. S001(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (stating that interest is to run from 
the •earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed, except that interest upon damages incurred 
thereafter shall be computed from the date incurred"), with NBV. RBV. STAT. § 17.130(2) (1995) 
(" [T]he judgment draws interest from the time of service of the summons and complaint . . . . "). 
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claim is filed are that it is unfair to penalize the defendant by assessing 
interest until th� plaintiff's claim is filed and that such a rule encourages 
earlier filings.210 The first argument is not persuasive because it is based 
on the repudiated theory that prejudgment interest is punishment. :m The 
second argument has some �erit in that waiting for the claim to be filed 
to start to accrue interest will discourage plaintiffs from delaying filing. 
Such a rule will also encourage injured plaintiffs to file immediately 
without trying to negotiate a settlement first and it will encourage injurers 
to try to discourage victims from filing quickly. m Neither effect would 
seem desirable. Accordingly, the recognition that prejudgment interest 
compensates for the defendant's possession of money that rightfully belongs 
to the plaintiff implies that a better rule would be to start accruing interest 
as soon as the claim arose. This will place plaintiffs and defendants in the 
same position as if the defendants had immediately paid the plaintiffs, 
which is the purpose behind prejudgment interest. 273 
In Amoco Cadiz, although the injury occurred in 1978, the court began 
the prejudgment period on January 1 ,  1980, when the cleanup costs were 
incurred. 274 Assuming, as an approximation, that the entire $65 million 
expenditure was made on March 16, 1978, the day the Amoco Cadiz ran 
aground, the prejudgment period would be 12.4 years (rounded to the near­
est tenth of a year). Calculating the multiplier in the same manner as 
before, but setting T= 12.4, not 10.6, would result in a final award of 
$260.615 million, a 22% increase. 275 
270. See Brown, supra note 23, at 349-50 (arguing that it is unfair to penalize tho defendant by 
assossins interest before the claim is filed); Don W. Cloud, Jr., Note, Cavnar v. Quality Control 
Parking, Inc.: Prejudgment Interest is Now Recoverable in Personal Injury, Wrongful Death and 
Survival Action O:ues, 38 BAYLOR. L. REv. 385, 409 (1986) (contendms that asaOBiinJ prejudsment 
interest from the date of films is needed to discourase plaintiffs from delaying films); Wilson et al., 
supra note 3, at 116 (arguinJ that alaOBiing interest from the date of injury denies the defendant the 
OPPOrtunity to set aside sufficient reservos in some cases). 
271 .  See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
272. See Thomas F. Londrisan & Lawrence R.. Smith, Prejudgment Interest: Is There Profit in 
Court Delay?, 1UDOBS' 1., Fall 1984, at 12, 15 (arguinJ that as101sins prejudsment interest from the 
date of films will result in unnecossary filings by plaintiffs who have not yet asaesaed the merita of their 
case but who do not want to delay the accrual of interost); Oyos, supra note 24, at SOB (contending that 
assessing prejudsmont interest from the date of filing will encourase hastily filed and poorly crafted 
pleadmss). 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10. 
274. Amoco Cadiz., 954 F.2d 1279, 1337 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit sivea no expla­
nation for this delay, noting only that the district court delayed the start of tho accrual of prejudsment 
interest and that on appeal the French plaintiffs have not contested this delay. Id. at 1335. 
275. The assumptions on which this calculation rests· are set out in note 6. The percentase 
increase in the award is larger than that in the length of the prejudsment period (17%) because of 
compounding. 
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C. Equitable Grounds for Denying Interest 
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Courts sometimes deny interest to plaintiffs who have unduly delayed 
taking legal action under the doctrine of laches. 276 Although at first 
glance this would seem to be a suitable penalty, it is not. A simple way 
of seeing why it is inappropriate to deny interest as a penalty for laches is 
because the penalty would vary directly with the interest rate. If the 
interest rate were high, the penalty would be large; if it were low, the 
penalty would be small . No reason has been offered, and I can think of 
none, why the penalty should depend on the interest rate, which is most 
sensitive to the expected rate of inftation.m 
Arguably, a better penalty would have the plaintiff forfeit only the real 
interest rate for delay. The real interest rate is roughly the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate. 278 However, 
differences in real interest rates are largely due to differences in risk. 279 
It is not clear why it would be appropriate to charge plaintiffs that endure 
more risk, because an unsecured investment in tlJ.e defendant is riskier, a 
larger penalty for delay. This suggests using the risk-free real interest rate. 
However, it is frequently close to zero, 280 which means that it is effec­
tively no penalty at all. 
276. See, e.g., West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 3 1 1  n.3 (1987) (stating that •an 
equitable consideration such as laches" could justify a denial of interest). 
277. In order to understand this point, consider an original judgment for $1 million and a two-year 
prejudgment period. Assume that the defendant's debt is riskless, and that the risk-free interest rate 
is alternatively 2% or 10%, compounded annually, over the two-year period. If the prejudgment 
interest rate is 2%, the final award will be $1,040,400, whereas if it is 10%,  the award will be 
$1 ,210,000. In both caaea, the plaintiff would be in the same position as it would be had it received 
$1 million immediately and deposited it in the bank. (This example ignores taxes.) 
Now consider what will happen if the court decides to deny prejudgment interest for one of the 
two years. The plaintiff will receive $1,020,000 when the interest rate is 2% and $1,100,000 when 
the interest rate is 10% .  Although the nominal amount of the award is larger when the interest rate 
is 10%, the real value of the award is smaller when the interest rate is larger. When the interest rate 
is 2%, it would take $980,392 to grow into $1,020,000 in two years. In contrast, when the interest 
rate is 10 %, it would take $909,091 to grow into $1,100,000 in two years. Thus, when the interest 
rate is 2%, the effect of the one year interest denial is equivalent to a reduction in the original award 
of $19,608, but when the interest rate is 10%, the effective reduction is four and a half times larger, 
$90,909. 
278. Denoting the inflation rate by T and the nominal interest rate by r, the formula for the real 
interest rate, i, is: 
i - l +r - 1 - � • r- n .  
1 + n  1 + n 
Unless the inflation rate is very large, the real interest rate is roughly the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the inflation rate. See R.oss BT AL., supra note 73, at 195. 
279. See David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex FiN:Jnciallnstrumenu, 43 TAX L. REv. 731,  
742 (1988) (stating that the excess of the interest rate paid by any borrower over that paid by the 
federal government is solely attributable to the risk of the borrower defaulting). 
280. See R.OOBil 0. IBBOTSON & REx  A. SINQUBFIBLD, STOCKS, BoNDS, BIU.S, AND INJILATION: 
HISTORICAL R.ETVRNS (1926-1987) 8 (1989) (stating the real rate of return on Treasury billa was close 
to zero over the entire 1926-87 period). 
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Although the above reasons caution against penalizing the plaintiff 
with lost interest, the most important argument supporting this position is 
that interest is not an independent exaction from the defendant or an award 
to the plaintiff. Rather, it is only compensation for the inevitable delay 
between the occurrence of the event that triggers the liability and a final 
judgment. 281 Only if the delay is caused by the plaintiff and is prej­
udicial to the defendant would it be appropriate to penalize the plaintiff. 
However, even here, the penalty should be assessed up front as a reduction 
in the judgment and not as a loss of interest. 282 
There is one exception to the proposed rule against denying or re­
ducing interest on equitable grounds. It would be appropriate to reduce the 
interest award when awarding interest at the defendant's cost of unsecured 
borrowing does not fully compensate the plaintiff. Thus, when the judg­
ment is to compensate the plaintiff, rather than to deter or penalize the 
defendant, and that requires a higher interest rate than the defendant's cost 
of unsecured borrowing, 283 it would be appropriate to deny the plaintiff 
the difference because of any ·umeasonable delay. 
Assuming that some portion of the standard interest award is denied 
as a penalty for delay, the obvious question is for what time should the 
penalty be assessed? If there is an umeasonable delay of one year in 
bringing suit, which year's interest should be denied or reduced? Is it the 
first year, the year that the delay in filing was umeasonable, or the final 
year? Arguably, the final year is correct because interest for every other 
year would still have been paid had the suit been timely filed and had the 
legal process continued at the same pace. 
D. Multiple Defendants 
The discussion so far has assumed that there is one plaintiff and one 
defendant. Because interest should be awarded at the defendant's cost of 
281. See 11upra text accompanying notes 7-10. 
282. See Keir & Keir, supra note 24, at 137 ("A rule that would be more consistent with the law 
of damages would allow interest, as in the case of any other compensation, on the basis of the wrong 
done, not the course of litigation. •) . Courts probably find the denial or reduction of interest for laches 
an attractive remedy because it seema precise. Having no other guidance regarding how much to re­
duce an award because of plaintiff's laches, they adopt a mathematical method that produces a precise, 
numerical answer. In this context, however, the precision is deceptive because the interest disallowed 
is a function of several factors unrelated to the inequitable behavior. 
283. The appropriate prejudgment interest rate is likely to be higher than the defendant's cost of 
unsecured borrowing when the plaintiff is an individual and the award is for a large amount relative 
to the plaintiff's wealth. In this case, the plaintiff will have been exposed to excessive nondiveraifiable 
risk and the delay will influence the plaintiff's spending pattern. See 11upra subpart V(B). The appro­
priate prejudgment interest rate will not be higher when the plaintiff is a publicly traded corporation 
(unless the plaintiff's and defendant's tax rates differ) because then the defendant's cost of unsecured 
borrowing is the appropriate rate for both parties. See 11upra subparts U(B-C). 
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unsecured borrowing, the calculation of prejudgment interest is not affected 
by multiple plaintiffs. The calculation does, however, have to be adjusted 
when the plaintiff can recover from more than one party. There are at 
least three situations in which the plaintiff can look to more than one party 
to recover: (1) when there are multiple defendants who are jointly and 
severally liable; (2) when the defendant is part of a group of affiliated 
corporations; and (3) when the defendant has insurance that would pay its 
liability. In each case, the simple rule that prejudgment interest should be 
charged at the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing has to be inter­
preted in light of the possibility of recovering from multiple sources. 
. When the defendants are jointly and severally liable, a successful 
plaintiff will fail to collect the full judgment only if all defendants are 
insolvent. Because the plaintiff will collect the entire judgment if any 
defendant is solvent, the plaintiff should be awarded prejudgment interest 
at the market interest rate for an unsecured loan made to (or guaranteed by) 
all of the defendants. Of course, the interest rate for such a loan will be 
at least as low as the rate paid by the most creditworthy defendant on its 
unsecured debt because the hypothesized loan cannot be riskier than a loan 
to that party. 284 
Although the above rule provides the plaintiff with the proper amount 
of interest, it does not charge each defendant the proper amount. Joint and 
several liability means that each defendant is in effect guaranteeing the 
other defendants' obligations. Thus, each defendant is in effect making a 
loan to the other defendants in the amount of their liability to the plaintiff. 
As with other loans, interest should be paid between defendants, especially 
if unsecured borrowing rates differed. 285 Although I know of no court 
that has been so meticulous as to adjust one defendant's prejudgment in­
terest rate to account for the risk of nonpayment by another, such an 
adjustment would be necessary to meet the goals of fairness and efficiency. 
284. Tho loan will be leas risky than a loan to the most creditworthy borrower as long as there 
is any chance that one of the other defendants will be solvent when the most creditworthy one is 
insolvent. 
285. This is perhaps easier to understand through an example. Assume that there are two defen­
dants, Big and Small, with ullBeCured annual borrowing rates of 6% and 10% respectively over the two­
year prejudgment period. Big a.,d Small are jointly and severally liable for $1 million and each owes 
half. Because the plaintiff is at least as well off as it would be if it could look only to Big to recover, 
the plaintiff should receive interest at a rate no higher than 6%. If, however, Small goes bankrupt, Big 
will have to pay the entire judgment; and if Big goes bankrupt, Small will have to pay. Thus, Big has 
a $500,000 claim against Small for contribution, and Small haa a similar claim against Big. Although 
tho principal amounts are cancelled when tho judgment is paid, the interest components are not. 
Because Big's claim against Small is riskier than Small's claim against Big, Big should receive a higher 
interest rate from Small than S�ll should pay Big. Thus, Small should pay Big interest at 4%, tho 
difference between the two companies' borrowing rates, on $500,000 for two yean. AI. a result, Small 
in effect pays interest at 10% on $500,000, which prevents it from being unjustly enriched. 
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Therefore, because the right of contribution is grounded in equity, 286 
such an apportionment should not be an abuse of discretion. 287 
When the defendant is part of an affiliated group of companies, there 
is often a dispute regarding how far up the corporate structure liability 
extends. For example, the supertanker Amoco Cadiz was operated by a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the parent.288 Thus, if the subsidiary were 
liable but the parent were not, the plaintiffs could look only to the 
subsidiary's assets to satisfy a judgment. Although the plaintiffs would ex 
ante be less likely to collect their judgment, they would be compensated for 
this additional risk through a higher prejudgment interest rate. 
Accordingly, the interest rate should reflect where in the capital structure 
liability rests. 289 
The last scenario to consider is when there is insurance. The analysis 
is different depending upon whether the plaintiff or the defendant is the 
insured. When the plaintiff is the insured, the plaintiff recovers from its 
insurer and the insurer is subrogated to the plaintiff in the suit against the 
defendant. In this case, the defendant's unsecured borrowing rate is again 
the correct interest rate to use. When the defendant is the insured, the 
plaintiff can look both to the defendant and to its insurance company for 
recovery. Thus, from the plaintiff's perspective, the situation is similar to 
that of joint and several liability. Since the plaintiff is paid if either party 
is solvent, prejudgment interest should be assessed at a rate not above the 
lesser of the defendant's and its insurance carrier's rate for unsecured 
borrowing. 
286. See Embrey v. Borough of West Miftlin, 390 A.2d 165, 714 (Pa. 1978) (emphaaizi111 that 
the contribution is intended to approximate an equitable division of responsibility between defendants 
who are jointly liable to a plaintiff). 
287. The law in at least two areas would directly support such an apportionment. The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) 
(1994), permits courts to use equitable factors in apportioning damages during the contribution phase. 
See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 511 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Western 
ProceSiing Co., 134 F. Supp. 930, 938 (W.D. Wash. 1990). Similarly, under maritime law, a court 
haa broad diacretion to apportion damages, including setting appropriate prejudgment interest rates. 
See Independent Bulk Transp. v. The Vessel "Morania Abaco," 676 F .2d 23 (2d Cir. 1982); Schroeder 
v. Tug Montauk, 358 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1966). 
. 
288. Standard Oil, later Amoco, waa the parent of Amoco International Oil Company (AIOC) and 
Amoco Transport. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1287 (7th Cir. 1992). Amoco Transport owned the 
Amoco Cadiz and AIOC operated the vessel. Id. 
289. Parent-subsidiary liability also creates a strategic issue. Although the plaintiff is subsidized 
for the risk it bean, liability is aasessed only after the parties know whether the subsidiary has 
survived. Accordingly, if the subsidiary has survived, the successful plaintiff has an incentive to claim 
that the subsidiary is liable but the parent is not and collect the higher interest rate that reflects the ex 
ante risk of the subsidiary's bankruptcy. Convenely, the defendant has an incentive to concede the 
parent's liability and pay the lower rate that reflects ita ex ante risk. 
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E. Postjudgment Interest 
The time from the injury until the trial court issues its judgment is the. 
prejudgment period. 290 The time from the trial court's original judgment 
until the judgment is paid, including the time during which appeals are 
pending, is the postjudgment period. 291 
To compensate for delay during this period, successful plaintiffs 
receive postjudgment interest. In contrast to prejudgment interest, post­
judgment interest is exclusively a statutory creation, and many jurisdictions 
have a set statutory rate· for calculating postjudgment interest. 292 In 
California, for example, the postjudgment interest rate is 10%.293 The 
arguments made throughout this Article with respect to prejudgment in­
terest also apply to postjudgment interest. In any given case, a fixed rate 
is likely to benefit one party at the other's expense because it will only be 
a coincidence if the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing matches the 
statutory rate. Accordingly, the benefitted party will be encouraged to file 
excessive motions and appeals and drag out the procedure. That party will 
also have a reduced incentive to take precautions. 294 
Federal law provides for postjudgment interest at the fifty-two week 
Treasury bill rate. 295 This is appropriate when the federal government 
is the defendant. In general, however, that rate is too low because many 
defendants cannot borrow unsecured at that rate. It will, therefore, 
encourage defendants to file excessive appeals and weaken the deterrent 
effect of awards. 
A fairer and more efficient result would be for courts to calculate 
postjudgment interest using the same techniques that have been described 
for prejudgment interest. This task should not be too difficult as long as 
prejudgment interest has been calculated because a court could use the 
same reference rate for the postjudgment period as for the prejudgment 
period. A court would only have to incorporate later interest rate obser­
vations into the calculation to assess postjudgment interest. Such a change, 
however, would require amending the existing postjudgment statutes.296 
290. There is a split amoDB the courts when prejudgment interest starts to accrue. Some courts 
start the prejudgment period when the cause of action accrues, and other courts only start the clock 
once a claim has been filed. See supra text accompanyiDB notes 269-73. 
291. For a discussion of the possibility of a hiatui in the accrual of interest under federal law 
because prejudgment interest runs until the date of the verdict, whereas postjudgment interest starts to 
accrue when the judgment is issued, which might be after the verdict, see 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, 
f 3.6(6), at 362. 
292. See 1 Id. f 3 .6(1), (6), at 335, 361-62. 
293. See CAL. CIV. PR.oc. COI)B f 685.010 (West 1993). 
294. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
295. See 28 U.S.C. f 1961 (1994). 
296. Statutocy reforms are taken up infra subpart VI(F). 
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F. Currency Conversion 
Throughout this Article, I have assumed that the original judgment 
was for $65 million. However, the costs incurred by the French plaintiffs 
to clean up the Brittany Coast were not in U.S. dollars but in French francs 
(FF). As calculated by the federal courts, the compensable cleanup costs 
totalled approximately 340 million FF.m Thus, as illustrated by Figure 
1 ,  the court's task is to go from an original award of 340 million FF as of 
January 1 ,  1980,298 to a final award in dollars of unknown amount as of 
July 24, 1990.2911 This requires two steps: converting the award into 
dollars and assessing prejudgment interest. 
As Figure 1 further illustrates, there are two principal methods a court 
can use to calculate the final award. First, it can convert the original 
award to dollars using the exchange rate at the time of the injury ("breach 
date" rule) and then calculate interest using an interest rate for dollar­
denominated loans. (This method is indicated by the arrows labelled a.) 
Alternatively, a court can calculate prejudgment interest using an interest 
rate for franc-denominated loans and then convert the award to dollars 
using the exchange rate at the end of the prejudgment period ("judgment 
date" rule). (This method is indicated by the arrows labelled b .)300 
a 
J u.s. � �( -. 
11 French Francs I --------�����----�� 
340 million francs b 
January 1, 1980 
0 Time 
July 24, 1990 
I � 
10.6 years 
Figure 1-Relation Between Currency Conversion and Prejudgment Interest 
297 . .Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1330 (7th Cir. 1992). I valued this award at $65 million using 
the exchange rate at the time of appeal, approximately 5.5 to 1 .  See supra note 5. It was on top of 
this amount that prejudgment interest was a88e8sed to arrive at a value for the final award of about $213 
million. 
298. This is the date the prejudgment period began, not when the injury occurred. See supra note 
274 and accompanying text. 
299. This is the end of the prejudgment period . .Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1290. Thereafter, 
postjudgment interest is assessed as provided by statute. See supra subpart VI(E). 
300. These are only the two most obvious of a continuum of possibilities. The award could be 
converted at any moment from the start to the end of the prejudgment period; it could also be converted 
in pieces over the period. 
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Figure 1 ,  thus, makes clear that the selection of a currency conversion 
rule determines the choice of currency for the purpose of calculating 
prejudgment interest and vice versa. This connection between the currency 
conversion rule and the calculation of prejudgment interest has apparently 
not been recognized either by the courts or by previous commentators.301 
Yet a connection exists, and the failure to account for it has led the 
calculation of many awards astray, including the award in Amoco Cadiz. 
Awards that do not properly take into account that connection are 
flawed because interest rates (with the same borrower) are not equal for 
loans in different currencies. They do, however, have a specific rela­
tionship. A large, multinational company such as Amoco can easily bor­
row in dollars or francs. As long as the market anticipates the franc-dollar 
exchange rate in the future to be either above or below the current (spot) 
exchange rate, the interest rate Amoco pays on dollar-denominated loans 
will not equal the interest rate it pays on franc-denominated loans. 302 For 
example, if the franc-dollar spot rate at the start of the prejudgment period 
exceeds the forward rate at that time for the end of the period, then the 
interest rate it pays on dollar-denominated loans will be below that on 
franc-denominated loans. The reason is arbitrage. If interest rates were 
equal, then a profit could be made with no investment by borrowing in 
francs, lending an equivalent amount (at current exchange rates) in dollars, · 
and locking in a profit by entering into a forward contract to convert less 
than all of the dollar proceeds of the loan extended into enough francs to 
pay the entire loan received. 303 Arbitrage will be prevented only if the 
difference in interest rates equals the difference between forward and spot 
rates. This relationship is called interest-rate parity.304 It is, thus, 
because interest rates in dollar-denominated and franc-denominated loans 
are generally not equal (for the same borrower) that the currency 
translation and prejudgment interest issues are related. 
301. When courta diJCusa both issues, they invariably diJCuss them separately and without any 
apparent connection. A good example of this is the Seventh Cin:uit's opinion in Amoco Cadiz. 
Compare Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1327-30 (diJCuaaing currency conversion), with Amoco Cadiz, 954 
F.2d at 1330-37 (diJCussing prejudgment interest). Even the court in the one cue that I am aware of 
that got the relatiolllbip between currency conversion and prejudgment interest right does not seem to 
have been aware of the connection. In lngersoU Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F .2d 680 (7th 
Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit awarded prejudgment interest baaed on a Belgian interest rate and used 
the judgment day rule to convert Belgian francs into U.S. dollars. 
302. The forward rate, or the rate at which parties can lock in an exchange of two currencies at 
a given future date, ia the best .indicator of the market's expectation of the future spot rate. See 
BRBALBY & MYERS, supra note 103, at 834. 
303. The dollars left over are the profit from arbitrage. 
304. See id. at 860-65. Denoting the spot rate by a, the current forward rate by J, and the 
multipliers along paths a and b by m. and m., interest-rate parity implies that 
II X m.-f X 1116• 
I I  j l  
I I  I I 
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A common mistake for a court to make is to calculate prejudgment in­
terest using an interest rate for dollar-denominated loans and to convert the 
award into dollars using the exchange rate at the end of the prejudgment 
period. This is illustrated by the bold arrows in Figure 1 .  As is clear 
from the diagram, this method is flawed because it does not properly 
account for the relationship between the currency conversion rule and the 
choice of currency for the calculation of prejudgment interest. In effect, 
the court is using the interest rate at which the defendant can borrow in 
dollars to calculate the interest it must pay on a debt in foreign 
currency. 305 
The Seventh Circuit made essentially the same mistake in Amoco 
Cadiz, even though it never converted the award to dollars. The Seventh 
Circuit ordered an award in francs, leaving it to the district court to 
convert the award, if needed. 306 The Seventh Circuit's decision to leave 
the award in the currency of the injured parties was an unusual decision for 
a U.S. court, where monetary awards are almost always in dollars.307 
It was also inconsistent with the use of an interest rate for dollar-denomi­
nated loans, the U.S. prime rate, to calculate prejudgment interest.308 In 
effect, the Seventh Circuit stated its intention to move along the horizontal 
portion of path b and to stop there, but what it actually did was to move 
along the horizontal portion of path a. That is to say, the court assessed 
interest using a rate for dollar-denominated loans when the award of pre­
judgment interest should have been based on a rate for franc-denominated 
loans. 
305. For example, in Black Sea cl Baltic Generalln.rurance Co. v. S.S. Hellenic Destiny, 515 F. 
Supp. 685 (S.D.N. Y. 1983), the court calculated prejudgment interest using the interest rate on short­
tenn, risk-free federal paper, bQt it converted the damages from Saudi Arabian riyals to U.S. dollan 
using the judgment date rule. IJ. at 693-95. That is, the court used a dollar-denominated interest rate 
to calculate prejudpent interest, but converted the award from riyals to dollan on the date judgment 
was entered. 
306. Amoco Oldiz, 954 F .2d at 1337. 
307. See id. at 1328 (*Foreign currency awards are rare • . •  in the United States-this may be 
the tint . . . .  "). 
308. There is an additional problem with the Seventh Circuit's decision to keep the award in 
francs. The problem is that the postjudgment interest rate is fixed by statute. This rate is set by a 
political process that has often explicitly, and baa probably always at least implicitly, assumed that the 
rate is for dollar-denominated judgments. Postjudsment interest in thia caae was governed by federal 
law, which provides for interest at the U.S. Treasury bill rate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). Accord­
ingly, if the award is not converted to dollan by the end of the prejudgment period, then the award of 
postjudsment interest, measured in dollara, might be ex ante much higher or lower than the statutory 
rate. (When the award is in the currency of a country experiencing high inflation, so that its currency 
would be expected to depreciate substsntially relative to the dollar, the dollar value of the award is 
likely to fall sharply over the postjudgment period. In the extreme ease, where the foreign currency 
is being hyperintlated, the award could be practically wiped out.) Thus, as long aa postjudgment in­
terest is calculated using an interest rate for dollar-denominated loans, the award should be converted 
to dollan by the end of the prejudgment period. 
I I  
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The Seventh Circuit's failure to account for the connection between 
currency conversion and prejudgment interest had a large impact on the 
final award. I have recalculated the final award in Amoco Cadiz, focusing 
on the connection between the calculation of prejudgment interest and the 
conversion of the award from francs into dollars. The final award is the 
product of the original award in francs (340 million FF), the interest 
multip1ier,309 and the currency conversion rate.310 The awards are cal­
culated using the prime interest rate, 1 1 .85 % ,  for dollar-denominated 
loans. For franc-denominated loans, they assume an interest rate of 
14. 1 1 % .311 The resulting awards are calculated as follows: 
Table: Final Awards with Different Interest and Currency Conversion 
Rules 
path Interest Rate Interest Currency Final Award 
(%) Multiplier Conversion ($ millions) 
Rate 
a 1 1 .85 3.2775 .2491 2n.535 
b 14.1 1  4.0501 .18416 253.599 
bold 1 1 .85 3 .2775 .18416 205.218 
Seventh Circuit 1 1 .85 3.2775 .18988512 211 .592 
As is clear from the above table, there is a substantial difference 
between the awards calculated along paths a and b compared with those 
calculated using either the bold path or the Seventh Circuit's method. The 
309. The interest multipliers in the table are all calculated using equation (3), with a prejudgment 
period of 10.6 years. 
310. The currency conversion rate is the price of the franc in dollars on the date of conversion. 
Exchange rate data come from the Wall Street Joumal. 
311 .  This is not the French prime rate, the Tar.a de base lxmcaire, for which data is published by 
the Banque de France. Using that data, the arithmetic mean of the French prime rate over the 1980s 
was only 1 1 .59%. Prime ratea, however, are often not directly comparable across countriea because 
lending practices differ substantially. Thus, I did not use the French prime rate to calculate pre­
judgment interest. Instead, I used the interest-rate parity formula in footnote 304 to calculate the U.S. 
prime rate in francs over the 1980s, which is the figure in the text. I used the spot and 90-day forward 
ratea (for the dollar price of the French franc) at the beginning of each quarter from 1980 through 1989 
and the yearly U.S. prime rate over the 1980s, as given in the Appendix, irifra. I calculated the pro­
duct of the ratio of the 40-spot and 90-day forward ratea (1 .2358), which is an estimate of the antici­
pated increase in the relative value of the dollar over the 1980s. I then multiplied the interest multiplier 
for a loan at prime (3 2775) by 1 .2358 to calculate the interest multiplier for an equivalent loan in 
franca. The resulting multiplier (4.0501) impliea a constant interest rate of 14. 1 1 % .  (The accuracy 
of the estimate would increase by uaing more observations for the ratio of spot and forward rates.) 
312. The currency conversion rate is for the date of the Seventh Circuit's opinion, 1anuaey 24, 
1992. The final award differs slightly from that used elsewhere in this paper because the dollar value 
of the original award is slightly leas than $65 million. 
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awards calculated using the conceptually correct methods (paths a and b) 
are about 25% larger than those calculated using the two incorrect 
methods. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's failure to properly account for the 
currency conversion issue cost the plaintiff more than $40 million.313 
As can also be seen from the table, the four final awards differ sub­
stantially in amount. No two awards are equal, not even those along paths 
a and b.314 Obviously, the court can grant only one award. Moreover, 
it is important to establish in advance a general rule regarding which one 
of the two conceptually correct paths will be used. If the choice were left 
to one or the other side, it would choose whichever path produced a more 
favorable result. To some extent, this advantage can be reduced by re­
quiring the party with the choice to make an early and binding selection. 
The advantage, however, cannot be eliminated unless a binding decision 
must be made when the injury occurs because currency movements will 
make one or the other choice preferable. 315 In addition, requiring that 
the selection be made early during a lawsuit will interfere with the parties' 
incentives to settle because the value of the option increases with the 
deferral of the decision. For example, if the plaintiff must select a path 
when it files suit, the plaintiff gains and the defendant loses by deferring 
filing. Accordingly, to eliminate the option element, the law should 
provide for a unique path in advance. 
There is an extensive jurisprudence on the conversion of awards in 
foreign currencies into dollars. It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
survey and evaluate that area of law. 316 Its implication for the calculation 
313.  The above calculations assess prejudgment interest at the U.S. prime rate. I have argued 
elsewhere in this Article regarding Amoco Cadiz that the prime rate is too high and that a better tate 
would be either the commercial paper rate or the Treasury bill rate plus 47 basis points. See 11upra Part 
m. Interest-rate parity implies that the ratio between the multiplier in dollars and francs is independent 
of the dollar interest rate index used. Accordingly, if the commercial paper rate is uaed, the multiplier 
for an award in franca is 3 .256, which is the product for the multiplier for an award in dollars (2 .6347) 
and the adjusted ratio of spot and forward rates (1 .2358). The corresponding award is $211 .638 
million. This is very cloae to what the Seventh Circuit awarded the French plaintiffs in Amoco Cadiz. 
In effect, the court's choice of an overly generous interest rate oftiet ita uae of a conceptually incorrect 
and (in this caae) parsimonious currency conversion rule. It was, however, just chance that the two 
mistakes offset one another 10 cloaely. In another caae, the conceptual errors might reinforce each 
other. Of courae, in a purely domestic context, there is no currency conversion, 10 the improper 
calculation of prejudgment interest will produce the wrong final award. 
3 14. The awards along paths a and b are not equal because the conversion of currency with path 
b uses the spot rate on 1uly 24, 1990, not the forward rate for that date on 1anuary 1 ,  1980. The award 
aloJ18 path a exceeds that aloJ18 path b becauae the forward price of the franc in dollars tended to over­
estimate subsequent spot prices over the very volatile 1980s. 
315. Interest-rate parity implies that, lookiJ18 into the future, neither path a nor b will be better 
ex ante. However, with floatiJI8 exchaJ18e rates, realized spot rates rarely equal the rates predicted by 
prior forward rates, so one or the other path would be better ex post. Thus, if the selection of a path 
is made in midstream, a party should choose the one on which they are currently ahead. 
316. The prevailing approach is to look to the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff's cause of action 
arose to determine what rule is applicable. The "judgment date" rule is applied only when the obli-
1996] Primer on Prejudgment Interest 365 
of prejudgment interest is, however, clear. If the currency conversion rule 
takes precedence, then the currency used to calculate prejudgment interest 
must follow. 
G. Statutory Reforms 
Although this Article is primarily concerned with how courts should 
go about calculating prejudgment interest, it also has implications for both 
the drafting of statutes that award prejudgment interest and their inter­
pretation. Throughout this Article, I have argued that prejudgment interest 
should be awarded from the time the claim arose, at a rate that reflects the 
defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing, and that such interest should be 
compounded. Because such an award is necessary both to compensate the 
plaintiff and to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment, statutes should 
be written to require that courts award successful plaintiffs prejudgment 
interest on these terms. Unless prejudgment interest is awarded on this 
basis, the fairness and efficiency goals of the legal system will not be met. 
As currently drafted, not all statutes permit courts to award interest as 
recommended. For example, several state statutes preclude the court from 
awarding prejudgment interest at the market rate either by setting a statu­
torily fixed interest ratel17 or by requiring the court use an index that is not 
related to the risk of the defendant. 318 Another problem with various state 
statutes is that they require simple interest. 319 Although both types of 
gation arises entirely under foreign law. If, however, at the time of breach the plaintiff has a cause 
of action arising under U.S. law, the "breach date" rule is applied. See Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 
274 U.S. 253, 256 (1927); In re Good Hope Chem. Corp.,  747 F.2d 806, 81 1-12 (1st Cir. 1984); 
Jamaica Nutrition Holdingav. United States Shipping Co., 643 F.2d 376, 380-81 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 
1981); Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1960); Gathercrest Ltd. 
v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 649 F. Supp. 106, 120-21 (M.D. Fla. 1985), qff'd, 805 F.2d 995 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (all applying the "breach date" rule which employs tho rate of exchange in effect on tho date 
of the breach). Some courta, however, view conversion of damages as a substantive rather than a 
procedural issue and have applied state law in diversity cases. See, e.g. , Compotex, S.A. v. LaBow, 
783 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cir. 1986); Nikimiha Sec. Ltd. v. Trend Group Ltd., 646 F. Supp. 1211 ,  1228 
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (both applying state law after finding tho conversion of damages to be a substantive 
iasuo). The Seventh Circuit in Amoco Cadiz endorsed a third approach-to award the final judgment 
in the currency the parties chose for the tranaaction that gave rise to the dispute. Amoco Cadiz, 954 
F.2d 1279, 1327-28 (7th Cir. 1992) . 
317. See, e.g., IOWA CODB I 535.3 (1994) (10%); MAss. GBN. LAWS ch. 231, I 6 (West 1995) 
(12%); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 1 600.6013 (West 1994) (12%); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004 (McKinney 
1992) (9%); 42 PA. CONSI'. STAT. ANN. I 8101 (1994) (6%). 
3 18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 549.09(l)(c) (1996) (assessing prejudgment interest at "the 
secondary market yield of one year United States treasury bills, calculated on a bank diicount basis"); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, 1 6  (West 1994) (assessing prejudgment interest at the Treasury bill rate plua 4% 
but not more than 10%); TBx. RBv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1 .05 I§ 2, 6(g) (Vernon Supp. 1997) 
(assessing prejudgment interest at the 52-week Treasury bill rate but not less than 10% nor more than 
20%). 
319. See, e.g. , MINN. STAT. I 549.09(l)(c) (1996); TBx. RBV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1 .05, 
1 6(g) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (both providing for a simple interest calculation). 
366 Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:293 
of statutes simplify the calculation of interest, they do so by sacrificing 
fairness and efficiency. Because improved calculations can be made with­
out great difficulty, the law should require courts to award prejudgment 
interest at the risk-adjusted market rate and to compound interest. 
There is another group of statutes that warrant comment. These 
statutes seek to encourage settlements by linking the award of prejudgment 
interest to the defendant's settlement offer. These statutes relieve 
defendants of an increasing portion of their interest obligations as their 
offers more closely approximate the final award. 320 There is a large 
literature on how various legal rules encourage parties to settle legal 
disputes, with many active disagreements. 321 Although it is not settled, 
it might be desirable to reward parties for making reasonable settlement 
offers through additional awards or reductions ancillary to the judgment. 
However, even if such adjustments are desirable, they should not be made 
by increasing or decreasing the interest multiplier. The reason why is that 
the magnitude of the effect would depend on factors that are unrelated to 
the activity being encouraged such as capital structures, which vary across 
firms, and market interest rates, which vary over time.322 Interest, which 
is compensation for the use of money, is always appropriate. Perhaps the 
judgment, or fees and costs, should be adjusted in light of the parties' 
behavior, but once the award is set, interest upon it should be calculated 
in the manner described in this Article. 
Finally, the law should permit a defendant to satisfy a judgment by 
placing money in an irrevocable trust. 323 On this money, only the return 
320. For example, Texas forgives interest to the extent of the defendant's settlement offer. TBx. 
RBV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1 .05, § 6(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997). Pennsylvania has a similar stat­
ute that tolls interest if the defendant makes a written settlement offer and the plaintiff does not recover 
more than 125" of that offer. See 1 DoBBS, supra note 4, § 3 .6(2), at 347 n.36. Minnesota provides 
that if the losing defendant's settlement offer was closer to the judgment than the prevailing plaintiff's, 
then the plaintiff shall receive prejudgment interest on the leaser of the judgment or the defendant's 
offer, but only from the time the action was commenced until the offer was made. See MINN. STAT. 
I 549 .09(l)(b) (1996). Interestingly, these statutes are all asymmetric. They do not increase the plain­
tiff's interest recovery if the plaintiff has made a reasonable settlement offer, but the defendant has not. 
They only reduce the plaintiff's recovery if the defendant has been reasonable. Why such an asymmet­
ric incentive system is appropriate is not clear. 
321. For a brief survey, - ROBBR.T COOTBR. & THOMAS Ul.BN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 484-504 
(1988) (analyzing the economics of legal procedure using the economic theory of decisionmakingunder 
uncertainty); David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 1. LBGAL 
STUD. 225 (1994) (suggesting shortcomings of legislative attempts to encourage settlement); Steven 
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and ni41: A Theoretical Analysis Under Altemative Methods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs, 1 1 1. LBGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (considering the impact of different methods 
for distributing legal costs upon settlement). 
322. See supra subpart VI(C) (discussing reasons not to deny interest on equitable grounds). 
323. Unleu the trust is irrevocable, the plaintiff is still in the position of an unsecured creditor. 
Only if the trust is irrevocable will the plaintiff be ensured that the funds will be available to pay a 
judgment in its favor. 
! I ,  
i i 
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earned by investing it would be allowed as prejudgment interest. 374 This 
would fully compensate the plaintiff and fully charge the defendant for 
delay. It would, in effect, place the parties in the position they would have 
occupied had compensation been paid immediately.325 Moreover, as long 
as the trustee is required to maintain a diversified portfolio, thereby 
eliminating the unsystematic component of risk, the trust will compensate 
the plaintiff for the risk it endures even when the plaintiff is an 
individual. 326 
H. Summary 
The topics covered in this Part are more diverse than those covered 
in previous Parts. Even so, the principal results can be summarized in a 
few brief paragraphs. 
First, prejudgment interest should be the rule. Courts should award 
prejudgment interest on liquidated and unliquidated damages and on pecu­
niary and nonpecuniary losses. It is also better to make the award of 
prejudgment interest explicit, so that it can be reviewed, rather than to 
compensate successful plaintiffs for delay by increasing the judgment by an 
unspecified amount. 
Second, prejudgment interest should be awarded from the time of the 
injury until the date of judgment. Courts should also be reluctant to deny 
or reduce interest on equitable grounds. 
Third, there are two situations that require special attention: multiple 
defendants and losses incurred in a foreign currency. When there are 
multiple defendants, the successful plaintiff should receive interest at a rate 
that refiects its probability of recovering from any defendant. Such a rate 
cannot exceed, but might well be much lower than, the rate that would re­
fiect the probability of recovering from a particular defendant. When the 
loss occurs in a foreign currency, the currency conversion rule should be 
consistent with the currency on which the calculation of prejudgment in­
terest is based. 
Fourth, the fairness and efficiency of damage awards would be im­
proved if statutes awarding postjudgment interest did not set a fixed interest 
324. The court should use a first-in, first-out method of accounting, and it should award interest 
at a rate equal to the retum earned by the trust while the money is in trust. Before the money was in 
trust, prejudgment interest should be assessed in the usual way. 
325. See Amoco Cadiz, 9S4 F.2d 1279, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (consideringa hypothetical trust fund 
established by the defendants in order to justify an award of prejudgment interest). 
326. When the plaintiff is a public corporation, the compensation would be complete. When the 
plaintiff is an individual, the trust would eliminate any difference in interest rates which arises because 
the plaintiff cannot diversify away the defendant's unique risk, but not the problem of the plaintiff's 
deferred consumption. See supra subpart V( B). The elimination of the interest-rate discrepancy would 
encourage tortfessors facing suits from individuals to establish such trusts. To encourage this activity 
plaintiffs should be prohibited from introducing evidence on the size of these trusta during the liability 
phase of trial and during the damages phase until the issue of prejudgment interest is addressed. 
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rate but required that postjudgment interest be calculated in the same 
manner as that proposed for prejudgment interest. Moreover, to the extent 
that existing law prevents the proper calculation of prejudgment interest, 
it should be revised to permit such calculations. 
VII. Conclusion 
This Article has filled a gap in the literature by providing guidance for 
courts to use in calculating prejudgment interest. The most basic principles 
are that prejudgment interest should be compounded and calculated at a 
floating rate that reflects the defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing. 
Because a court will rarely observe a market transaction that is an exact 
equivalent of the coerced loan to the plaintiff, the court is going to have to 
use proxies and possibly make some adjustments to set the prejudgment 
interest rate.327 Moreover, because in many cases the additional interest 
paid or received would not justify the effort and expense of such an 
exercise, a good rule would be the one adopted by the Seventh Circuit-to 
use the prime rate of interest as a default. Either party could move the 
court beyond this rate by introducing evidence of the defendant's cost of 
unsecured borrowing or by estimating the cost of such borrowing as the 
spread over an index, as described in Part ill. 
The proper calculation of prejudgment interest entails additional steps. 
The most significant of these include the following: prejudgment interest 
should be calculated with explicit reference to the compounding period and 
the multiplier should be adjusted for taxes, which are deferred. 328 If the 
injury is in a foreign currency, the currency conversion rule should be 
consistent with the currency in which prejudgment interest is calcu­
lated. 329 Finally, prejudgment interest should be awarded from when the 
injury occurs until the date of judgment. 330 
By following the guidance described in this Article and by forcing 
parties seeking variances from that guidance to follow the lines of argument 
outlined, prejudgment interest can be calculated more consistently and 
accurately than is now being done. Such a result would significantly 
improve the fairness and efficiency of dispute resolution by compensating 
for the inevitable delay while the judicial machinery moves to a conclusion. 
I I  
327 o It is also unlikely that the precise, theoretically correct measure can be calculated o 
328. See supra subparts IV(A), VJ(E)o 
329. See supra subpart VI(F)o 
3300 See supra subpart VI(A)o 
i : 
1996] Primer on Prejudgment Interest 369 
VII . Appendix: Alternative Calculations of the Final Award 
This Appendix describes alternative ways of calculating the final 
judgment in Amoco Cadiz. The calculations all assume an original award 
of $65 million and a prejudgment period of 10.6 years. The calculations 
are made for the prime rate, the commercial paper rate, and the Treasury 
bill rate using various computational methods. The award is calculated 
using both geometric and arithmetic mean interest rates over the 1980s. 
The calculations are first done assuming yearly compounding and then 
using the compounding period that each interest rate assumes. Finally, the 
award is calculated assuming a spread of 47 basis points over the Treasury 
bill rate. 
The prime rate, the commercial paper rate, and the Treasury bill rate 
either were or could have been proposed to calculate the final award in 
Amoco Cadiz. The prime rate was proposed by the plaintiffs and accepted 
by the court;331 the Treasury bill rate was proposed by the defendant;332 
the commercial paper rate would have had a good chance of being accepted 
had it been proposed by the defendant. 333 The reason for providing such 
a variety of calculations is to illustrate the effect of different assumptions 
on the final award. 334 
Table 1 sets out the different interest rates that prevailed each year 
from 1978, when the Amoco Cadiz ran aground, through 1992, when the 
Seventh C�rcuit issued its opinion. 
Table 1 ·  Average Annual Interest Rates 
Prime Rate 6-month 3-month Treasury 
CoiiUlleteial Paper Bill Rate 
Rate 
Year Percent per annum 
1978 9.06 7.99 7.22 
1979 12.67 10.91 10.04 
1980 15.27 12.29 11 .51 
1981 18.87 14.76 14.03 
331. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1335 (7th Cir. 1992). 
332. Id. at 1333. 
333. See aupra notea 167-71 and accompanying text. 
334. The calculations are for the final award required to compensate the plaintiffs for delay; they 
are not for the final award that would prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment by delaying payment. 
The latter award would be calculated using equation (6) aa the multiplier, and would be much smaller 
than thoae here. See 1upra subpart IV(D). 
I I  
' ' I ·� 
370 Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:293 
Prime Rate 6-month 3-month Treasury 
Commercial Paper Bill Rate 
Rate 
Year Percent per annum 
1982 14.86 1 1 .89 10.69 
1983 10.79 8.89 8.63 
1984 12.04 10.16 9.58 
1985 9.93 8.01 7.48 
1986 8.33 6.39 5.98 
1987 8.21 6.85 5.82 
1988 9.32 7.68 6.69 
1989 10.87 8.80 8.12 
1990 10.01 1.95 7.51 
1991 8.46 5.85 5.42 
1992 6.25 3 .80 3.45 
)OUrce: ECONOMIC REPORT OF THB PRESIDENT 358 tbl .B-72 (1995). 
As the above table illustrates, interest rates varied markedly between 1978 
and 1992. 
Using the data in Table 1 ,  Table 2 calculates mean interest rates. 
Both arithmetic and geometric mean interest rates are calculated for the 
1980s, the period the Amoco Cadiz court used to calculate a mean interest 
rate. This roughly corresponds with the period for which the court 
awarded prejudgment interest, which ran from January 1 ,  198()335 
through July 24, 1990, when the district court issued its final judg­
ment.336 The geometric mean is calculated using equation (4); the arith­
metic mean is calculated using the formula in note 189.337 
335. Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1337. 
336. Id. at 1290. 
337. In both calculations, n is set equal to 1 and T is set equal to 10. 
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Table 2: Average Interest Rates, 1980-89 
Prime Rate C/P Rate TIB Rate 
Method of Calculating Percent per annum 
Mean 
Arithmetic 11 .85 9.51 8.85 
Geometric 1 1 .80 9.54 8.82 
The above table shows that over the 1980s the prime rate was the 
highest of the three mean rates. On average, the prime rate was 3 %  higher 
than the Treasury bill rate. The commercial paper rate was in the middle, 
with a mean 72 basis points above the Treasury bill rate. 
The various multipliers are calculated using the mean interest rates in 
Table 3 .  338 The multipliers are first calculated assuming yearly interest 
compounding (n= 1), as the court did in Amoco Cadiz. The entries in the 
following table are calculated using equation (3), with T= 10.6. 
Table 3:  Multipliers, Annual Compounding 
Method of Calculating Prime Rate CIP Rate T/B Rate 
Mean 
Arithmetic 3.2775 2.6347 2.4569 
Geometric 3.2620 2.6271 2.4497 
The corresponding final awards are given in Table 4. The final 
awards, which are calculated using equation (2), are the product of the 
original judgment, $65 million, and the multipliers, as calculated in Table 
3 .  
Table 4 :  Final Awards, Annual Compounding 
Prime Rate C/P Rate T/B Rate 
Method of Calculating 
Mean Millio111 of Dollars 
Arithmetic 213.037 171.256 159.696 
Geometric 212.030 170.759 159.230 
338. The multipliers are all calculated after rounding the relevant interest rate to four decimal 
places (e.g. , 11 .85")· 
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The above table presents various calculations for the final judgment in 
Amoco Cadiz, assuming annual interest compounding. The method used 
by the court produces an award of $213 .037 million.339 Had the court 
accepted the defendant's suggestion and used the Treasury bill rate, but 
otherwise used the same computational method, the award would have been 
$50 million less-$159.696 million.340 Alternatively, had the court used 
the commercial paper rate, the best of the three estimates,341 the final 
award would have been $171 .256 million, or $42 million less than the final 
award using the prime rate. 342 
The final award can also be calculated taking into account the com­
pounding period implicit in the various interest rates. 343 Interest is 
compounded semiannually with the six-month commercial paper rate and · 
quarterly with the other two rates. Thus, the multiplier for the commercial 
paper rate is calculated using equation (3) with n=2 and the other two 
multipliers are calculated using the same formula with n =4. As can be 
seen in Table 5, the resulting multipliers are larger than those in Table 3 
because more frequent compounding increases the interest component of 
the award. 
Table 5: Multipliers, Implicit Compounding 
Method of Calculating Prime Rate C/P Rate T/B Rate 
Mean 
Arithmetic 3.4482 2.6937 2.5291 
Geometric 3 .4305 2.6855 2.5213 
The corresponding awards, assuming that interest is compounded as 
implicit in the reference rate, are calculated using equation (2) and are 
shown in Table 6. 
339. That value was calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of the prime interest rate over the 
1980s, which was 1 1 .85% .  The French plaintiffs claimed (and the Seventh Circuit accepted) that the 
averege prime rate was 1 1.9%, AmOco Cadiz, 954 F .2d at 1335, the above value rounded to the nearest 
tenth of a percent. Rounding to the neareat tenth of a percent, instead of the nearest hundredth, in­
creaaea the award to $214.049 million, which is an increase of slightly more than $1 million, or about 
seven-tenths of one percent of the interest component. 
340. This represents a 36% decrease in the intereat component of the award. 
341 . See supra Part m. 
342. Using the commercial paper rate reduces the interest component of the award by 28% .  This 
is much closer to the award using the Treasury bill rate than to the award with the prime rate. The 
award of prejudgment intereat using the commercial paper rate is 3 .6 timea closer to the award with 
the Treasury bill rate than with the prime rate. 
343. This was recommended supra subpart IV(A). 
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Table 6: Final Awards, Implicit Compounding 
Prime Rate C/P Rate TIB Rate 
Method of Calculating Millions of Dollars 
Mean 
Arithmetic 224.133 175.087 164.393 
Geometric 222.982 174.557 163.882 
In Part III, I calculated the final award assuming that Amoco's cost of 
unsecured borrowing was 47 basis points over the Treasury bill rate. The 
corresponding arithmetic and geometric mean prejudgment interest rates are 
12.32% and 12.29 % .344 Using these interest rates, the multipliers and 
final awards are given in Table 7. 
Table 7: Multipliers and Final Awards, Spread over Treasury bills 
Compounding Period 
Yearly Quarterly 
Multiplier Award Multiplier Award 
Method of Millions of Millions of 
Calculating Dollars Dollars 
Mean 
Arithmetic 2.5717 167.159 2.6554 172.559 
Geometric 2.5794 166.673 2.6471 172.064 
Among the final awards calculated using the prime, commercial paper, 
and Treasury bill interest rates, the awards in Table 7 are closest to those 
calculated using the commercial paper rate. Using a spread of 47 basis 
points over the Treasury bill rate produces final awards slightly lower than 
those using the commercial paper rate. 
As described· above, the conceptually correct way to calculate pre­
judgment interest is to use the geometric mean, and to compound interest 
using the implicit compounding period. 345 Therefore, the best estimate 
of the final award is probably from the last table, 346 using the geometric 
mean and adjusting for quarterly compounding-$172.064 million.347 
344. These mean interest rates were calculated by adding 47 basis pointll to the arithmetic and 
geometric mean Treasury bill rates in Table 2. 
345. See supra aubpartll IV(A-B). 
346. This is probably the beat eatimate of those given here because it uaea the most specific 
information-Amoco's triple-A bond rating. 
347. As described in note 196, the theoretically correct way to calculate the geometric mean with 
an adjustment is not to make the adjustment after calculating the mean, but to adjust each observation 
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The next best estimate is probably the one using the six-month commercial 
paper rate, calculated in the same way except for semiannual compounding 
instead of quarterly compounding-$174.557 million.348 
before calculating the mean. The impact, however, of such a theoretically correct adjustment is very 
small. The interest component of the award is about $2000 larger, or two-hundredths of one percent 
of the interest awarded, when the adjustment is made before calculating the mean. (This assumes that 
the interest rate is not rounded before calculating the multiplier. If the interest rate is first rounded, 
even this small difference disappears.) 
348. The calculations assume an original award of $65 million, which is based on converting the 
award to dollars using an exchange rate at the end of the prejudgment period. Converting the award. 
at the beginning of the prejudgment period or using an interest rate for a franc-denominated loan (either 
would have been appropriate) increases the final award by about 20 'Jii . See supra subpart VI( F). 
Calculating prejudgment interest from the date of injury, as proposed supra subpart VI(A), 
implies a prejudgment period of 12.4 years. Accordingly, the award calculated using the commercial 
paper rate or a spread of 47 basis points over the Treasury bill rate will be about 15% larger. 
Together these two modifications increase the final award between 35 and 40%.  Thus, the final 
award should have been around $230 to $240 million. Such an award, about 10 to 15% larger than 
the actual award in Amoco Cadiz, would have fully compensated the French plaintiffs over the pre­
judgment period. 
i l  
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